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Uncertainty is an all-embracing challenge for individuals and society as a whole.
Many decisions - especially those regarding the future - are made under uncer-
tainty: decisions on production, health care, pension plans and even ﬁnding
your spouse. Since human beings are heterogeneous, they react diﬀerently in
uncertain situations. That is why, since early on, economists have been inves-
tigating decision making under uncertainty. In 1738 the Swiss mathematician
Bernoulli disentangled the concepts of utility and expected value.1 He states
that two subjects facing the same lottery may evaluate the same uncertain situ-
ation diﬀerently. To illustrate his point Bernoulli uses an example with lotteries
containing fair coin tosses. Bernoulli argues that the value an individual assigns
to such a lottery depends on the individual traits towards uncertainty. Given
Bernoulli's concept von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) develop four axioms
for preferences under which a subject evaluates a lottery by the expected value
over all outcomes. We refer to this concept as the expected utility theory.
A major restriction of von Neumann and Morgenstern's theory is the fact that
in order to compute the expected value, the probability distribution over the
1For an English translation see Bernoulli (1954).
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set of outcomes must exist and be known to the decision maker. Savage (1954)
argues that this is not a problem per se as long as the decision maker has a
subjective probability distribution in mind that satisﬁes the assumptions of the
expected utility theory.
Knight (1921) changes the understanding of uncertainty, as in his view the mea-
surability of the probability plays an important role. He introduces the concept
of ambiguity (or Knightian uncertainty). While under the expected utility the-
ory the probability distribution is known and unique, under ambiguity a decision
maker might not be able to assign a unique (subjective) probability distribu-
tion over the potential outcomes. Ellsberg (1961) presents thought experiments
which illustrate that in an ambiguous situation behavior may occur for which
no such subjective beliefs exist. This is not only a theoretical exercise as many
experimental validations of the Ellsberg experiments show that a large share
of subjects exhibits behavior which is inconsistent with expected utility theory
(see Camerer and Weber 1992 or Oechssler and Roomets 2013).
When we think of real decision making situations the probabilities are only
rarely known. Individuals face decisions in an uncertain environment in various
real life situations. Prominent examples are decisions in which the payoﬀs real-
ize in the future. Consider a situation in which an individual has to decide over
a pension plan when entering the job market in a young age. Hence, for the
decision maker it is essential that the decision made today ﬁts her preferences
when the payoﬀ materializes in the future. Therefore, either the preferences
need to be stable between the time of the decision and the payoﬀ or the deci-
sion maker has to anticipate correctly a change in preferences over time when
making the decision. While the literature provides some insights into the sta-
bility of risk preferences (Zeisberger et al. 2012), it is mainly quiet with respect
to ambiguity attitudes. We tackle these research questions in chapter 3.
2
We analyze the stability of ambiguity preferences experimentally. To elicit am-
biguity aversion, we use a standard tool of the ambiguity literature, the 3-color
urn from Ellsberg's thought experiment. For the intertemporal stability, we
repeatedly elicit ambiguity attitudes towards multiple 3-color urns over a pe-
riod of two months. In our data, 57% of the choices are consistent with stable
preferences over the time of two months. This share is signiﬁcantly higher than
random choices would suggest, but also far away from a full consistency. In
order to isolate the pure time eﬀect on the consistency level we use a control
treatment whose structure is identical to the main treatment but omits the time
delay of two months. With this treatment, we estimate a statistically signiﬁ-
cant drop of the consistency level by 14% over two months. In order to measure
if subjects are able to anticipate a change in preference correctly we separate
payoﬀs and decisions and move the payoﬀs into the future. We do not ﬁnd any
eﬀects on consistency. Of course, the time frame in our experiment is relatively
short compared to a pension plan, but the results show a signiﬁcant eﬀect on
consistency even after such a short period. In a further task, we elicit the sub-
jects' capacity to recall their choices made two months before. Surprisingly, for
subjects who are able to recall their decision correctly, the share of consistent
choices does not drop signiﬁcantly over time.
In contrast to chapter 3, which deals with attitudes towards ambiguity, chapters
4, 5 and 6 investigate behavior towards risk. Chapter 4 and 5 are based on a
common artefactual ﬁeld experiment. Similar to the case of ambiguity, individ-
uals permanently have to make decisions under risk. Many of these decisions
are complex and made under the assistance of professional advisors. This is also
because individuals prefer having assistance of an advisor when making a deci-
sion (see Schotter 2003). Prominent examples are the choice of pension plans or
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medical treatments.2 In an experiment Powdthavee and Riyanto (2012) show
that even in a game with purely random payoﬀs subjects are willing to pay for
advice. As subjects give advice such a high priority, it is important for the
advisor's advice to match the preferences of the advisee. In chapters 4 to 6 we
investigate subjects' ability to "read out" others' risk preferences. This is the
link that spans over these three chapters. In all chapters, we test the ability to
predict the risk preferences of others under various conditions. Subjects have
to make the predictions while we manipulate the available information.
There is a large body of literature that studies the correlation between risk
preferences and demographics (see Harrison and Rutström 2008, Croson and
Gneezy 2009 or von Gaudecker et al. 2011). Furthermore, behavior under risk
such as ﬁnancial decisions, smoking and occupational choices can be predicted
by risk preferences (Dohmen et al. 2011). In chapter 4 and 5 we study whether
professional advisors know these correlations between demographics and risk at-
titudes and use this knowledge when giving their advice. As the following papers
focus on a setting of ﬁnancial advisory we apply an artefactual ﬁeld experiment.
Our subject pool contains ﬁnancial professionals as well as non-professionals.
We choose this design as there is evidence that occupational potential sorting
may induce a selection bias on ﬁnancial professionals (see Dohmen and Falk
2011).
In chapter 4 we explore diﬀerences between ﬁnancial professionals and non-
professionals. Although we do not ﬁnd any statistical diﬀerences in the risk
attitudes between ﬁnancial professionals and non-professionals, we do detect
diﬀerences in their knowledge regarding the correlations of demographics and
risk preferences. Therefore, we compare the subjects' perceived correlation of
2More and more assets are managed by institutions instead of private individuals. For ex-
ample, according to TheCityUK, a British lobby group, the assets under management doubled
from 2002 to 2011 (see www.thecityuk.com/assets/Uploads/Fund-Management-2012.pdf, ac-
cessed on May 3rd 2013).
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a certain demographic characteristic (or stereotype) with the true correlation.
We ﬁnd that experienced professionals are less aware of these correlations than
non-professionals. Young professionals show a better knowledge of these corre-
lations relative to non-professionals.
In contrast to chapter 4, where we investigate the relationship between diﬀerent
demographic characteristics and risk attitudes separately, in chapter 5 we look
at demographic proﬁles as a whole. We inspect whether the advisors are capable
to "read out" a real person's risk preferences given their demographic proﬁle.
By using multiple demographic proﬁles we account for correlations within the
demographic categories (e.g., older people are more likely to be parents). A
main feature of this experiment is that we use "real" proﬁles which we collect
from a survey. By design we are able to compare these proﬁles to a large-scale
dataset. This oﬀers the opportunity to construct representative demographic
proﬁles. As a result, the ﬁnancial professionals show a higher precision when
predicting the risk attitudes of these proﬁles. When analyzing the beliefs regard-
ing the risk attitudes of these proﬁles we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant false consensus eﬀect.
In fact, the advisors' own risk preferences correlate signiﬁcantly with their be-
liefs. This eﬀect is the strongest for experienced professionals and might reﬂect
a paternalistic trait of experienced advisors.
While in chapter 6 we focus on diﬀerences between ﬁnancial professionals and
non-professionals when predicting others' risk attitudes, in chapter 4 and 5 we
inspect whether this prediction improves when having a personal conversation
between advisor and advisee at hand. In this experiment we have three treat-
ments. In all treatments the subjects' task is to predict the risk preferences of
another person. First, similar to chapter 5, the prediction is made given demo-
graphic information only. Second, two subjects meet and have a personal chat.
Subsequently, the prediction is made. Third, the subjects have to make the
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prediction given a transcribed conversation between two subjects only. As we
want to isolate the eﬀect of a conversation, the comparison between the ﬁrst and
the second treatment may be misleading because in a personal chat the advisor
possibly receives additional information and is in a "hot state" (see Loewenstein
2005 or Bohnet and Frey 1999). In the second and the third treatment the in-
formation is similar but the third treatment lacks the emotional involvement of
the personal contact. When we compare the predictions of the ﬁrst with those
of the third treatment we measure the eﬀect of additional information trans-
mitted in a conversation. Our results conﬁrm that the additional information
provided in a chat decreases the prediction errors. Comparing the second to
the third treatment it is the emotional involvement we measure. Surprisingly,
when comparing the second to the third treatment we ﬁnd that the prediction
errors increase. This is interesting for online banking applications where com-
munication is less vivid and the costumer is not as identiﬁable as in a personal
conversation, for example.
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: In chapter 2 we in-
troduce the preference measures which are applied in the experiments of the
following chapters. Each of the following chapters is independent and can be
read on its own.
All chapters are based on work with co-authors. Chapter 3 is a joint project
with Peter Dürsch and Daniel Römer (see Duersch et al. 2013). All authors
contributed to this paper in equal shares and in all parts of research. My main
contributions are in the ﬁelds of the experimental design, the execution of the
experiment and the empirical analysis. Chapters 43, 54 and 65 are based on three
papers which are co-authored by Andrea Voskort. Both authors contributed to
3Roth and Voskort (2012b)
4Roth and Voskort (2012a)
5Roth and Voskort (2013)
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these papers in equal shares to the design, execution, data analysis and writing.
In these papers I have an over average stake in the programming work.
Although the chapters are independent they share a common appendix and the
bibliography. The appendix contains the experimental instructions and supple-





For all experiments in this dissertation we use experimental preference measures.
In this chapter we introduce and brieﬂy discuss the methods we apply. Section
1 explains our experimental measure for ambiguity preferences, while section 2
discusses the diﬀerent elicitation methods for risk preferences.
1 Ambiguity preferences
Chapter 3 investigates the stability of ambiguity preferences. We elicit am-
biguity preferences by using a 3-color urn. This method is an experimental
implementation of a thought experiment proposed by Ellsberg (1961). The ex-
periment has the following structure: Consider an urn containing thirty balls.
Ten balls are yellow (Y ). The remaining twenty balls are either green (G) or
blue (B) balls in an unknown distribution. In order to elicit the preferences,
the subject faces two bets. For each bet the experimenters randomly draw a
ball from the urn.1 If the subject's bet coincides with the draw we pay e4 and
1After each draw the ball is returned to the urn.
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otherwise e0. In the ﬁrst bet the subject faces two possible choices: either to
bet on Y or to bet on B. In the second bet the subject bets either on Y or G
or on B or G. The above choices translate into ambiguity preferences according
to table 2.1.
Ambiguity preference Averse Neutral Neutral Loving
Bet 1 Y Y B B
Bet 2 B or G Y or G B or G Y or G
Table 2.1: Classiﬁcation of choices
Note that there are no beliefs that justify strictly preferring Y in bet 1 and B
or G in bet 2 under the assumption of expected utility maximizing behavior.
Rather, by preferring Y over B and B or G over Y or G a subject opts for
choices with a known number of balls over choices where the number of winning
balls is ambiguous. Such a subject is called ambiguity averse. Analogously,
a subject preferring B over Y in bet 1 and Y or G over B or G in bet 2 is
called ambiguity loving. Finally, Y and Y or G as well as B and B or G are
the only choice combinations for which probability distributions of beliefs exist
that satisfy subjective expected utility theory. Subjects showing this behavior
are hence classiﬁed as ambiguity neutral.
Indiﬀerence The 3-color urn is not able to identify subjects who are indif-
ferent in any bet. To tackle this issue, we add two non-incentivized questions
to each bet. The questions are non-incentivized in order to exclude any pos-
sibility of hedging and to maintain the incentive-compatibility of the 3-color
urn. In a ﬁrst step, we follow Dominiak et al. (2012) and ask subjects about
their conﬁdence when making the bet.2 This conﬁdence measure ranges from
2The exact wording is "How conﬁdent (from "not conﬁdent at all" to "very conﬁdent")
are you with this decision?".
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"not conﬁdent at all" to "very conﬁdent" on a ﬁve point Likert-scale (denomi-
nated as conﬁdence henceforth). Furthermore, we elicit a subject's hypothetical
willingness to change the bet to the other choice (we will refer to this task as
WTA).3
2 Risk preferences
In all chapters we elicit an individual's risk preference. There are various meth-
ods to measure risk preferences (Harrison and Rutström 2008 provide an ex-
cellent overview). In our experiments we use the measure of Holt and Laury
(2002) and Dohmen et al. (2011), which we discuss in the following.
2.1 Multiple price lists
In all experiments subjects complete a risk preference measure in a multiple
price list design (abbreviated MPL, see Holt and Laury 2002). Consider ﬁgure
2.1 for a graphical illustration for this mechanism. In the following we refer to
this task as HL-task or MPL task. In this mechanism a subject faces choices
between two lotteries (option A or option B). Option A pays e2 in the ﬁrst state
and e1.60 in the second state. Option B pays e3.85 in the ﬁrst and e0.10 in the
second state. The payoﬀ of option A exhibits a lower variance than the payoﬀ
of option B. In the tenth row the expected payoﬀ of option B strictly dominates
the expected payoﬀ of option A as the amount of e3.85 is paid for sure. Hence,
every rational individual prefers B over A at least in row ten. An increasing
row number indicates a higher probability that the ﬁrst state is paid out. The
more rows a subject opts for option B, i.e., the earlier a subject switches from
3The exact wording in the instructions is: "You will be paid-oﬀ according to your decision
above. But, hypothetically asked, how much should we pay you such that you change your
decision above?" The answers are scaled from e0 to e4.
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Figure 2.1: HL-task
option A to option B, the higher the subject's risk tolerance. For the subject's
payoﬀ experiment, one row is randomly chosen and a lottery according to the
probability distribution of this row is played.
In chapter 3 and in the surveys of chapter 4 and 5 we use the HL-task as de-
scribed above. For each subject we elicit ten separate decisions. However in
chapter 4, 5 and 6, our experimental design requires the switching point to be
singleton. In order to enforce monotonicity of the risk preferences we use a
switching MPL or sMPL instead of the classic design (Andersen et al. 2006).
Whereas in the MPL design a subject makes a separate decision for each of the
ten rows, in the sMPL the subject is only asked for the marginal row switching
from A to B.4 We apply the sMPL as we want to compute the average decision
later on.5 This mechanism has been tested to measure risk attitudes outside
the lab consistently (Harrison and List 2004, Harrison et al. 2007). The payoﬀ
procedure is the same as in the classical HL-task. An illustration of how this
mechanism is presented to the subjects can be found in ﬁgure 2.1 in the ap-
4Holt and Laury (2002) do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant eﬀects for subjects with non-monotonic
answers.
5See section 2.4 in appendix 2 for a graphical illustration of the sMPL mechanism.
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pendix.
Although there are some concerns that this elicitation mechanism is prone to
framing eﬀects (see Harrison and Rutström 2008, Lévy-Garboua et al. 2011)
a major advantage of the MPL measure is its symmetry. A subject always
compares two lotteries having equal probability distributions but diﬀerent pay-
oﬀs. In other tasks subjects face a trade-oﬀ between a lottery and a certainty
equivalent (e.g., Gneezy and Potters 1997 or Dohmen et al. 2011). This could
potentially bias (e.g., less sophisticated) subjects towards the certainty equiva-
lent as the single value is easier to evaluate than the more complex structure of
the lottery.
2.2 e100,000 question
The second mechanism (hereafter: "e100,000 question") we apply is taken from
the German socioeconomic panel (SOEP). We use this measure as it provides
the opportunity to relate our experimental data to the large-scale data base of
the SOEP survey. The exact wording of this risk task is as follows:
e100,000 question Please consider what you would do in the following situation: Imag-
ine that you had won e100,000 in the lottery. Almost immediately after you collect the win-
nings, you receive the following ﬁnancial oﬀer, the conditions of which are as follows: There
is the chance to double the money. It is equally possible that you could lose half of the amount
invested. You have the opportunity to invest the full amount, part of the amount or reject the
oﬀer. What share of your lottery winnings would you be prepared to invest in this ﬁnancially
risky, yet lucrative investment?
Your Decision e100,000 - e80,000 - e60,000 - e40,000 - e20,000 - Nothing, I would
decline the oﬀer.
The elicitation mechanism is an ordered lottery selection design in which sub-
jects can invest e100,000 into a lottery that doubles or halves the amount with
equal probabilities. In order to provide incentives to take the decision thor-
oughly in the lab experiment, for the actual payoﬀ we convert the e100,000
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into e2.50, e80,000 into e2 etc. The reliability of this measure has been val-
idated via a lab experiment with substantial stakes (Dohmen et al. 2011). In
contrast to the lottery this design is very easy but it captures only preferences
on the risk averse domain.
For a better comparability, the e100,000 measure is rescaled in the analysis.
We will present the amount invested in an inverse order and refer to it as the
amount not invested in the lottery in units of e10,000. By this, a value of 10
indicates that nothing is invested whereas a value of 0 means that e100,000 are
invested into the lottery. Hence, in both measures a higher value indicates a






People who prefer alternatives with known probabilities over alternatives with
unknown probabilities are ambiguity averse. In his seminal paper, Ellsberg
(1961) described a thought experiment designed to test an individual's ambi-
guity aversion. Since then, the topic has received considerable attention in the
literature (Etner et al. 2012). The thought experiment has been conducted
many times with real subjects and incentives (see Camerer and Weber 1992,
Oechssler and Roomets 2013 and Trautmann and Kuilen 2013). The usual
result is that a majority of subjects are indeed ambiguity averse. As a conse-
quence, ambiguity is taken into account to better explain real world phenomena
and to make better predictions. Increasingly, ambiguity aversion models are ap-
plied to economic problems such as the stock market (Epstein and Schneider
2008) or climate change (see Weitzman 2009 or Millner et al. 2012).
In any model that makes predictions based on preferences, an often unmen-
14
tioned, but important assumption is the stability of said preferences. To draw
conclusions from previous observations to future behavior, we have to assume
that an individual chooses according to the same rules at both points in time.
When designing policies, for example in the context of the choice of pension
plans or climate protection, we can only observe choices today while the payoﬀs
realize in the future, often involving uncertainty. While the literature provides
some insights into the stability of risk preferences (Zeisberger et al. 2012), it is
mainly quiet with respect to ambiguity attitudes. The scarcity of real life choice
situations with precise probabilities stresses the importance of an extension of
the analysis to preferences on ambiguity. Since it is impossible, so far, to di-
rectly "read out" these preferences from the subject's mind, we repeatedly use
a standard tool of the ambiguity literature, the 3-color Ellsberg urn, to classify
and compare behavior over time. If subjects possess preferences for ambiguity,
and if those preferences are stable, we expect choices to be consistent. That
is, we expect subjects to reveal identical ambiguity preferences at two diﬀerent
points in time. To apply the strictest possible test, we use a design that allows
us to obtain two measures of ambiguity aversion using the same elicitation pro-
cedure for one and the same, physically identical, urn.
Our experimental design allows us to study preference stability under diﬀer-
ent conditions. In our main comparison, we analyze the stability of ambiguity
preferences by comparing choices on two 3-color Ellsberg urns over a period of
two months. Moreover, we also look at two variations where the time interval
between choices is reduced to a few minutes only. In the ﬁrst variation, we
repeat the same elicitation procedure directly after the ﬁrst choices to test for
the eﬀect of time on stability. In a second variation, we keep the shorter time
interval, but additionally delay the draws and the payoﬀs for one urn by two
months to study the eﬀect of deferred payoﬀs.
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Overall, we ﬁnd that individual choices are more stable than random choices
would suggest. However, far from all subjects are consistent across all choices.
Moving payoﬀs to the future does not signiﬁcantly impact stability, but sepa-
rating choices by two months' time leads to lower consistency. We even ﬁnd
reduced consistency when moving from back-to-back decisions to decisions that
are taken roughly 10 minutes apart. Interestingly, for subjects recalling their
choices after two months, we do not ﬁnd time eﬀects on stability.
In section 2, we brieﬂy review the related literature. Section 3 explains the ex-
perimental design. In section 4 and 5 we present the results of our experiment.
Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 Literature
There is a large number of studies that address the general question of pref-
erence stability. With respect to preferences on uncertainty, the majority of
papers deals with expected utility theory and prospect theory (see Zeisberger
et al. (2012) for a more detailed survey on this literature). To study stability,
most papers compare choices at two diﬀerent points in time. Wehrung et al.
(1984) elicit hypothetical investment decisions of 90 business men with a de-
lay of one year. They ﬁnd a small but highly signiﬁcant positive correlation
(ρ = 0.36) for the corresponding personal risk measures. Smidts (1997) elicited
Dutch farmers' certainty equivalents for 50/50 lotteries concerning the market
price for potatoes in two consecutive years. Comparing the Arrow-Pratt mea-
sures of absolute risk aversion across the two years he observes a positive and
signiﬁcant correlation (ρ = 0.44). Harrison et al. (2005) conduct lab experi-
ments and elicit risk preferences according to the Holt and Laury (2002) frame-
work twice, with a delay of 20 to 28 weeks in between. By using a structural
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maximum likelihood model, they estimate coeﬃcients of constant relative risk
aversion and do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant diﬀerence of the aggregate parameter
between both points in time. Note, however, that they do not study individual
stability. Andersen et al. (2008) elicit risk preferences over a 17-month period
from a representative sample of the adult Danish population, using four diﬀer-
ent elicitation tasks. They ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant correlation (ranging
from ρ = 0.34 to ρ = 0.58, depending on the actual task), but do not identify
a general tendency for risk attitudes to change over time. In a related paper,
Baucells and Villasís (2010) study the stability of risk preferences in a prospect
theory framework. They observe a stable pattern of preferences on the aggre-
gate level, while the percentage of individuals that change their responses across
sessions is quite high (63%).
There are only few studies that address the stability of ambiguity aversion. None
of them systematically investigates identical situations over distinct points in
time. Eliaz and Ortoleva (2012) elicit multiple ambiguous decisions with one
decision appearing three times in the same session. Here, 71% of subjects give
consistent answers while the remaining 29% change their view when faced with
the decision for the second or third time.1 However, there is no variation in
the time dimension in this study. Some other papers test for the stability of
ambiguity aversion across diﬀerent choice situations.2 Stahl (2013) compares
both classical variants of the Ellsberg urn and ﬁnds a lower number of ambi-
guity averse subjects in the 3-color urn (55%) than in the 2-color urn (70%).
Moreover, he shows that the number of ambiguity averse choices drops as the
relative payoﬀs of the ambiguous urn rises. Based on the observed choices
1In the experimental literature on ambiguity aversion, broader classiﬁcations (averse, neu-
tral, loving) are more common than the estimation of a more speciﬁc parameter, which makes
the use of a correlation coeﬃcient less meaningful.
2Note that this approach cannot rule out the possibility that observed instabilities are
driven by diﬀerences in the tasks and sources applied.
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in these diﬀerent situations, he classiﬁes 60% of the subjects to be choosing
"almost random", while 26% of choice patterns are consistent with expected
utility and only 12% represent ambiguity averse choices. Binmore et al. (2012)
also analyze decision behavior in diﬀerent conditions and test the explanatory
power of diﬀerent theories. They ﬁnd only weak evidence for consistent ambi-
guity aversion and explain this result by a stricter consistency requirement as
they analyze two diﬀerent (but related) comparisons in choices. Dimmock et al.
(2011) compare ambiguity attitudes from diﬀerent elicitation tasks and ﬁnd at
least 35% inconsistent classiﬁcations across the tasks. Summarizing, the litera-
ture suggests that choices under ambiguity contain a large share of randomness,
at least when comparing behavior across diﬀerent tasks.
3 Design
The experiment is designed as a sequence of two parts. The ﬁrst part was
run in November 2012 (November sessions) while the second part took place in
January 2013 (January sessions). The time lag between the two parts varies
from 47 to 59 days depending on the speciﬁc sessions the subject was assigned
to. All sessions took place in the AWI lab at Heidelberg University. Subjects
were recruited via the local ORSEE platform (Greiner 2004) and were informed
in the invitation that the experiment would consist of two parts. To increase
retention in the second part, we oﬀered a e4 show up fee and fourteen diﬀerent
time slots in January for which the subjects received up to three invitations by
e-mail.
The experiment was executed in a paper and pencil design. The complete
instructions were distributed at the beginning of each session and remained
with the subjects for the whole experiment. All random draws were made by
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means of physical devices and in the presence of the subjects.
Our measure for ambiguity preferences we use the standard 3-color urn proposed
by Ellsberg (1961). We outline the procedures of the experimental task in
chapter 1.
3.1 Main experiment
The main experiment contains multiple elicitations of ambiguity attitudes at
diﬀerent points in time. By comparing choices over time we can evaluate pref-
erence stability. Note, however, that not every change in behavior must be due
to instable preferences in the strictest sense. When faced with a new urn, sub-
jects might simply expect diﬀerent (sets of) probability distributions and adjust
their behavior accordingly. Therefore, we wanted to disentangle this confound
and designed the experiment in a way that allows us to use the same urn at two
diﬀerent points in time. Comparing two measures of ambiguity aversion elicited
by the same procedures and based on the physically identical urn is the strictest
possible test for stability we can think of. In the following we describe the ex-
perimental procedures and start by introducing the diﬀerent choice conditions
used in the experiment.
Choice conditions We diﬀerentiate between three choice conditions (com-
pare ﬁgure 3.1). Each condition consists of two urns. The two urns are identical
in appearance and we do not provide any information on how the urns are ﬁlled.3
The conditions diﬀer with respect to the timing of decisions and payoﬀs. In con-
dition Present (short: P), choices are made today and corresponding payoﬀs
are realized today as well. In condition Present-Future (short: PF ), choices
are made today but random draws and payoﬀs are deferred to the future. In
3The pictures in ﬁgure 7.1 in the appendix show an example.
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Figure 3.1: Course of actions
condition Future (short: F ), both choices and payoﬀs take place in the future.
Note that conditions P and F are structurally equivalent and only occur at
diﬀerent points in time. Hence, the comparison of P and F is the natural test
for the stability of preferences over time.
Procedures Initially, subjects are seated and informed about the complete
structure of the design at the beginning of each session. In the ﬁrst part of the
November sessions, in P, we ask subjects to make their choices for two urns
(P1 and P2 ). In this condition subjects make decisions in the present for the
present, that is choices and payoﬀs happen in the same session (in November).
After collecting the subjects' decisions, a coin is ﬂipped and either P1 or P2 is
determined for payment. The remaining urn is used again as PF1. In PF, sub-
jects again have to make their choices for two urns, the relabeled urn (PF1 ) and
a new urn (PF2 ). However, in this condition, choices are made in the present
for the future, that is random draws and payoﬀs are postponed to the January
sessions. After collecting the subjects' decisions, another coin ﬂip decides which
of the two PF urns will be paid oﬀ in January.
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Roughly two months after the P and PF conditions, we run the January ses-
sions. In condition F, we reintroduce the non-paid urn from PF, which is now
labeled as F1. Additionally, a new urn is brought in (F2 ). We ask subjects to
make choices for both urns. In this condition subjects make a decision in the
future for the future, that is choices and payoﬀs happen in the same session (in
January). When subjects have made their choices, a coin ﬂip decides which of
the urns is paid out.
Our design allows us to observe repeated choices on a physically identical urn
without distorting the incentives. In particular, by moving an urn from P to
PF we are able to observe incentive compatible choices for a physically iden-
tical urn under both P and PF. Similarly, by moving an urn from PF to F
we observe choices of a physically identical urn in PF and F. Additionally, by
eliciting ambiguity attitudes towards two urns in each choice condition, we get
information on the stability of preferences across time within the smallest time
interval possible: in two back-to-back decisions.
Reverse order In order to control for order eﬀects within the November ses-
sions, we randomized and counterbalanced the order in which subjects received
the conditions P and PF.4
Credibility Since we elicit the ambiguity attitudes on a physically identical
urn twice, a major concern is that subjects have to trust the experimenters that
urns are not tampered. To tackle this issue, we take pictures of the urns in front
of the subjects. Each picture carries a physical and unique time stamp. After
ﬁnishing the experiment, all pictures are sent out to the subjects to verify that
4Note that the randomization procedure also aﬀects the urn that is moved between the
diﬀerent conditions. In standard order, a P urn is moved to PF and a PF urn is moved to
F. In reversed order, a PF urn is moved to P and a P urn is moved to F.
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the urns have remained the same when moved between choice conditions.5
3.2 Treatment single session
In order to establish a strict test for the time eﬀect, we also run an additional
treatment omitting the time lag of two months. Applying the above coin ﬂip
procedure, we elicit ambiguity attitudes on four urns with immediate payoﬀs in
a single session.
Figure 3.2: Single session: Course of actions
The structure is similar to the main experiment. First, we elicit ambiguity
preferences on two urns denoted by P1 and P2 (see ﬁgure 3.2). After the
decision is made, a coin ﬂip decides which urn is paid out. The urn not chosen
for payment is moved to the next choice condition P' which is identical to
the ﬁrst condition P : again, both choices and payoﬀs are realized today. P'
represents a second elicitation of immediately paid choices and hence replaces
F from the main experiment.6 However, in contrast to the main experiment,
5In the appendix, we depict examples for these pictures.
6Note that in single session there is no counterpart to the PF condition with deferred
payments as all choices and payments take place in the same session.
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between P and P' approximately ten minutes elapse whereas between P and
F there is a time span of two months. Therefore, comparing consistency levels
between P and P' to those between P and F in the main experiment serves as
a test for the eﬀect of time.
3.3 Further measures
We elicit several additional variables to control for their potential impact on
ambiguity preferences and their temporal stability.
Risk preferences In both experiments, after eliciting the ambiguity prefer-
ences, subjects complete a risk preference measure in a multiple price list design
(Holt and Laury 2002). For a detailed discussion we refer to chapter 2.
Time preferences Moreover, in the November sessions, subjects are given a
choice list that involves deferred payoﬀs (see ﬁgure 3.3). Option A pays e2 at
date P for all ten decisions. Option B is paid out in the January sessions with
payoﬀs ranging from e2 in the ﬁrst decision to e3 in the tenth decision. A
random draw chooses one payoﬀ relevant decision. Any subject who discounts
the future chooses option A in the ﬁrst decision. Depending on their time
preference, they will switch to B in later rows, or even stay with A all along for
extreme time preferences.
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Figure 3.3: Elicitation of time preferences
Sociodemographic information In both experiments, as a last task, we sur-
vey sociodemographic information of the subjects including gender, age, body
height, studentship and whether statistics, econometrics, or game theory classes
had been taken.
Recall questions In the January sessions, two urns of the November sessions
play a role: The PF urn which is chosen for payment and - depending on the
order - the PF or P urn which was moved to the F condition (see ﬁgure 3.1).
Therefore, in January, we elicit a subject's ability to recall the choices made in
the November session. This task is incentivized as we pay e0.25 for each choice
that is recalled correctly.
4 Main results
4.1 General information
In the November sessions of the main experiment 110 subjects participated, of
which 105 returned to the January sessions. This amounts to a retention rate
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of 95%.7 In the single session experiment 35 subjects participated. Fourteen
subjects participated in both experiments.8 The sample is balanced on gender
(51% males) while 95% of the subjects are students. The average payoﬀ was
e6.87 in November, e17.34 in January and e13.44 in the single session treat-
ment.
Averaged over all ambiguity tasks, we ﬁnd 52.7% ambiguity averse, 37.4% neu-
tral and 9.9% ambiguity loving choices. These numbers are in line with results
other studies have found before (see Camerer and Weber 1992 and Oechssler
and Roomets 2013).
In terms of recall capacity, we ﬁnd 58.1% of the subjects remembering their
preferences for the payoﬀ relevant PF urn correctly (recall henceforth). This
share is higher than in the case of random answers (N=103, p <0.001, binomial
test).9
4.2 Descriptives: Consistency
Our main interest is the share of consistent choices with respect to the revealed
ambiguity attitude. We deﬁne two choices to be consistent if they reveal the
same ambiguity attitude in two diﬀerent choice situations.10
7Due to a mistake in the instructions we had to drop ten observations in one session. A
few other observations were dropped on a case-by-case basis for some tests when decision
sheets or questionnaires were returned incomplete.
8We invited subjects from single session to the main experiment with the intention of
creating additional within subject comparisons. Due to the low rate of retention from single
session to the main experiment, we drop this analysis. We successfully added additional
incentives to increase subject retention in the main experiment. In the regressions, we cluster
on the subject level.
9For the remainder of the paper we focus on the recall of the PF urn given its payoﬀ
relevance. In the other recall task, subjects performed similarly. 52.5% remember their
preferences of the P urn that is moved to January. Also here, this share is statistically
diﬀerent from 25%, which would be expected for random answers (N=59, p <0.001, binomial
test). Moreover, the correlation between both measures turns out to be ρ = 0.48.
10Note that there are two diﬀerent choice combinations which are classiﬁed as ambiguity
neutral (see table 2.1). For being consistent we do not require the same choices but the same
revealed ambiguity attitude in two conditions.
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Figure 3.4 shows the consistency levels for choices when comparing diﬀerent
situations (e.g., PF-F compares condition PF with condition F ). First, we
discuss diﬀerences in consistency while econometric tests are provided in the
next section.
Last four bars: dark (light) bars for subjects that recall correctly (incorrectly). "2 months"
etc.: time lag between decisions.
Figure 3.4: Consistency over choice conditions
Note that our subjects are in general more consistent than one would expect
under random choice (37.5%, bar random).11 However, they are also not fully
consistent in their choices. Consistency varies with the time interval between
decisions. Deferring the payoﬀs is less relevant for consistency.
Moreover, we can compare choices with diﬀerent time lags. Here, the main
diﬀerence is between decisions taken in the same session, with a delay of 10
minutes, and those taken in two diﬀerent sessions, with a two months' lag in
between. For the longer time lag we compare decisions in the November session
with the decisions taken in the January session. Here, we ﬁnd low levels of
11In each 3-color urn a subject can make four possible choices (one ambiguity loving, one
ambiguity averse and two ambiguity neutral). Hence, when randomizing with equal proba-
bilities over the four choice combinations we would expect a consistency level of 37.5%.
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consistency represented by the bars PF-F (51%) and P-F (57%).
The level of consistency is higher when we consider decisions taken only 10
minutes apart. Bar P-PF depicts the consistency levels across decisions taken
during the November session (69%). A second within session measure, bar
P-P', comes from the single session treatment and shows a very similar level
(71%). Last we can analyze a third, even shorter time lag between decisions in
the experiment. Remember that, in each choice condition, we asked subjects
to state their preferences for two Ellsberg urns. This was done on a single
decision sheet. That is, these decisions were taken back-to-back without any
time delay.12 For back-to-back decisions we ﬁnd even higher levels of consistency
(bar same condition13, 79%). It seems that even a small time delay between
decisions reduces consistency in behavior.
A very good predictor of consistent decision making is the subjects' ability to
recall their previous decisions after two months. Bars recall PF and recall P-PF
report the consistency levels for PF-F, P-F and P-PF when splitting the sample
in subjects who remember their previous decision (light bars) and subjects who
do not (dark bars). The recall ability especially aﬀects consistency in decisions
with two months' time delay. Subjects who, after 2 months, do not recall their
previous decisions, have a consistency level similar to random behavior.
4.3 Econometric analysis
Data structure and consistency measures Before presenting the econo-
metric results, we brieﬂy describe the data structure. When assessing the con-
sistency of choices in two conditions, we need to keep in mind that the subjects
were asked to decide for two Ellsberg urns in each condition. Hence, denot-
12Since subjects could change their ﬁrst urn decisions after answering for the second urn,
one could also argue that the decisions where simultaneous.
13Pooled over all conditions (P, PF, F, P' ).
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Figure 3.5: Data structure
ing the two conditions A and B, this involves four urns: A1, A2, B1 and B2.
Therefore, there are four possible comparisons between A and B corresponding
to the horizontal and diagonal arrows in ﬁgure 3.5. We use all of these four
comparisons in our regressions. That is, for each subject and each combination
of conditions, we have four observations of the dependent variable consistent,
set to one if the revealed ambiguity attitudes for the two corresponding urns
coincide and 0 otherwise.
Further, our experimental design guarantees that subsequent choice conditions
always share one identical urn (compare ﬁgures 3.1 and 3.2). Therefore, when
comparing subsequent choice conditions, one out of the four arrows in ﬁgure 3.5
represents a comparison of decisions for a physically identical urn. In this case,
the dummy variable ident is equal to 1. The dummy variable reverse order is
set to one if PF choices were elicited ﬁrst to counterbalance the order in the
November sessions. Finally, we can compare the ambiguity attitude between
the two urns within one condition (the vertical arrows in ﬁgure 3.5). These
decisions are not part of comparisons across conditions. Instead, they form the
comparison group same condition.
All consistency comparisons are necessarily within subject. We can compare
conditions P to F, P to PF and PF to F, since subjects made decisions for all
three cases P, F and PF. Hence, we gain multiple observations for each subject.
As the independent unit of observation is the subject in the regression models
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below, we cluster standard errors on the subject level.14
An exception is the treatment single session, which is done in a diﬀerent exper-
iment and therefore provides an across subject comparison. Here we evaluate
the diﬀerences between P and P' (ﬁgure 3.2).
As a robustness check, in section 5.1, we deﬁne consistency as having the same
ambiguity attitude in all four urns (that is, being consistent along all arrows in
ﬁgure 3.5 connecting A and B).
Regressions We test for diﬀerences in consistency levels across time lags via
the regressions in table 3.1. In a probit model, with standard errors clustered
on subjects, we explain consistent behavior, coded as a binary variable. In-
dependent variables in our main model (1) are dummy variables representing
diﬀerent pairs of choice conditions PF-F, P-PF, P-P' and same condition. The
omitted category is P-F. We add the ident dummy to test the eﬀect of being
consistent across two decisions for a physically identical urn whereas the reverse
order dummy accounts for a possible order eﬀect.
The signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients conﬁrms the visual impressions from ﬁgure
3.4. P-F and PF-F both feature a time lag of two months and are not signif-
icantly diﬀerent from each other. However, P-F is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent both
from comparisons with a time lag of 10 minutes (at 1% level comparing to P-PF
and at 5% level comparing to P-P' ) and from the comparisons without a time
lag (0.1% level comparing to same condition). We run additional Wald tests
(see table 7.1 in the appendix) to test the non-omitted categories against each
other. We ﬁnd a similar result as for P-F for the second condition with a two
months' time lag, PF-F : It is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from P-PF (p <0.001), from
P-P' (p =0.003), and from same condition (p <0.001). P-PF, with a time lag
14The results are qualitatively robust when using random eﬀects models for the estimation.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PROBIT PROBIT OLS OLS PROBIT PROBIT
RECALL RECALL
Dep. Var. consistent consistent consistent consistent consistent consistent
PF-F -0.13 -0.12 -0.056 -0.05 -0.29* -0.31*
0.072 0.077 0.029 0.03 0.13 0.14
P-PF 0.35** 0.35** 0.13** 0.12* 0.41 0.42
0.13 0.13 0.047 0.049 0.21 0.23
P-P' 0.47* 0.48* 0.15** 0.14*
0.19 0.22 0.056 0.065
same condition 0.57*** 0.59*** 0.19*** 0.20*** 0.61*** 0.66**
0.11 0.12 0.037 0.04 0.19 0.2
recall P-F 0.59** 0.67**
0.2 0.21
recall PF-F 0.81*** 0.96***
0.2 0.2
recall P-PF 0.48* 0.57*
0.21 0.23
recall same condition 0.45* 0.52*
0.19 0.2
ident -0.044 -0.0074 -0.016 -0.00049 -0.057 -0.025
0.072 0.073 0.027 0.027 0.082 0.083
reverse order 0.045 0.017 -0.095
0.15 0.055 0.16
HL -0.027 -0.012 -0.13
0.36 0.13 0.37
HL_inconsistent 0.026 0.0093 0.016
0.045 0.016 0.043
conﬁdence 0.15* 0.054* 0.19*
0.066 0.023 0.08
WTA -0.032 -0.011 -0.047
0.06 0.021 0.06
Constant 0.16 -1.59 0.57*** -0.053 -0.15 -0.73
0.099 2.25 0.038 0.75 0.14 2.22
demographics No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1,800 1,644 1,800 1,644 1,590 1,511
* p <0.05; ** p <0.01; *** p <0.001, robust standard errors clustered at subjects' level
Demographics: age, male, semester, game, econmajor, statistics, econometrics, height. P-F omitted
Table 3.1: Diﬀerences in consistency
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of 10 minutes, is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from P-P', also with a time lag of
10 minutes (p =0.573), but is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from same condition, which
has no time lag (p =0.021). The only comparison which is not diﬀerent across
time delays is P-P', with a time lag of 10 minutes, versus same condition, no
time lag, which are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent (p =0.625).
Surprisingly to us, the ident variable is not signiﬁcant. When evaluating sub-
jects' consistency, the fact whether the two decisions are made for one and the
same urn or for two diﬀerent urns does not matter. Hence, subjects do not
seem to treat diﬀerent urns diﬀerently when the information on the urn is kept
constant. In our experimental design, we spend considerable eﬀort to come up
with a comparison of physically identical urns. Our result on ident is important
for future experiments: The eﬀort to compare physically identical urns is not
necessary, as it suﬃces to use urns with the same information structure.
In model (2) we add sociodemographic measures (year of birth, being male,
number of semesters studied, having participated in a game theory or statistics
course, being an economics major and body height in cm).15 Furthermore, we
add the subjects' risk preferences elicited by the HL-task (HL_inconsistent is
a binary variable that carries a one if incomplete answers or non-monotonic
preferences were returned in the HL-task).16 Neither of these variables is sig-
niﬁcant, nor do they change the signiﬁcant results of our condition variables.
Finally, we add the variables conﬁdence and WTA. Both of them are the con-
ﬁdence measures introduced in section 2. Measuring consistency between two
urns generates data on four bets. The variables reported are the averages over
these four bets. In the results we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant and positive eﬀect of the
15Since Dohmen et al. (2011) ﬁnd correlations between height, age and risk aversion, this
raises the issue of multicolinearity. When testing the variance inﬂation factors we do not
detect such eﬀects in any model.
16For the HL-task we use the ﬁrst row in which a subject switches from option A to B.
Lower values represent a higher risk tolerance.
31
conﬁdence variable in all models. Therefore, subjects who show higher levels
of conﬁdence in their choices are also more likely to show consistent behavior.
However, we do not detect a relevant eﬀect for the WTA variable. It is in-
signiﬁcant in all models. As a robustness check, we repeat model (1) and (2)
as an OLS speciﬁcation, see model (3) and (4). The results stay qualitatively
unchanged.
Overall, whenever the time lag between two compared choice conditions is diﬀer-
ent, the level of consistency is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent as well - with one exception,
P-P' versus same condition. And when the time lag between two compared con-
ditions is similar, consistency is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent, too. This shows how
consistency depends on the time lag between decisions, even when the amount
of time passed is only 10 minutes.
Since time diﬀerences are a driving force behind diﬀerent levels of consistency,
we look at the eﬀect of being able to recall past decisions. To measure recall, we
asked subjects in the main experiment to recall their decisions on this speciﬁc
Ellsberg urn in choice condition PF, which was selected to be paid in the Jan-
uary session. In single session no such question was asked as we did not reinvite
subjects. Subjects did have an incentive to recall their own decisions, since this
allowed them to verify their payment in the January session. If a subject cor-
rectly recalled all their past decisions in the PF condition, the variable recall
takes the value 1, and 0 otherwise. In models (5) and (6) we test whether sub-
jects who recalled their previous decisions correctly diﬀer from those who did
not. To do so, we reduce the sample to observations from the main experiment
and add interaction terms of recall with all available comparisons.17 The results
show that subjects who are able to recall past own actions are more consistent in
condition P-F, with a two months' time lag, than those how are not. Performing
17Note that we do not control for P-P' as this comparison is only available for single session.
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a Wald test for the PF-F dummy versus its interaction with recall shows that
the same holds true for decisions in this comparison (p <0.001). So, for both
consistency values with a two months' time lag, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect of
recall. In fact, subjects who do not recall their previous actions act not signiﬁ-
cantly diﬀerent from random.18 What about consistency levels with a time lag
of 10 minutes (P-PF ) or with no time lag (same condition)? While we see some
diﬀerence in ﬁgure 3.4, the eﬀect is not signiﬁcant (p =0.860/p =0.604). This is
not surprising: Recall is measured over a time period of two months. Recalling
actions over 10 minutes must be considerably easier, such that we would not
expect a strong diﬀerence between groups here.
We can also test whether subjects who are able to correctly remember previous
choices are still aﬀected by the diﬀerent time lags. Interestingly, based on the
estimates in model (5), not a single diﬀerence across choice conditions is still
signiﬁcant!19 That is, for those subjects who, after two months, still recall their
decisions, we do not detect a time eﬀect on consistency. Again, adding sociode-
mographics and risk aversion in model (6) does not alter these results in terms
of signiﬁcance.20
Non-parametric tests In the following we will present non-parametric tests
as a robustness check for the regression models above.
In general, our consistency measure is a binary variable which shows a one if
a subject has the same ambiguity preferences in two urn tasks. According to
ﬁgure 3.5 we observe four realizations for any comparison between two choice
conditions. When considering single session we gain six observations. In order
18If we restrict model 3 to subjects who do not recall, PF-F and P-F are not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from 37.5%.
19Wald test p-values for the comparisons are 0.686 (P-F vs. P-PF ), 0.146 (P-F vs. PF-F ),
0.568 (P-F vs. same condition), 0.164 (PF-F vs. P-PF ), 0.152 (PF-F vs. same condition)
and 0.881 (P-PF vs. same condition).
20See table 7.1 in the appendix.
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to boil down these multiple observations to apply non-parametric tests we av-
erage over each choice condition for each subject.
We begin by testing whether subjects behave more consistent than under ran-
dom choice. We use χ2-goodness-of-ﬁt tests to compare behavior to the bench-
mark of 37.5%. It rejects random behavior for all choices at the 0.1% level
(N=102, p < 0.001).21
Consistency across choice conditions Consistency and recall∆
same condition P-P'∆ P-PF P-F
PF-F 0.000 0.017 0.002 0.10 PF-F 0.000
N 102 137 102 102 N 102
P-F 0.002 0.076 0.058 P-F 0.006
N 137 137 102 N 102
P-PF 0.423 0.671 P-PF 0.015
N 102 137 N 102
P-P'∆ 0.991 same condition 0.014
N 137 N 102
We use a two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test for paired data. For comparisons indicated by
∆ we apply a two-sided WilcoxonMannWhitney test for independent observations.
For all tests the null hypothesis is that the consistency level is not diﬀerent across two compar-
isons - for recalling and non-recalling subjects.
Table 3.2: P-values for non-parametric tests
In table 3.2 we present p-values and numbers of observations of our tests (com-
pare ﬁgure 3.4). Similar to the results based on regressions, consistency is
signiﬁcantly lower when choices are separated by two months (PF-F and P-F )
compared to choices that are only a few minutes apart (P-PF and P-P' ) or
when the decisions are back-to-back (same condition). Although signiﬁcance
is lower compared to section 4.3, we ﬁnd these results signiﬁcant at least at
the 10%-level. However, we do no longer detect a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between
choice conditions P-PF, P-P' and same condition. Therefore, we do not ﬁnd a
diﬀerence in consistency when ten minutes elapse between two decisions com-
21Instead of assuming equal probabilities for all urn choices, we can alternatively assume
that the probability of showing any ambiguity preference in a single urn is equal to the
observed frequency in the experiment, but that there is no further correlation across urns.
This would amount to a consistency level of 42.74%. χ2-goodness-of-ﬁt tests reject (N=102,
p < 0.0001 in all tests) random behavior for this case as well.
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pared to back-to-back decisions.
When considering the results on recall, we ﬁnd our earlier results unanimously
conﬁrmed on reasonably high levels of signiﬁcance. Although we lose variance
by averaging on the subject level, these non-parametric tests largely conﬁrm
our ﬁndings from section 4.3.
5 Further results and robustness
5.1 Consistency over four Ellsberg urns
In the above section we analyze consistency based on pairwise comparisons of
urns. In the following we present a robustness check by applying a stricter mea-
sure for consistency. Here, we consider a subject to be consistent if the attitude
towards ambiguity is the same in all four decisions associated with immediate
payment, corresponding to the P and F decisions in the main experiment and
to P and P' in single session.22 This approach yields an alternative dependent
variable cons_all, consisting of one observation for each subject, which is set to
one if all choices are consistent and 0 otherwise. Overall, we ﬁnd a consistency
level of 40.8% in the main experiment and a level of 62.9% in the single session
treatment.
In table 3.3, we present estimates from diﬀerent models using cons_all as de-
pendent variable and including controls similar to the analysis in section 4.3. In
line with the ﬁndings in section 4.3, we ﬁnd a higher level of consistency in the
single session treatment as the signiﬁcant coeﬃcient in all six models shows.
Even under the stricter speciﬁcation, consistency decreases when decisions are
separated by a longer time interval.
22We do not consider the PF data, as we do not have corresponding observations in single
session.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PROBIT PROBIT OLS OLS PROBIT PROBIT
Dep. Var. cons_all cons_all cons_all cons_all cons_all cons_all
single session 0.56* 0.76* 0.22* 0.28* 1.06*** 1.32***
0.24 0.31 0.093 0.11 0.3 0.4
recall 0.81** 1.01***
0.27 0.3
reverse order 0.19 0.072 0.029
0.27 0.099 0.28
HL 0.96 0.32 1.14
0.66 0.23 0.72
HL_inconsistent 0.095 0.03 0.11
0.071 0.025 0.079
Constant -0.23 3.88 0.41*** 1.26 -0.73*** 3.91
0.13 4.62 0.049 1.15 0.21 4.17
demographics No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 138 137 138 137 138 137
R-squared 0.037 0.141
* p <0.05; ** p <0.01; *** p <0.001, robust standard errors clustered at subjects' level
Demographics: age, male, semester, game, econmajor, statistics, econometrics, height
Table 3.3: Consistency over four urns
We argue in the above section that consistency is not aﬀected by time for sub-
jects that remember their decisions. Here, we tackle this issue in model (5) and
(6) by including the subjects' ability to correctly recall previous decisions. We
detect a highly signiﬁcant eﬀect (at 1% in model (5) and 0.1% in model (6)) in
the expected direction. Again, subjects recalling their decisions are more likely
to be consistent. Additionally, a Wald test reveals that the single session vari-
able is not statistically diﬀerent from the recall variable (p =0.36). Subjects in
the main experiment that are able to remember past decisions are as consistent
over two months as the average subject is in a setting with a delay of 10 minutes
only.
As a further result, the only signiﬁcant eﬀect of demographic variables we ob-
serve is a mild age eﬀect. Although the coeﬃcient is not reported, we ﬁnd the
year of birth signiﬁcant on the 5%-level in all models. Younger subjects are
less likely to be consistent. When computing the marginal eﬀects (p =0.017 for
model 2), the probability of being consistent decreases for every year of birth
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by 3.2%. Restrictively, the age variation is quite small since we observe 95%
students in our sample. Nonetheless, the eﬀect is a pure age eﬀect as we control
for the seniority at university. Similar to the models in table 3.1, reverse order
and the risk preferences (HL) have no eﬀect on consistency.
To sum up, this robustness check bolsters the results from section 4.3. With
an even stricter measure of consistency, we conﬁrm both the general time ef-
fect on consistency and the mitigating role of the individual recall capacity.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd a slightly positive age eﬀect on consistency.
5.2 Ambiguity preferences
Preferences in aggregate After having analyzed the individual consistency
of preferences, we take a look at the overall distributions of ambiguity attitudes
in the diﬀerent choice conditions. As ﬁgure 3.6 shows, the distribution of ambi-
guity attitudes is broadly similar over the diﬀerent choice conditions. Although
we ﬁnd that time has an eﬀect on the individual consistency above, this does
not imply that the preferences change in the aggregate. Observe, however, that
ﬁnding diﬀerences over a period of two months would suggest an extreme eﬀect
of aging.
Ambiguity preferences In table 3.4 we present six probit models for the
diﬀerent types of ambiguity preferences. The underlying data is organized and
stacked by urns and we consider data from the main experiment only. Depend-
ing on the retention to the January sessions, each subject decides on up to six
urns corresponding to up to six observations for each subject in the dataset.
The models are computed with standard errors clustered on the subject level
to control for multiple observations.
The dependent variable is a binary variable that carries a one if the subject
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Figure 3.6: Ambiguity preferences over choice conditions
shows the respective preference in the urn. Model (1) and (4) investigate am-
biguity averse (AA), (2) and (5) ambiguity neutral (AN ) and (3) and (6) am-
biguity loving (AL) attitudes.
For the explanatory part we include two diﬀerent sets of variables. First, in
order to evaluate the time eﬀects on the ambiguity attitudes, we include binary
variables to control for the choice conditions (PF, F ). The omitted category is
P. While model (1) to (3) are probit models, models (4) to (6) are estimated
by OLS as a robustness check. Second, similar to regressions in the previous
section, we include several personal control variables.
As ﬁgure 3.6 suggests, there are no large eﬀects on the distribution of ambigu-
ity attitudes. When considering the tests in the regressions in model (1) and
model (4) in table 3.4, we ﬁnd a mild reduction of ambiguity aversion in PF.
This ﬁnding is in line with Onay et al. (2012).
We detect mild correlations between demographics and ambiguity preferences
while time preferences do not have a signiﬁcant impact. Furthermore, the mod-
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PROBIT PROBIT PROBIT OLS OLS OLS
Dep. Var. AA AN AL AA AN AL
PF -0.25* 0.17 0.19 -0.088* 0.061 0.026
0.11 0.1 0.19 0.04 0.036 0.027
F -0.23 0.15 0.23 -0.081 0.05 0.031
0.15 0.15 0.2 0.053 0.053 0.031
HL 0.14* -0.13* -0.0001 0.050* -0.049* -0.001
0.061 0.053 0.065 0.021 0.019 0.012
HL_inconsistent 0.46 -0.81 0.5 0.17 -0.3 0.13
0.55 0.54 0.52 0.19 0.21 0.12
reverse order 0.29 -0.16 -0.33 0.11 -0.057 -0.051
0.19 0.19 0.19 0.07 0.068 0.029
time 0.017 -0.01 -0.014 0.0057 -0.0031 -0.0025
0.028 0.025 0.03 0.01 0.0091 0.0045
conﬁdence 0.1 -0.066 -0.044 0.037 -0.023 -0.013
0.095 0.092 0.099 0.035 0.034 0.02
WTA -0.006 0.016 -0.0028 -0.0009 0.006 -0.0051
0.087 0.083 0.089 0.031 0.031 0.016
Constant -4.17 2.62 -7.17 -1 1.44 0.56
2.46 2.32 5.62 0.85 0.8 0.32
demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 607 607 607 607 607 607
R-squared 0.117 0.062 0.07
* p <0.05; ** p <0.01; *** p <0.001, standard errors clustered on subjects' level. P
omitted. Demographics: age, male, semester, game, econmajor, statistics, econo-
metrics, height
Table 3.4: Ambiguity attitudes in aggregate
els show a correlation between the risk task and ambiguity attitudes. For am-
biguity averse choices we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant correlation with risk averse behavior
whereas ambiguity neutral choices are positively associated with risk tolerance.
For ambiguity lovers we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant eﬀects. In general, these re-
sults coincide with the ﬁndings of Lauriola and Levin (2001) and Chakravarty
and Roy (2008) who ﬁnd ambiguity and risk aversion positively associated.
However, this relationship is not undisputed since Di Mauro and Maﬃoletti
(2004) ﬁnd only a low correlation and Cohen et al. (1985) no relationship at all.
The time coeﬃcients are insigniﬁcant in all models.
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Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
PROBIT PROBIT OLS OLS
Dep. Var. cons_HL cons_HL cons_HL cons_HL
consistent -0.014 -0.097 -0.004 -0.0046
0.44 0.5 0.11 0.12
recall 0.22 0.32 0.053 0.07
0.34 0.4 0.084 0.091






Constant 0.91** 2.82 0.82*** 1.11
0.3 5.11 0.077 1.37
demographics No Yes No Yes
Observations 91 90 91 90
R-squared 0.005 0.099
* p <0.05; ** p <0.01; *** p <0.001, standard errors clustered on
subjects' level. P omitted. Demographics: age, male, semester,
game, econmajor, statistics, econometrics, height
Table 3.5: Ambiguity and risk attitudes
5.3 Consistency of uncertainty: Risk and ambiguity
Above, we argue that the ability to recall choices correlates with consistent
ambiguity preferences. In the following we will explore two questions: First,
whether the ability to recall also aﬀects consistency in risk preferences. Second,
whether having consistent ambiguity attitudes correlates with consistent risk
preferences.
In the experiment, we elicited risk preferences in the P and the F session.
Therefore we are able to investigate the P-F consistency for ambiguity as well
as for risk preferences.
For this analysis, we construct a binary variable that carries a one if a subject is
consistent between both risk tasks (cons_HL). Hence, we consider a subject to
be consistent if the deviation in rows switching from option A to B between the
two tasks is smaller or equal than one. Using this variable, we ﬁnd a consistency
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level of 85% between the two risk tasks.23 This is considerably higher compared
to the 57% we ﬁnd for ambiguity preferences for P-F (see ﬁgure 3.4).24
In table 3.5 we present two binary choice models investigating the relationship
between the consistency in risk and ambiguity preferences. The dependent vari-
able measures the consistency in risk preferences over the choice conditions P
and F (cons_HL).25 The independent variable of interest is our previous mea-
sure for consistent ambiguity preferences (consistent). Additionally, model (1)
controls for subjects who remember their decision in the PF urn whereas model
(2) includes a set of demographic variables.26 Model (3) and (4) are robustness
checks estimated by OLS. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant relationship between the con-
sistency of risk and ambiguity preferences since consistent is insigniﬁcant. The
fact that subjects remember their decision in the ambiguity task has also no
eﬀect on the consistency of risk preferences as recall is signiﬁcant.
Although we ﬁnd a correlation between risk and ambiguity preferences, we do
not ﬁnd a correlation in the corresponding levels of consistency.
5.4 Order eﬀects
A concern when eliciting multiple urns per subject is that subjects may decide
diﬀerently in repeated tasks. The models in table 3.6 investigate whether the
sequence in which urns are presented does aﬀect the subjects' ambiguity pref-
erences. The independent variables consist of binary variables indicating the
23By using a structural maximum likelihood model (Harrison and Rutström 2008) we do
not ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences in CRRA coeﬃcients (assuming u(x) = xα) between November
(0.88) and January (0.89) in aggregate. This is in line with Andersen et al. (2008).
24The results do not change qualitatively or in signiﬁcance if we use an alternative measure
of consistency for risk preferences: A subject is considered to be consistent when showing
risk averse, neutral or loving preferences in both HL-tasks. Here we ﬁnd a consistency level
of 87.9%.
25We restrict the analysis to P-F since we do not observe an HL decision with a delayed
payment. However, a comparable setting is tested by Noussair and Wu (2006), who ﬁnd that
subjects are less averse toward future risks.
26See section 4.3 for the description.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PROBIT PROBIT PROBIT OLS OLS OLS
Dep. Var. AA AN AL AA AN AL
urn_nb_1 0.01 0.09 -0.23 0.004 0.033 -0.037
0.12 0.12 0.21 0.049 0.045 0.034
urn_nb_2 -0.023 0.15 -0.29 -0.0092 0.055 -0.046
0.12 0.11 0.21 0.049 0.042 0.033
urn_nb_3 -0.082 0.042 0.087 -0.032 0.015 0.017
0.09 0.099 0.16 0.036 0.036 0.032
Constant 0.15 -0.44*** -1.23*** 0.56*** 0.33*** 0.11***
0.12 0.12 0.16 -.048 0.045 0.03
Observations 438 438 438 438 438 438
R-squared 0.001 0.002 0.008
* p <0.05; ** p <0.01; *** p <0.001, standard errors clustered at subjects' level, urn_nb_4 omitted
Table 3.6: Order eﬀects on multiple elicitations
position in the sequence of presentation regardless of the choice condition. For
example, urn_nb_1 carries a one for the ﬁrst urn in the experiment and a zero
otherwise. The dependent variables are also on a binary scale and show a one
if the subject's preference is ambiguity averse (model 1), neutral (model 2) or
loving (model 3). While models (1) to (3) are probit estimations, (4) to (6) are
OLS models which are presented for robustness. The results show that there
are no signiﬁcant and systematic order eﬀects.27
6 Conclusion
In an experiment designed to test the stability of subjects' ambiguity pref-
erences, we ﬁnd that the consistency of choices is well above the benchmark
of random behavior. Consistency decreases as the time lag between choices
increases, from 79% for back-to-back choices to 57% for two months. The de-
crease in consistency over time is mitigated by subjects' ability to recall their
previous choices. For subjects who successfully recall their previous choices,
there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between longer and shorter time lags. Overall,
27In an alternative test we include urn_nb in the models of table 3.4. While losing the
January observations in these regressions we again do not ﬁnd an order eﬀect.
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the consistency results leave a mixed picture: Subjects are consistent to some
degree, but not fully. A large amount of individual inconsistency can remain
hidden when only aggregate results are taken into account.
Apart from the observed levels of consistent choices, we are also interested in
the drivers of stability. Here, we can reject our initial concern that the com-
parison across diﬀerent urns might introduce a bias: Subjects' consistency over
the same urn is not diﬀerent from the consistency for physically not identical
urns. This suggests that it is acceptable to forgo the eﬀort of constructing ex-
periments where one and the same urn is used multiple times in an incentive
compatible way. Moreover, we identify two correlates of stability. One is self-
reported conﬁdence in the choice which turned out to be a signiﬁcant predictor
of stability. Hence, including a question like the one used in our experiment
might be helpful in predicting individual behavior. Second, subjects who recall
their behavior are associated with more consistent behavior, in particular as
the time span increases. These subjects might deliberately choose consistently
with their previous choices, either to appear consistent, or to avoid having to
make up their minds again. However, since we only ﬁnd a correlation, other
causal eﬀects are also possible. The subjects using easy to remember heuristics
(Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011) could lead to a reverse direction of causality:
Subjects are consistent because they use the same heuristic at both times. And
they are able to recall their previous decisions not because they remember the
action, but remember using the same heuristic as before.
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Chapter 4
Stereotypes and Risk Attitudes of
Financial Professionals: Evidence
from the Lab and the Field
1 Introduction
The correlation between risk attitudes and sociodemographic characteristics
has been actively studied in recent years (Dohmen et al. 2011, Gaudecker et al.
2011). These ﬁndings give rise to the question of whether subjects are aware of
the correlation between risk preferences and sociodemographic information.
Risk attitudes are important for decision making, for example for buying stocks
or for ﬁnancial decisions in general (e.g., Dohmen et al. 2011). However, previ-
ous studies suggest that ﬁnancial literacy is limited (Rooij et al. 2007), which
shows the importance of professional advice (Shiller 2008). And indeed, when
making their decisions, individuals are increasingly relying on professionals -
such as doctors in the health domain, insurance agents, and in particular ﬁnan-
cial consultants (c.f. Allen 2001, Bhattacharya et al. 2012). Of course, agency
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problems, which have been discussed in the theoretical literature (Bhattacharya
and Pﬂeiderer 1985 or Inderst and Ottaviani 2012), are of major inﬂuence in the
counseling interview. However, these models assume that the risk preferences
or some distribution over risk preferences are common knowledge. Our research
starts by tackling this assumption.
We study a subject's ability to identify the major demographic correlates with
risk preferences. We conduct an artefactual ﬁeld experiment1 in which three
types of subjects participate: senior ﬁnancial advisors, junior ﬁnancial advisors
and non-professionals. In particular, we assess professionals' knowledge about
people's risk preferences and seek to ascertain if they attach importance to other
characteristics than subjects without advice experience. Studying these groups
allows us to explore potential experience and training eﬀects in the ﬁnancial
sector (c.f. Haigh and List 2005).
The experiment consists of two parts. The ﬁrst part is based on a survey con-
ducted on the web and a large-scale survey (SOEP) of Germany. By using these
data we estimate risk preferences of certain subgroups of the population (e.g.,
older versus younger, female versus male). In the second part, we run a com-
puterized lab experiment. The lab experiment consists of two stages. At ﬁrst
we elicit the subjects' risk attitudes using the risk measures of Holt and Laury
(2002) and Dohmen et al. (2011). In the second stage, we elicit the subjects'
stereotypes (or perceived correlations) of risk preferences of sociodemographic
groups (such as gender). By augmenting the subject pool with ﬁnancial pro-
fessionals we are able to study behavioral diﬀerences between ﬁnancial advisors
and non-professionals.
In a further task subjects are asked to rank their individual risk attitude relative
to the population mean of the survey. This is to measure their self-assessment
1Artefactual ﬁeld experiments use the tools of a standard lab experiment with a non-
standard subject pool (Harrison and List 2004).
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of risk taking.
The results of the experiment show that subjects recognize the correlation be-
tween particular sociodemographic variables and risk preferences rather con-
sistently. The subjects are able to assess with a high precision how their own
risk attitude relates to the average risk attitude of the representative popu-
lation. Although we ﬁnd professional subjects to be more risk tolerant than
non-professionals, these diﬀerences are not statistically signiﬁcant. However,
senior professionals are signiﬁcantly less successful in recognizing the correla-
tions between risk attitudes and demographics found in the data. They assume
a zero correlation of a characteristic and even more often they mispredict the
direction of the correlation. Additionally, senior professionals are less successful
in ranking their own risk attitude relative to the population mean. In contrast,
the junior professionals are signiﬁcantly more accurate in predicting the correla-
tions of demographics and their own position in the distribution of preferences.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In the next section (section
2), we discuss the literature. Section 3 explains the experimental design of the
study while section 4 presents the results. Finally, we conclude in section 5.
2 Literature
Recent research on risk preferences has detected signiﬁcant linkages between
sociodemographic characteristics and risk attitudes. It is largely undisputed
that women are more risk averse than men (e.g., Byrnes et al. 1999, Croson and
Gneezy 2009). By using German micro data (SOEP) Dohmen et al. (2011) ﬁnd
that individuals are more risk averse if they are older, married, or are parents.
The authors report that individuals are more risk loving if they have a high
school diploma or higher income. However, regarding the relationship of educa-
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tion or income and risk tolerance, the ﬁndings of other literature are ambiguous
(c.f. Barsky et al. 1997, Belzil and Leonardi 2007, Hartog et al. 2002). In addi-
tion, Dohmen et al. (2011) report a signiﬁcant correlation between stated risk
preferences and real-life decisions e.g., holding risky ﬁnancial assets, smoking,
and being self-employed.
A strategy to ﬁgure out others' preferences is "stereotyping". By intuition,
a subject assumes a correlation between an observable characteristic and the
risk preference. This perceived correlation does not necessarily need to coincide
with the true correlation. Regarding the knowledge about the correlation be-
tween risk preferences and sociodemographic information, Eckel and Grossman
(2008) study gender stereotypes. Their results are twofold: First, in line with
previous results, females tolerate less risk than males. And second, the beliefs2
over gender are consistent since women are perceived to be less risk tolerant.
In this setup the judged person is fully visible to the judging subject. If the
belief formation is based on groups (e.g., males) instead of individuals, subjects
overestimate males' risk tolerance, while females' is correctly assessed (Siegrist
et al. 2002). In terms of cultural stereotypes people perceive Chinese to be less
risk tolerant than Americans. Interestingly, the actual experimental data shows
that the opposite is true (Hsee and Weber 1999).
Previous studies on ﬁnancial decision making suggest that especially ﬁnancial
professionals are less prone to behavioral biases, such as anchoring eﬀects, when
forming expectations about long-term stock returns (Kaustia et al. 2008). They
show a higher degree of analytical behavior than the general population (Nof-
singer and Varma 2007). However, there is contradictory evidence regarding
the degree of myopic loss aversion of ﬁnancial professionals compared to student
subjects (Eriksen and Kvaloy 2009, Haigh and List 2005). Financial profession-
2In the literature 'prediction', 'forecast' and 'belief' are used interchangeably.
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als are better in assessing the quality of public information, while students more
closely follow Bayes' Rule (Alevy et al. 2007). Nevertheless, artefactual ﬁeld
experiments which allow observing ﬁnancial professionals and students in an
identical situation are scarce.
This study contributes to the existing literature by investigating subjects' per-
ceived correlation of risk preferences and six demographic characteristics. It is
the ﬁrst study that takes up this question by using an "artefactual ﬁeld exper-
iment" as the subject pool is augmented by ﬁnancial professionals. This setup
allows exploring diﬀerences in behavior between these subject groups.
3 Experimental design
This experiment is designed to study diﬀerences of subjects' "perceived" corre-
lations between risk preferences and sociodemographic groups (or stereotypes)
and the "true" correlations. In order to ﬁnd these true correlations we use data
from two surveys. Having computed correlations between sociodemographic
groups and risk preferences in the survey data, we go to the lab and elicit the
subjects' stereotypes. As we use a non-standard subject pool we compare these
stereotypes of ﬁnancial advisors and non-professionals.
At ﬁrst, in the treatment SELF, we measure the subjects' own risk preferences.
Subsequently, the treatment STEREOTYPE contains two tasks: First, we in-
vestigate the subjects' ability to self-assess their own risk attitudes. For this we
ask them to rank their willingness to take risk in the distribution of risk atti-
tudes. Second, we check whether the subjects' perceived relationship between
risk preferences and demographics and the true correlations coincide. A time
line of the experiment is provided in ﬁgure 4.1.
Throughout the experiment we use two preference elicitation methods: The
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Figure 4.1: Experimental design: Course of actions
method borrowed from the German large-scale survey SOEP (see Dohmen et al.
(2011)) and the multiple price list by Holt and Laury (2002). Both methods
are discussed in detail in chapter 2.
3.1 Part 1: Surveys
One major restriction we face with our design is that there is no publicly avail-
able survey containing the HL-task. Therefore we run our own online survey to
collect sociodemographic information and risk preferences.
First, for the e100,000 question we make use of the German Socioeconomic
Panel (SOEP), which is publicly available.3 Second, for the HL-task we em-
ploy a web-based survey which can easily be distributed to diﬀerent people
via e-mail.4 The distribution of the survey ran over university and private e-
mail lists.5 The survey collects risk preferences (in the HL-task as well as the
e100,000 question) and sociodemographic information and it ran from Novem-
ber to December 2010.
The second and the third column in table 4.1 show the descriptive statistics of
the surveys. The data show heterogeneity within the surveys especially in the
categories age, parenthood and university education. The subjects in the SOEP
survey are signiﬁcantly older and thus more often have a partner and children.
3We use data from 2009. See www.diw.de/soep for more details.
4Consult the appendix for the complete instructions.
5Participants were recruited via e-mail and were asked to further distribute the survey.
For the completion of the web-based survey we raed oﬀ e50 among the participants.
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Part 1: Reference decisions Part 2: Lab experiment
Web survey SOEP survey Non-prof. Junior prof. Senior prof.
Variable mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
N 84 - 20750 - 77 - 52 - 38 -
Year born 1979 10.0 1959 17.71 1986 6.29 1989 1.06 1973 11.0
Female 0.57 0.56 0.52 0.50 0.56 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.18 0.39
Partner 0.41 0.62 0.77 0.42 0.26 0.44 0.23 0.43 0.66 0.48
Parenthood 0.20 0.40 0.62 0.49 0.05 0.22 0.02 0.14 0.47 0.51
High income* 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.07 0 0 0 0 0.11 0.31
Uni degree 0.59 0.50 0.21 0.41 0.94 0.25 1.00 0.00 0.63 0.49
Counsel. exp. (years) - - - - - - 1.02 1.07 10.97 8.27
CRRAΥ 0.20 - - - 0.32 - 0.25 - 0.28 -
HL∆ 6.11 1.68 - - 6.81 1.56 6.33 1.78 6.32 2.08
100,000 7.61 2.70 9.08 1.98 4.70 3.29 6.00 2.44 6.89 3.18
* refers to a monthly net income above e6,000 (approx. $8460).
Υ See section 4.2 for estimation details. The survey is not incentivized.
∆ refers to the row in which Option B was chosen for the ﬁrst time in the lottery.
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics of surveys and subjects
3.2 Part 2: Lab experiment
General information and subject pool In the lab, subjects ﬁrst play SELF
and STEREOTYPE subsequently. When entering the lab, subjects are ran-
domly allocated to a computer slot. During the experiment there is no interac-
tion and no feedback about the payoﬀ.6
The experimental sessions took place in 2011 and 2012. In total 167 subjects
participated in the lab experiment. In the subject pool of the lab experiment
we have three types of subjects: senior professional advisors, junior professional
advisors and non-professionals. The non-professionals are mainly students re-
cruited via the AWI-lab at Heidelberg University, where all sessions with non-
professionals were run.7 The senior professional advisors are recruited from a
German ﬁnancial advisory agency and from local banks. The junior advisors
come from a banking speciﬁc advanced training institution.8 After ﬁnishing
high school, the junior professionals enter a study program in ﬁnancial advi-
sory. This takes place at an applied university, and practical counseling makes
up 50% of their training. Since these subjects are currently students, their age
6We treat each subject as an independent observation.
7The experiment is programmed on a PHP-platform. A transcribed version of all instruc-
tions can be found in the appendix.
8We ran seven sessions with professionals - three in the lab and four on-site.
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and educational level are comparable to the non-professional advisors.
An experimental session lasts approximately 50 minutes; on average subjects
earn e11.92.
SELF The SELF treatment elicits the subjects' own demographics and their
risk tolerance. First, subjects answer the questions about their demographics.
Then they play the e100,000 question and the HL-task. Both measures are
incentivized as described in chapter 2.
STEREOTYPE After ﬁnishing the SELF treatment, subjects move on to
STEREOTYPE.9 In the ﬁrst task, we are interested in ﬁnding out whether
subjects are able to locate their own risk attitudes in the (representative) dis-
tribution of risk preferences. We ask the subjects to assess whether their own
decision in the two preference elicitation tasks is riskier, less risky, or bears the
same risk compared to the advisees' average decision in the surveys of part 1.
Our instructions explicitly mention that the reference decisions are based on
surveys. The exact wording for the e100,000 question is:
Approx. 22,000 participants answered the Game Decision I in a preceding survey.10 Do you
think the average participant of the preceding survey invested more, less, or the same amount
of money as you did in the ﬁrst game decision?
Your decision: I think that the average participant of the preceding survey invested
(please choose): More, less, the same amount of money as I did in the ﬁrst game decision.
For the risk task we use the average choices in the web survey to determine the
advisees' average decision, for the e100,000 question choices from the SOEP
survey are employed. However, only the SOEP survey constitutes a represen-
tative sample of the German population.11 For all tasks in STEREOTYPE we
9After STEREOTYPE two more treatments are executed which are not reported here.
The results of these treatments are reported in chapter 5.
10Here, the instructions include Barsky et al. 1997, a repetition of the e100,000 question.
11We are aware that there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the sample size of both surveys. We
account for this in the design by explicitly mentioning the data count in the instructions.
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pay e0.25 for a correct answer.
In a second task, we study stereotypes of risk preferences of diﬀerent subsam-
ples. The subjects' task is to correctly predict the subsample that makes the
riskier decision. To determine whether the subjects' stereotypes are correct,
we use the data from the surveys of part 1. The average decisions of diﬀerent
subsamples formed in the categories 'age', 'gender', 'family status', 'education',
'parenthood' and 'income' are computed. The diﬀerent subsamples and the ex-
act wording are presented in table 4.2. Two subsamples are formed per category.
For these categories we calculate the average decisions and infer which subsam-
ple takes the riskier decision. For example, we compute the average decision
among advisees that are 40 years old and above and the average of advisees that
are below 40 years of age.12 The averages are computed for both risk measures
separately.
In table 4.2 an asterisk (triangle) indicates the subgroup making the riskier
decision for the HL-task (the e100,000 question).13
e100,000 question: Which group invested more money in the lottery?
lottery: Which group switched to option B earlier?
Category Choice 1 Choice 2 Choice 3
Age younger than 40*∆ 40 and older both equal
Gender male*∆ female both equal
Family status single*∆ partner/married both equal
Education university degree*∆ no university degree both equal
Parenthood having no children*∆ having children both equal
Net income up to e1,000* more than e1,000∆ both equal
The riskier average decision (correct answer) for the HL-task is denoted by an asterisk (*), for the
e100,000 question by a triangle (∆).
Table 4.2: STEREOTYPE: Average choices of subsamples
12The cut-oﬀ values of the categories are designed to be close to the median. E.g., the
median age in the survey is 44. For a better comprehensibility we choose 40 years.
13The true correlations of both samples diﬀer only in the income variable. This is in line
with the ambiguous ﬁndings in the literature. Hartog et al. (2002) ﬁnd that risk aversion
decreases with income and wealth. In contrast to that, Barsky et al. (1997) identify an
inverse U-shape relation of risk aversion and income.
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4 Results
In the following section we present the results of the experiment. While we ex-
plore the diﬀerences in preferences between ﬁnancial advisors and non-professionals
in section 4.1, we investigate the diﬀerences in their self-assessment and the
stereotypes of the subject groups in section 4.2.
4.1 SELF
One of the main features of this experiment is the non-standard subject pool
containing ﬁnancial advisors. In ﬁgure 4.2 we present the distributions of the
subjects' choices in both risk elicitation mechanisms for each subject group.14
Considering the e100,000 question (table 4.1), non-professionals invest much
less (e47,000) in the lottery compared to the junior professionals (e60,000)
and the senior professionals (e69,000). However, a two-sample Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test15 for equal distributions does not detect any signiﬁcant diﬀerences
between the diﬀerent subject groups for the e100,000 question.
The same is true when considering the HL-task, as we do not recognize any
systematic diﬀerences between the subject groups in the preference distribution
(see ﬁgure 4.2). The intersection of the risk neutral prediction (black solid line)
with the actual distribution of the subjects' choices in ﬁgure 4.2 indicates that
up to 13% of the subjects exhibit risk loving choices.16 On average, the subjects
exhibit risk averse preferences.
This is backed by a structural maximum likelihood model to estimate the co-
eﬃcient of relative risk aversion. For this we follow the procedure proposed by
14As discussed in chapter 2 we present the scale of the e100,000 question in an inverse
order.
15H0: Student=Junior, N=126, p=0.25, H0: Non-prof.=Senior, N=115, p=0.42, H0: Se-
nior=Junior, N=90, p=0.64
16This is in line with Holt and Laury (2002), who ﬁnd 20% of subjects to exhibit risk loving
choices.
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Figure 4.2: Subjects' risk attitudes in e100,000 question and HL-task
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Model 1 2 3 4 5 6
Subject: Non-prof. Junior Senior Non-prof. Junior Senior
α 0.68*** 0.75*** 0.72*** -1.13 21.9 -4.88
0.031 0.038 0.059 8.49 86.7 10.3




low inc. -0.019 -0.047
0.054 0.086
yob 0.001 -0.011 0.0028
0.0043 0.044 0.0052
partner 0.081 0.11 0.34***
0.071 0.08 0.089
children -0.15 -0.33*** -0.2
0.23 0.09 0.14
Observations 77 52 38 77 52 38
Robust standard errors, *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Note: In model 5 uni, in model 6 low income, are omitted because of colinearity.
Table 4.3: SELF: CRRA coeﬃcients
Harrison and Rutström (2008) and assume a power utility function in the form
u(x) = xα.17 Given the data of the HL-task we present the estimation results
in table 4.3. The models 1 to 3 present the ﬁtted parameters of the underlying
utility function for the diﬀerent subject groups. The results we obtain are in
line with the e100,000 question: With a CRRA of 0.32, the non-professionals
show the lowest risk tolerance compared to the junior professionals with r=0.25
and the senior professionals with r=0.28. However, these values are not signiﬁ-
cantly diﬀerent when we estimate the three equations in a system and compare
the coeﬃcients. In model 4 to 6 we include demographic controls. Surprisingly,
beside parenthood in model 5 and having a partner in model 6, the usual co-
variates do not show up to be signiﬁcant in our data. Hence, the diﬀerences
in the estimates are not driven by the demographics, and as the diﬀerences are
insigniﬁcant there is no evidence for potential sorting in our sample.
17For this functional form the CRRA coeﬃcient is r = 1− α.
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4.2 STEREOTYPE
In the following chapter we will focus on the prediction of risk preferences.
In the ﬁrst task subjects have to self-assess their risk attitude relative to the
sample average. In the second task subjects predict the risk attitudes of distinct
demographic groups.
Self-assessment and the population mean Figure 4.3 shows the percent-
age of subjects which are able to locate themselves correctly in the distribution
of risk preferences. The ﬁgure is split up into the diﬀerent subject groups and
the two elicitation tasks. On the left, we present the fractions of correct answers
in the e100,000 question. The results indicate that over three quarters of the
non-professionals and the junior professionals rank their risk tolerance relative
to the mean choice of the subjects in the web survey and SOEP survey correctly.
For senior professionals this value is lower but still amounts to 63%.
Decisions in the HL-task show a similar pattern. Approximately 60% of the pro-
fessionals and 67% of the non-professionals assess their risk tolerance correctly.
All values are signiﬁcantly larger than random answers would suggest. As there
are three possible answers, under random answers we would expect a share of
33%. We test for this with binomial tests for both risk measures and all subject
groups. We reject random answers with p<0.001 for all tests. When testing for
diﬀerences between the subject groups we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant eﬀects. As
a further robustness check we run regression models including demographics to
predict a correct self-assessment.18 In line with ﬁgure 4.3 these models show
only signiﬁcant eﬀects for the e100.000 question.
18Consult appendix 2.1 for details.
56
Note: The columns denote the percentage of subjects that are able to correctly answer the question "What
do you think, did people in the pretest invest more, less or the same amount respectively switch earlier, later
or at the same point as you?" split by the mechanism of elicitation. Answers of the participants in the SOEP
and web survey are framed as pretest.
Figure 4.3: Subjects' self-assessment compared to the population mean
When considering the coeﬃcients, we ﬁnd the senior professionals to be less
successful in locating their own risk attitude in the distribution of risk prefer-
ences compared to the other subject groups. However, when testing this result
statistically, there is only a mildly signiﬁcant structural diﬀerence.
Stereotypes on demographics In the following section we investigate the
subjects' stereotypes on the risk attitudes of certain demographic groups. Table
4.2 outlines the diﬀerent subsamples and their attitudes towards risk. In ﬁgure
4.4 we present the fraction of subjects who are able to identify this correlation
correctly in the experiment. The column labeled by 'avg. correct' displays the
average of correct answers summarized over all six categories. It is followed by
the fraction of correct answers in the six diﬀerent subsamples.
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Note: The columns denote the percentage of subjects that are able to correctly answer the question "What
do you think, on average, which of the two groups invests more/ switches earlier, or do both groups switch
at the same time/invest the same amount?". The column "avg. correct" averages the correct answers over
the six characteristics.
Figure 4.4: Distribution of correct answers
On average, for the e100,000 question, the stereotypes of the junior profession-
als coincide more often with the true correlations than for the other subjects.
Regarding the HL-task, again junior professionals on average answer the most
questions correctly, followed by non-professionals and senior professionals. Over
both elicitation mechanisms, junior professionals recognize the correlation be-
tween sociodemographic information and risk preferences with higher precision
than non-professionals or senior professionals.
Considering the category 'gender' in ﬁgure 4.4, nearly all subjects are aware
of the fact that men tolerate more risk than women; in the e100,000 question
even 100% of the junior professionals judge this correctly. On the other hand,
in the HL-task 61% of the senior professionals correctly believe that males, on
average, tolerate more risk. Considering the categories 'age', 'family status' or
'parenthood', around 70% to nearly 100% of subjects assess the statistical rela-
tionship in the e100,000 question correctly. The percentage of correct answers
is lower for the HL-task in these categories with around 50 to 90%.
Whereas the data delivers fairly clear results for the ﬁrst four categories, in the
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'education' and 'income' category the results are less clear.19 Approximately
20% of the non-professionals and 30 to 40% of the professional groups identify
the eﬀect of a university degree correctly.20 While in the e100,000 question 50%
to 65% are aware of the correct correlation with 'income', for the HL-task less
than 30% of answers are accurate. The 'income' category is a special case as
the correct answer is "high income" to the e100,000 question and "low income"
to the HL-task. Our study ﬁnds that only 7% recognize this pattern correctly
and answer that a diﬀerent subgroup exhibits the riskier choice.
In order to explore the diﬀerences between the subject groups, in table 4.4 we
set up four regression models. The dependent variable is the number of cor-
rectly predicted categories.21 While model 1 and 2 use data of the e100,000
question, model 3 and 4 investigate the HL-task. In model 1 and 3 we apply
a negative binomial regression model to account for the count data structure
of the dependent variable. The data are on a integer scale and range from 0
(no category is predicted correctly) to 6 (all categories are predicted correctly).
In model 2 and 4 we present OLS estimations as a robustness check. The set
of independent variables contains two dummy variables to identify the subject
groups (senior and junior for the professionals). The omitted category is non-
professional. Additionally, we include demographic variables as in model 4.3.
When we consider the regression results we ﬁnd the junior and senior coeﬃ-
cients to be signiﬁcant in all models. The senior professionals predict fewer
19If subjects chose their answers randomly we would expect 33% of correct answers. In both
mechanisms, for all categories beside income and education a t-test rejects the null-hypothesis
at reasonable levels of signiﬁcance. Even when we apply a stricter test and exempt the answer
"both equal", the correct answers of junior and non-professionals are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from 50% except for income and education.
20Regarding education, the correlations found in the literature are - as for income - am-
biguous. Dohmen et al. (2011) show that higher educated people are more risk tolerant. In
contrast to that, Belzil and Leonardi (2007) ﬁnd only modest evidence for the hypothesis that
higher risk tolerance relates to higher education levels, whereas Barsky et al. (1997) ﬁnd a
U-shaped relationship between completed years of education and the willingness to take risk.
21This is a linear transformation of "avg. correct" in ﬁgure 4.4 but allows us to use count
data models.
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Table 4.4: STEREOTYPE: Quality of prediction
Model 1 2 3 4
Dep. Var # correct e100.000 # correct HL
Method Neg.Bin OLS Neg.Bin OLS
senior -0.165*** -0.769*** -0.321*** -1.237***
0.0578 0.283 0.111 0.44
junior 0.128*** 0.623*** 0.123** 0.548**
0.0324 0.159 0.0526 0.239
female -0.0472 -0.224 -0.0526 -0.226
0.0316 0.154 0.0527 0.23
year of birth -0.0007 -0.0028 -0.0014 -0.0044
0.00275 0.013 0.00527 0.0228
single 0.00315 0.0133 -0.00127 -0.00467
0.0361 0.173 0.0697 0.292
parent 0.0411 0.182 0.173 0.65
0.0722 0.339 0.144 0.585
low income -0.0583 -0.298 0.0391 0.104
0.0527 0.27 0.0824 0.352
uni 0.00901 0.0394 -0.046 -0.177
0.0594 0.268 0.108 0.423
constant 2.981 10.54 4.247 13.09
5.459 25.84 10.43 45.12
Observations 167 167 167 167
R-squared 0.167 0.15
Robust standard errors, *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
categories correctly than the non-professionals. The opposite is true for the
junior professionals. On average, junior professionals are successful in more
categories compared to the omitted non-professionals. When testing the pro-
fessionals against each other, we ﬁnd that senior professionals get on average
less categories right.22 Note that all comparisons between the subject groups
are signiﬁcant at least on the 5%-level or higher. In contrast, for the demo-
graphic controls we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant eﬀects. The only correlation we
detect comes from the diﬀerent subject groups. Of particular interest is the
insigniﬁcance of the income variable. A potential concern of our design is the
incentive structure: We pay the same e-amounts to all subject groups. As the
senior professionals have a higher income on average, the incentives relative to
22When applying a Wald test (H0: Senior=Junior) we ﬁnd for model 1: (N=167) p<0.0001,
for model 2: (N=167) p<0.0001, model 3: (N=167) p<0.0001, model 4: (N=167) p<0.0001.
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their income are lower. Since in all models in table 4.4 the income coeﬃcient is
insigniﬁcant, there is no problem with biased incentives.
To sum up, we interpret these ﬁnding that senior professionals have less knowl-
edge on the correlations of risk preferences and demographics.
Note: Answers to the question "What do you think, on average, which of the two groups invests
more/switches earlier, or do both groups switch at the same time/invest the same amount?" with "both
groups switch at the same time/invest the same amount", averaged over all categories and split by subjects'
type and elicitation mechanism.
Figure 4.5: Distribution of answer "both equal": e100,000 question and HL-
task
So far we have focused the analysis on the correlations of certain demographic
groups and risk attitudes. In the following we will look at subjects' conﬁdence
regarding these correlations. As in STEREOTYPE the task allows the answer
"both groups switch at the same time/invest the same amount". In fact, this
answer indicates that subjects do not assign any correlation - in either way - to
the variable. Subjects choosing this option do not attach informational content
to this category. In ﬁgure 4.5 we show how often subjects choose this option
on average. With 7% (e100,000 question) and 14% of cases (HL-task) junior
professionals pick this option the least often. The non-professionals and senior
professionals choose this answer with shares between 14% and 25% nearly twice
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as often. As a result we ﬁnd that the junior professionals, the group which
shows the best knowledge on correlations and demographics, chooses the "both
equal" option the least often.
5 Conclusion
This experiment studies whether the behavior of ﬁnancial professionals devi-
ates from non-professionals when predicting the correlations between certain
demographic groups and risk preferences. Our subject pool contains senior pro-
fessionals with a long experience in ﬁnancial counseling, junior professionals
with an experience of roughly one year and non-professionals. We ﬁnd that
subjects identify the relationship between gender, age, family status, parental
status and risk taking correctly while the eﬀect of education and income is more
often predicted incorrectly.
In a further task subjects are asked to rank their own risk preference relative to
the population mean of two surveys. The large majority of the subjects is able
to identify their behavior correctly.
As a main result we ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the diﬀerent subject
groups. Senior professionals are least successful in identifying the relationship
between demographics and risk attitudes. There is also mild evidence that this
is true for their self-assessment relative to the population mean. In contrast,
junior professionals are most exact when predicting the relationship between de-
mographic groups and risk preferences or self-assessing their preferences relative
to the population mean. Interestingly, we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant diﬀerences
in the risk attitudes between the groups.
Throughout the whole analysis we control for subjects' demographics. Hence,
all eﬀects come from the diﬀerences in the subject groups and are not driven
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by observed demographics. Junior professionals show the most accurate predic-
tions, senior professionals the lowest. A possible explanation could be that with
a larger experience ﬁnancial advisors develop other strategies which are outside
the control of this experiment to ﬁgure out the risk attitudes of a potential
advisee. An alternative explanation could be that a trait of paternalism comes




Does Good Advice Come Cheap? -
On the Assessment of Risk
Preferences in the Lab and the
Field
1 Introduction
Every day, people have to decide among multiple risky options. An important
aspect is that people make a decision not only based on their own knowledge
and experience, but also based on advice. Especially in the ﬁnancial sector,
products are becoming more and more complex and at the same time, ﬁnancial
literacy is limited (Rooij et al. 2007). Thus, individuals are increasingly rely-
ing on professionals - such as ﬁnancial consultants, insurance agents, but also
doctors in the health domain - when making their decisions (c.f. Allen 2001,
Bhattacharya et al. 2012).
An integral determinant of individuals' decision making is their risk preferences.
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Behavior such as ﬁnancial decisions, smoking and occupational choices can be
predicted by risk preferences (e.g., Dohmen et al. 2011).
These developments give rise to the question of whether an advisor is capable
of assessing the risk preferences of an advisee correctly. This is the aim of this
study. We analyze whether good advice is possible if risk preferences are not
obvious to the advisor. Explicitly, we abstain from any agency problems on
which the theoretical literature has focused so far (c.f. Bhattacharya and Pﬂei-
derer 1985, Inderst and Ottaviani 2012, or Ottaviani and Sorensen 2006). Our
objective is to start a step earlier. If the advisor's only goal is to correctly gauge
the risk preferences of the advisee, is the advisor able to do so?
Advice is usually given by professional advisors. Therefore we employ an arte-
factual ﬁeld experiment1 in which three types of subjects participate: senior
ﬁnancial advisors, junior ﬁnancial advisors and non-professionals. These groups
allow us to explore potential behavioral diﬀerences, in particular as the counsel-
ing experience diﬀers and sorting of employees into the ﬁnancial sector could be
an issue (c.f. Bonin et al. 2007, Dohmen and Falk 2011, Haigh and List 2005)
Several aspects are studied: First, we inspect how advisors form beliefs about
the risk preferences of speciﬁc advisees given sociodemographic information.
We also check whether advisors' beliefs are subject to false consensus (Hsee
and Weber 1997, Hadar and Fischer 2008) regarding their own risk preferences.
This would indicate that they overestimate the extent to which other people
are similar to themselves. Furthermore, we investigate how precise the advisors'
beliefs are. Instead of analyzing whether the advisors' stated beliefs coincide
with the advisees' actual decisions, we make use of the data of a German large-
scale representative survey (SOEP) in order to generalize our result. Therefore,
we compare the advisor's belief with the average decision of subjects in the
1Artefactual ﬁeld experiments use the tools of a standard lab experiment with a non-
standard subject pool (Harrison and List 2004).
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SOEP data conditional on the sociodemographic characteristics of the observed
advisees.
In the experiment, subjects in two diﬀerent roles participate: advisors, or sub-
jects who form beliefs, and subjects on whom beliefs are formed - advisees.
Our experimental design incorporates these two roles as it consists of two main
parts. First, we use a web-based survey to collect data on potential advisees.
In the second part, we run an artefactual ﬁeld experiment consisting of four
treatments. In the ﬁrst treatment, we elicit the advisor's own risk attitude.
In the subsequent treatments, we vary the information available to the advisor
when forming beliefs about the risk preferences of a speciﬁc advisee as collected
in the survey of part one. In the second and the third treatment advisors are
able to draw on several sociodemographic variables.
The results of the experiment show a false consensus bias of the advisors. In-
deed, the advisors' own risk preferences positively correlate with their beliefs on
the advisees. Interestingly, this is especially pronounced for experienced ﬁnan-
cial advisors and non-professionals. Besides the advisors' own risk preferences,
the advisees' gender and the self-assessment of risk are considered to be impor-
tant by the advisors when forming beliefs. In general, advisees are perceived as
less risk tolerant than the advisors are themselves.
In a further step we investigate whether the advisors' beliefs coincide with the
advisees' actual choices. We ﬁnd that information on family status and the ad-
visee's self-assessment on risk improve the predictions of risk preferences. Fur-
thermore, the precision increases if more information is available. Professionals
exhibit a signiﬁcantly higher accuracy in the forecast than non-professionals.
Our paper is the ﬁrst to observe the process of forming beliefs about risk prefer-
ences of others based on several sociodemographics in detail. We can explicitly
control for the available information. A major advantage is the subject pool of
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ﬁnancial advisors.
The remaining paper is structured as follows: In the next section (section 2),
we discuss the literature on risk preferences and advice. Section 3 explains the
experimental design, while section 4 presents the results followed by concluding
remarks in section 6.
2 Literature
When making risky decisions subjects strongly react to advice (Allen 2001,
Schotter 2003). Furthermore, people prefer to have advice when making a de-
cision. Surprisingly, this is even true when it is common knowledge that the
advisor does not have any information advantage in the ﬁeld of the decision
(Nyarko et al. 2006, Schotter and Sopher 2007). A prominent example is that
subjects even demand advice for the outcome of a fair coin-ﬂip (Powdthavee
and Riyanto 2012). One explanation why subjects are keen on advice is that
during the advice process people rethink their decision problem more in-depth
and are therefore able to make better decisions (Schotter 2003).
To give good advice it is essential for the advisor to know the advisee's pref-
erences. Recent research on risk preferences has detected signiﬁcant linkages
between sociodemographic characteristics and risk attitudes. It is largely undis-
puted that women are more risk averse than men (e.g., Byrnes et al. 1999,
Croson and Gneezy 2009). Furthermore, individuals are found to be more risk
averse if they are older, married, or have children (Dohmen et al. 2011). Re-
garding the relationship of education or income and risk tolerance the ﬁndings
in the literature are ambiguous (c.f. Belzil and Leonardi 2007, Barsky et al.
1997, Dohmen et al. 2011, Hartog et al. 2002).
In contrast to the above research that studies actual correlations, advisors form
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their beliefs according to their perceived correlation between an advisee's so-
ciodemographics and his or her risk attitude. One strategy to ﬁgure out some-
body's preferences is stereotyping. Eckel and Grossman (2008) study gender
stereotypes. In their study, females tolerate less risk than males. Furthermore,
the beliefs about gender are consistent since women are perceived to be less
risk tolerant. If, instead of individuals' stereotypes, groups' stereotypes are
elicited, subjects overestimate the risk tolerance of the male group, while the
female group is correctly assessed (Siegrist et al. 2002). In terms of cultural
stereotypes, people perceive Chinese to be less risk tolerant than Americans.
Interestingly, the actual experimental data shows an opposite correlation (Hsee
and Weber 1999).
Studying the beliefs on others' risk preferences is particularly interesting with
respect to ﬁnancial decision making. Regarding ﬁnancial advice, Faro and Rot-
tenstreich (2006) inspect how subjects predict others' risky choices. Their ﬁnd-
ings show a systematic bias towards risk neutrality when estimating the risk
preferences of others. In their experiment - in contrast to the setting of Eckel
and Grossman (2008) - the advisors have to assess how a randomly chosen sub-
ject decided. Hsee and Weber (1997) study diﬀerences between a subject's own
risk preferences and the subject's beliefs about others' risk preferences. The
authors show that the diﬀerences increase with social distance. If subjects have
to assess an abstract, randomly chosen subject from the session, the self-other
discrepancy occurs. It is absent if the judging subject has visual contact with
the judged subject. No further information is transmitted in both situations;
the judging subject is unknown to the judge.
Another aspect that is raised in the literature is the false consensus bias in
belief formation (Hsee and Weber 1997, Hadar and Fischer 2008). Subjects'
beliefs about the risk preferences of another person are consistently biased to-
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wards their own risk attitude. A restriction of these studies is that no monetary
incentives are used to elicit the advisors' risk aversion or the advisors' belief.
Daruvala (2007) explores gender diﬀerences in beliefs when predicting risk pref-
erences of others. She ﬁnds that gender stereotypes as well as the subject's own
risk attitudes aﬀect the belief. However, there is no incentive compatible mech-
anism applied to elicit the beliefs on others in this design. Chakravarty et al.
(2011) inspect risk taking in delegated decisions by using lottery gambles. The
subjects have to judge the risk preferences of other participants of the experi-
ment. Judging and judged subject are seated in diﬀerent rooms, and again, no
further information on the judged subject is provided. When making the lottery
decision for this anonymous advisee, advisors exhibit a signiﬁcantly higher risk
aversion compared to their own risk attitude. In addition, the increase in risk
aversion is relative to their own risk preferences, which again supports the false
consensus hypothesis.
There is evidence that ﬁnancial professionals exhibit a diﬀerent behavior in de-
cision making than the average population (Haigh and List 2005, Nofsinger and
Varma 2007, Slovic et al. 2004). People choose their job according to their pref-
erences (Dohmen and Falk 2011). It is argued that individuals which are willing
to take more risk sort into occupations with a higher variance in income (Bonin
et al. 2007, Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln 2005) or even with a higher mortal-
ity risk (Deleire and Levy 2004). The premium dependent incentive schemes in
the ﬁnancial sector could be a reason for the sorting of ﬁnancial professionals.
This study contributes to the literature in several ways: First, in our experiment
advisors are provided with a set of sociodemographic characteristics of speciﬁc
and vivid advisees. In the literature so far, only a single sociodemographic in-
formation is presented and varied. Based on this information, advisors form
their belief about the risk preferences of the advisees. We can study the ad-
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visors' belief formation process while explicitly controlling for the information
available. Second, incentives are provided for the elicitation of the advisors'
risk preferences and beliefs, while this is not the case in previous studies. A
major advantage of our approach is our subject pool consisting of ﬁnancial pro-
fessionals and non-professionals. This allows us to study behavioral diﬀerences
of subjects familiar and unfamiliar with giving advice.
3 Experimental design
The experiment investigates beliefs about the risk preferences of others.2 This
involves two distinct roles: subjects who form beliefs (advisors) and subjects
about whom beliefs are formed (advisees). Therefore our experimental setup
consists of two main parts (c.f. ﬁgure 5.1).3 In a ﬁrst part, we collect data on
risk preferences of advisees in a web-based survey as described in section 3.1.
From this data, we choose the advisees that are presented to advisors in the
second part. We augment this information by survey data from the German
Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP) to control for representativity as discussed in
section 3.2. Especially, we borrow our risk measure (e100.000 question) from
the survey, which enables us to relate our data to the data coming from the
SOEP. As robustness check we also include the measure of Holt and Laury
(2002). A detailed discussion of our risk measures is given in chapter 2.
In the second part, we run an experiment consisting of three treatments. When
entering the lab the advisors are randomly assigned to a computer and then log
on to the experimental software. All treatments are played one after another
without interaction between the advisors. Hence, we treat each subject as an
independent observation. The payoﬀs of the whole experiment are shown after
2In the literature 'prediction', 'forecast' and 'belief' are used interchangeably.
3The instructions of both parts of the experiment can be found in appendix.
70
all treatments are ﬁnished to avoid learning eﬀects. At ﬁrst treatment SELF
is played, which asks for the advisors' sociodemographic information and their
own risk attitude using two risk measures.4 These two risk tasks are described
in section 2. In the second (RANK) as well as in the third treatment (PAY)
advisors forecast the risk preferences of four advisees' proﬁles, each chosen from
the web survey of part 1. For each advisee proﬁle we present a screen with
the advisee's sociodemographic information. Subsequently, the advisor is asked
to predict the advisee's actual decision in the same two risk measures used in
SELF. RANK and PAY diﬀer in the way the sociodemographics are presented
to the advisor. A detailed description is given in section 3.2.
Figure 5.1: Experimental design: Course of actions
3.1 Part 1: Surveys
Our main objective is to study how advisors assess the risk preferences of speciﬁc
advisees. As we analyze how the variation of sociodemographic information is
incorporated into the assessment of the advisees' risk preferences, it is crucial
to achieve suﬃcient sociodemographic heterogeneity in the pool of advisees.
To collect the subject pool from which the advisees' proﬁles are then selected,
we ran a web-based survey in November and December 2010.5 This allows us
to generate a heterogeneous sample in several sociodemographic characteristics.
4There are two more treatments. SELF, as well as PAY, is followed by a further treatment.
We do not expect interference for the presented results as the advisors do not receive any
feedback from this further treatment.
5Participants were recruited via e-mail and were asked to further distribute the survey.
Among all participants who completed the web-based survey we raed oﬀ e50.
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Furthermore, we ask the participants about their sociodemographics and elicit
their choices in the e100,000 question.
In the course of the experiment, we make use of the fact that the e100,000
question is also part of the German Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP) survey, which
allows us to generalize our results.6 This large-scale dataset surveys approx-
imately 20,750 subjects yearly and is therefore a powerful and representative
tool for our purpose. At ﬁrst, we will compare the advisees selected for presen-
tation to the advisors with subjects in the SOEP to ensure that the advisees
do not diﬀer from the population in general. Second, in section 4.3 we ana-
lyze whether the advisors' beliefs coincide with the advisees' actual choices. To
assess whether advisors' beliefs are correct, we compute the average risk pref-
erences of a subsample of the SOEP population which are comparable to the
actual advisee's sociodemographics and take this as a benchmark. This allows
us to conclude whether advisors are able to assess average advisees.
Part 1: Surveys Part 2: Lab experiment
Web survey SOEP survey Non-prof. Junior prof. Senior prof.
Variable mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
N 84 - 20,750 - 77 - 52 - 38 -
Year born 1979 10.0 1959 17.71 1986 6.29 1989 1.06 1973 11.0
Gender (female=1) 0.57 0.56 0.52 0.50 0.56 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.18 0.39
Partner (yes=1) 0.41 0.62 0.77 0.42 0.26 0.44 0.23 0.43 0.66 0.48
Parent (yes=1) 0.20 0.40 0.62 0.49 0.05 0.22 0.02 0.14 0.47 0.51
High income* (yes=1) 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.07 0 0 0 0 0.11 0.31
Uni degree (yes=1) 0.59 0.50 0.21 0.41 0.94 0.25 1.00 0.00 0.63 0.49
Counsel. Exp. (in years) - - - - - - 1.02 1.07 10.97 8.27
Stated risk attitudeθ 3.54 1.81 1.90 2.13 5.26 1.39 5.08 1.52 4.68 1.71
100,000ψ 2.38 2.70 0.91 1.98 4.70 3.29 4.00 2.44 3.11 3.18
* refers to a monthly net income above e6,000 (approx. 8,460$).
θ Subjects chose on a scale from 0 (=risk averse) to 10 (=fully prepared to take risks).
ψ refers to the the amount invested into the e100,000 question in e10,000.
Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics
While the SOEP survey is a representative sample of the German population,
this does not hold for the web survey as can be observed by comparing the de-
scriptive statistics of the sociodemographics in table 5.1, column two and three.
6C.f. www.diw.de/soep for further information. The e100,000 question was included in
the year 2009.
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However, the heterogeneity of sociodemographic characteristics within these two
pools is large compared to a sample that mainly consists of students as table 5.1
(compare column 'non-professionals', which mainly consists of students) shows.
Selection of advisees In total, eight proﬁles are used in RANK and PAY -
four for each treatment. These proﬁles are chosen from the web-based survey











64 university married >6,000 male yes 1 2 2.55
38 training single 1,001-3,000 female no 2 0 0.83
25 econ student partner <1,000 male no 5 4 1.29
30 training married 1,001-3,000 male yes 1 4 1.01
36 adv training single 3,001-6,000 male no 1 2 3.24
57 university married 3,001-6,000 female yes 0 4 0.62
41 university divorced >6,000 female no 1 2 2.50
21 econ student single <1,000 female no 4 0 1.59
θ Advisees chose on a scale from 0 (=risk averse) to 10 (=fully prepared to take risks).
ψ refers to the the amount invested into the e100,000 question in e10,000.
Table 5.2: Proﬁles of advisees
shown to the advisors is random. That is, a proﬁle could appear as the second
advisee to be assessed in RANK but also as the fourth in PAY, for example.
Nonetheless, every advisor sees all eight proﬁles in random order in RANK or
PAY.
Within the described experimental design it is vital to choose the set of our
advisees thoughtfully. The eight advisees are chosen out of the 84 subjects of
the web survey in order to achieve a balanced and diversiﬁed sample over age,
education, family status, income, gender, and parenthood as presented in table
5.2. The column '100,000' depicts the individual choices in the e100,000 ques-
tion.
Only if the advisees do not show any exceptional risk preferences, it becomes
a feasible task for the advisor to correctly assess the advisee. Hence, we have
to assure that our advisee sample is approximately coherent with the popula-
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tion. The large SOEP panel allows to accomplish this issue. We reduce the
whole SOEP population to subjects that are similar to our speciﬁc advisees
in the sociodemographic characteristics age, education, family status, income,
gender, and parenthood as presented in table 5.2. From this subsample we
calculate the average of the answer to the e100,000 question. Consider for ex-
ample the advisee in the second row of table 5.2. In order to compute the risk
tolerance of the 'representative counterpart' of this advisee (consider column
'SOEP mean'), we compute the mean of the answers in the e100,000 question
given a subsample of all SOEP observations with these characteristics.7 This
subsample contains all females, aged between 32 and 43 who are single, have
an income between e1,000 and e3,000 and are skilled by a vocational training.
On average, people with these characteristics invest e8,300 in the lottery. By
this procedure we incorporate two design features: First, the advisors assess
real-life advisees which, second, do not show extraordinary risk attitudes. We
show the diﬀerences between the individual risk preferences and the respective
population average in column '100,000' and 'SOEP mean'.
3.2 Part 2: Lab experiment
The experimental sessions took place between April 2011 and January 2012. In
total, 167 subjects in the role of advisors participated.8 In the subject pool we
have three types of advisors: senior professional advisors, junior professional
advisors and non-professionals. The non-professionals are mainly students and
hired via the AWI-lab at Heidelberg University where all sessions with non-
professionals were run.9 The senior professional advisors were recruited from
7Means are weighted with a dataset-speciﬁc weighting function which considers cross-
sectional personal weights of each subject.
8The experiment involves no interaction among the advisors, therefore each advisor is
treated as an independent observation.
9The experiment was programmed on a PHP-platform and accessible via a Web Browser.
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a large German ﬁnancial advisory agency and from local banks. The junior
advisors were recruited from a banking speciﬁc advanced training institution.10
After ﬁnishing high school, the junior professionals enter a study program in
ﬁnancial advisory at an applied university which contains practical counseling
in up to 50% of time. Since these advisors are students, regarding age and
education, they are comparable to the non-professional advisors. Detailed in-
formation on the advisor pool and descriptives are given in table 5.1. The
experiment lasted approximately 50 minutes. The average payoﬀ was e11.92.
In the following we present the three treatments (SELF, RANK, PAY). RANK
and PAY diﬀer in the way the information is provided to the advisor. As dis-
cussed in the previous section, the information in RANK and PAY is drawn from
the following categories of the advisees' sociodemographic characteristics: age,
education, family status, income, gender, having children and self-assessment
of risk-taking in ﬁnancial matters. The possible realizations of these variables
are shown in table 5.3.
Age age in years
Education university, advanced training, training, in training, no formal
training
Family status single, partner, married, divorced, living separated, widowed
Net income up to e1,000, e1,001-e3,000, e3,001-e6,000, more than e6,000
Gender male, female
Parenthood having children, having no children
Risk Index Self-assessment of risk with the question: Regarding ﬁnancial mat-
ters, are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks
or do you try to avoid taking risks?(0=risk averse to 10=fully
prepared to take risks)
Table 5.3: Information/Categories in RANK and PAY
SELF In the SELF treatment, the advisors' own sociodemographics and their
risk preferences are elicited. At ﬁrst, advisors answer the questions on their
10We ran seven sessions with professionals - three in the lab and four on-site. In all sessions,
the conditions (no communication among participants, the distance between computers, the
visual presentation of the experiment) were identical.
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sociodemographics. Subsequently, they play the e100,000 question.
RANK For this treatment, we randomly choose four out of the eight proﬁles
in table 5.2. The incentivized task is to correctly assess the risk preferences
of an advisee. In the following analysis we want to estimate the eﬀect of the
demographic characteristics of table 5.3 on the adviors' beliefs. For this we need
variation in the advisee proﬁles. Therefore we randomly assign the number of
visible characteristics. As some characteristics may be more informative the
advisors can inﬂuence the probability that a speciﬁc characteristic is uncovered.
For this we apply the following mechanism. The advisors rank all characteristics
(e.g., 1. age , 2. gender, 3. income, 4. risk index,... ). Then a random number
is drawn from a uniform distribution on the interval [1,7]. If for example, the
random number is two and we are dealing with the advisee of the last row of
table 5.2, the computer displays the following information: age: 21 years old
and gender: female. Then the advisor has to assess how this speciﬁc advisee has
decided in the e100,000 question. For this advisee the correct answers would
be 0 for the e100,000 question (see table 5.2). If the answers are correct, the
advisor is paid e0.50 for each risk task.
In total, this procedure is repeated for four advisee proﬁles. The ranking stated
at the beginning is kept for all proﬁles. However, for each proﬁle a new random
number is drawn and, of course, a new advisee proﬁle is presented. Hence, the
advisors evaluate four proﬁles one after another before moving on to the PAY
treatment.
PAY In the PAY treatment, advisors can freely choose the number and kind of
available characteristics that they want to be presented. In contrast to RANK,
the advisors have to pay for each category they want to see in each round sep-
arately (c.f. ﬁgure 5.2). The characteristics are priced according to a convex
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Figure 5.2: Course of actions
pricing rule. The ﬁrst characteristic costs e0.01 while buying all seven charac-
teristics amounts to e0.99 in total.11 When entering the PAY treatment, the
advisor are asked which categories they want to buy. If, for example, the advi-
sor wants to see age and gender, the total price amounts to e0.03. On the next
screen the categories are shown (e.g., age: 21 years old and gender: female for
the above example) and the advisor is asked to assess the risk preference of this
proﬁle. Again, the advisor earns e0.50 for each correctly assessed risk task.
On the subsequent screen, the advisor is asked to buy the sociodemographic
characteristics for the next proﬁle. As in RANK, this procedure is repeated for
four proﬁles in total.
4 Results
After introducing the diﬀerent treatments, the following section presents the
results. In this section we contribute to three questions. Section 4.1 studies
diﬀerences in the belief formation in the diﬀerent treatments and sheds a light on
self-other discrepancies. Secondly, in section 4.2 we investigate how information
on the advisee's sociodemographic characteristics aﬀects the advisor's belief.
Finally, in section 4.3 we inspect if the advisors' beliefs are correct. For this we
combine representative survey data with lab data.
11Price for the second characteristic: e0.02, the third: e0.03, the fourth: e0.06, the ﬁfth:
e0.12, the sixth: e0.24, the seventh: e0.50. As the minimum earnings that are generated
before the PAY treatment amount to e4, net losses are excluded.
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Figure 5.3: Advisors' risk preferences and beliefs (e100,000 question)
4.1 Self-assessment and beliefs
In this section, we analyze how the advisors' own risk preferences relate to their
beliefs. The term self-other discrepancy refers to a systematic misperception
between the advisor's own risk tolerance and the perceived risk tolerance of
the advisee. This eﬀect is found by Hsee and Weber (1997) but also discussed
by Eckel and Grossman (2008), Faro and Rottenstreich (2006) and Eriksen
and Kvaloy (2009). Regarding the process of giving advice it is important to
analyze whether advisors judge themselves to be more or less risk tolerant than
the advisees evaluated.
In order to investigate this eﬀect, we present the advisor's self-assessment in
the e100,000 question (SELF) compared to their beliefs separately for the two
treatments RANK and PAY in ﬁgure 5.3. The decisions are aggregated for all
three groups of advisors. The ﬁrst column 'SELF' indicates the advisor's own
decision. The second column denotes the beliefs for the RANK treatment, the
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third represents the beliefs for the PAY treatment. A Wilcoxon signed-rank
test does not detect a statistical diﬀerence between the beliefs in RANK and
PAY (p=0.43). We conclude that the way we let advisors rank and select the
sociodemographic information does not aﬀect the belief formation.
However, we ﬁnd statistically diﬀerent distributions for the comparison of SELF
vs. RANK and PAY at the 1%-level. The results indicate that the advisors on
average take more risk in their own decisions compared to the beliefs about their
advisees' risk preferences. In other words, the advisors perceive their advisees
to be less risk tolerant. If analyzed individually, 80% of the beliefs in RANK
and PAY exhibit either the same risk or are more risk averse than the advisors'
own choice. A self-other discrepancy does indeed exist.
4.2 How do advisors form beliefs?
In order to analyze how the advisors assess others' risk preferences based on
sociodemographics, we set up three regression models which are presented in
table 5.4. The data of RANK and PAY is pooled in the regressions since we do
not ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the beliefs.12 As the 167 advisors
have to judge four randomly chosen advisees in each treatment, the pooled
decisions sum up to 1,336 observations.
12Furthermore, we control for potential diﬀerences with a dummy variable.
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Model (1) (2) (3)








Year of birth -19.48 -15.26 -12.2
15.63 15.16 15.11
No uni degree 0.222 0.171 0.166
0.230 0.210 0.205
Single -0.00252 -0.0251 -0.0312
0.185 0.171 0.170
Low income -0.00822 -0.0794 -0.0812
0.159 0.148 0.148
Male 0.666*** 0.651*** 0.654***
0.224 0.201 0.198
No children 0.206 0.413** 0.414**
0.193 0.177 0.176
















Year of birth 0.00989 0.00776 0.00623
0.00794 0.0077 0.00767
Uni degree -0.0261 -0.00661 -0.0164
0.246 0.231 0.224
Partner -0.269 -0.188 -0.185
0.216 0.207 0.208
High income 1.409*** 1.429*** 1.458***
0.240 0.237 0.231
Female -1.118*** -1.133*** -1.158***
0.218 0.218 0.217
Children -0.654*** -0.748*** -0.766***
0.251 0.246 0.243










Self · junior -0.142**
0.0696
Self · senior 0.103
0.0905
Junior -0.667** -0.422** 0.146
0.189 0.176 0.295
Senior -0.653** -0.265 -0.587*
0.282 0.241 0.317
Rank -0.0709 -0.0885 -0.0886
0.0982 0.0971 0.0970
Constant 3.781*** 2.756*** 2.742***
0.351 0.333 0.341
N 1,336 1,336 1,336
R2 0.43 0.474 0.483
Adjusted R2 0.419 0.464 0.472
Advisee FE yes yes yes
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, robust standard errors clustered
at advisors' level. Dependent variable: advisor's belief in e100,000
question. 1{seen = 1} indicates a characteristic is visible. {soc dem}
indicates the realization of the characteristic. The left-out category is
1{seen=0}.
Table 5.4: Regression results: Belief formation
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Model (1) (2) (3)
H0 : {socdem = 0}+ {socdem 6= 0}=0
Year of Birth 0.4207 0.3155 0.4207
Education 0.3891 0.3461 0.3891
Family status 0.2277 0.2350 0.2277
Income 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Gender 0.0022 0.0046 0.0022
Parenthood 0.1400 0.1692 0.1400
Risk index 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Table 5.5: Wald test on joint signiﬁcance (p-values) for table 5.4
We run an OLS regression in which the dependent variable is the belief on the
eight advisees.13 However, how much and which information is available to
each advisor when forming the belief depends on the ranking and the random
number (RANK) or on how many categories are bought (PAY). The empiri-
cal models have to incorporate diﬀerent states of available information of the
advisor when making the prediction. Therefore, we include two major sets of
variables. The estimated models thereby allow evaluating how advisors adopt
their beliefs when information on diﬀerent categories is available.
The dummy variables in the upper part (1{seen=1}) bear a value of one if
the corresponding characteristic is visible. The variables in the part below
(1{seen=1} · {soc dem 6=0}) are interaction terms carrying the value of the
variable itself and are interacted with the upper dummy variables. Thus the
value of the characteristic shows up only if it is observable.14 The omitted cat-
egory in this speciﬁcation is `not seen' (1{seen=0}). Hence, this allows us to
interpret the results as the marginal eﬀects of the speciﬁc characteristics if it
is observed. In this speciﬁcation the coeﬃcients of the upper set of dummy
13Remember that for a better readability, in the analyses, we present the belief in the
e100,000 question in 'e10,000 invested' such that the beliefs are scaled from 0 to 10.
14Note that the value of the sociodemographic information on 'income', 'education' and
'family status' is converted into a dummy variable to ease the interpretation. 'Income' is
divided into high income (value=1) and low income (value=0), 'education' into advisees with
(value=1) or without (value=0) university degree and 'family status' into having a partner
(value=1) and not having a partner (value=0).
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variables reﬂect the eﬀect if the actual value of the variable is zero (e.g., the
eﬀect on male, as the gender dummy variable has a value of zero for male and
one for female).
Additionally, by including dummy variables for the junior and senior profession-
als respectively, we disentangle deviations in the behavior of the groups being
familiar with giving advice. Since the unit of observation is the advisor, the
errors are clustered on the level of the advisors.
Given the econometric speciﬁcation, we compute the scope of adjustment of
the advisors' forecast dependent on the observable information. Generally, we
expect the signs to be coherent with recent literature such as Dohmen et al.
(2011), who use the same risk measure; we expect an advisor's belief to be more
risk averse if an advisee is female instead of male. In chapter 4 we show that
especially males, younger people, singles and non-parents are on average asso-
ciated with a higher degree of risk taking. Advisors are thus expected to form
their beliefs according to the known correlations. While model (1) serves as
the baseline speciﬁcation, model (2) and (3) include advisors' risk preferences
in addition.
The regression results show that the risk index and gender variable are highly
signiﬁcant for both sets of controls in all models. By evaluating the gender vari-
able in model (1) we ﬁnd that advisors increase their forecast for the e100,000
question by e6,660 on average if a male is assessed. The investment decreases
by e4,520 if a female is indicated.15 In eﬀect, males are expected to invest
e4,520 more in the lottery than females. A Wald test on the joint signiﬁcance
over both sets of controls (H0 : {socdem = 0} + {socdem 6= 0} = 0) reveals
joint signiﬁcance at the 1%-level (table 5.5). The correlation between gender
and risk preferences, as suggested by the literature, is thus incorporated into
15To calculate the total eﬀect, we have to sum both the male and female coeﬃcient; the
total eﬀect turns out to be negative.
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the advisor's belief.
A similar statement can be made for the variable risk index. The variable risk
index in the upper part has the value of one if the advisee's risk index is zero
and visible to the advisor. The fact that it shows up to be signiﬁcant decreases
the investment by approximately e33,650.16 We ﬁnd that on average the ad-
visors increase their investment forecast by e8,850 for each point the advisee's
risk index variable increases. Both coeﬃcients are jointly signiﬁcant.
Regarding the income variable, we ﬁnd that advisors adjust their belief only
for advisees with high income.17 The interaction variable for high income is
highly signiﬁcant. Therefore, the amount invested in the lottery increases by
e14,090.18
In addition to the advisee ﬁxed eﬀects we incorporate advisor attributes in
model (2). The `self' variable contains the advisor's personal risk attitude.
This variable turns out to be highly signiﬁcant. This is an interesting ﬁnding
since the forecast is not only made on the grounds of the provided information
about the advisees but is also related to the advisor's personal risk attitude.
Especially the size of the coeﬃcient shows the considerable inﬂuence of the advi-
sor's preferences. Together with the dependent variable, this variable is located
on the same domain. For every e1,000 an advisor invests into the lottery, he or
she expects the advisee to invest e183 more, on average. This implicates that
an advisor's personal risk attitude serves as a reference point for judging oth-
ers. The inclusion of further advisor's characteristics (e.g., gender, age) shows
a stable inﬂuence of the advisor's risk preferences (not reported).
16The advisees' choices of risk index range from 0 to 5 (table 5.2).
17Note: High income refers to a monthly net income of e6,000 and more. Regarding the
correlation between income and risk preferences, results in the literature are ambiguous (see
section 2).
18For the information on parenthood, we can observe that the eﬀect is signiﬁcant if the ad-
visor observes that the advisee has children. Nevertheless, the Wald test on joint signiﬁcance
in table 5.5 proves that this is not signiﬁcant.
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In model (3) we are interested in whether professional experience changes the
extent to which advisors base their belief on their own risk preferences. Sim-
ilarly to the 'Self' variable we include two more interaction variables: 'Self ·
junior' and 'Self · senior'.19 These variables interact the advisor's risk prefer-
ences with a dummy variable of the respective advisor's type. This speciﬁcation
allows analyzing systematic diﬀerences of the inﬂuence of the advisors' own risk
attitude on the beliefs in the diﬀerent advisor groups. The coeﬃcient of 'Self'
stays largely unchanged when comparing model (2) and model (3). Hence, the
non-professional advisor expects, on average and ceteris paribus, an advisee to
invest e186 more into the lottery for every e1,000 the advisor himself invests.
The junior professionals' advice decisions are not based on their own risk pref-
erences because the coeﬃcients 'Self · junior' and 'Self' are jointly not sig-
niﬁcant as proven by a Wald test. In contrast to that, senior professionals
show no signiﬁcantly diﬀerent behavior compared to the omitted category 'non-
professionals'. The false consensus bias is thus driven by senior professionals
and non-professionals, while junior professionals seem to abstain from using
their own decision as reference point.
As suggested above, pooling the data of RANK and PAY is not an issue since
'Rank' is insigniﬁcant in all models. The variables controlling for the advisor's
type indicate that professionals compared to the non-professional advisors gen-
erally believe that advisees invest a lower amount in the e100,000 question.
In conclusion, this analysis demonstrates that advisors adjust their beliefs ac-
cording to the available information. In particular, the signiﬁcant variables show
the presumed signs. Furthermore we conclude that they use their own risk atti-
tude as a reference point. Hence, this matches the ﬁndings of Chakravarty et al.
(2011) who report a correlation between advisors' and advisees' preferences.
19The omitted category is 'non-professional'.
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4.3 Prediction error
One of the research questions raised in the introduction is whether the advisors'
beliefs coincide with the advisees' actual risk preferences. In other words, we
analyze if the advisors' beliefs are correct. Furthermore, we inspect whether
and which information is a prerequisite for forming precise beliefs. In order
to answer this question we combine our experimental data with the large-scale
heterogeneous data from the SOEP. This allows us to generalize our results and
to make statements on a representative level.
Derivation of Prediction Errors In a similar manner as described in sec-
tion 3.1, we compute the risk preferences of 'representative counterparts' of the
advisees in order to make use of the higher predictive power of the SOEP data.
However, in contrast to section 3.1 we have to take into account that not all
characteristics are visible to the advisor when making the prediction. Hence,
the subsample on which the conditional average of the answer to the e100,000
question is based has to be adjusted to the available information for every sin-
gle assessment. Take for example the advisee in the second row of table 5.2. If
the advisor sees all seven characteristics, this could be due to the fact that the
random number is seven in RANK or the advisor buys all seven categories in
PAY. In this case, the conditional mean is computed as described in section 3.1
and would amount to an investment of e8,300. However, if the advisor buys
only gender, or alternatively, ranks gender ﬁrst and the random number is one,
the subset contains all female observations. On average, panel participants of
the SOEP with this characteristic invest e6,878 in the lottery.
By the above procedure we obtain a value for every observation which proxies
the advisee's actual decision. In order to analyze if the advisor's belief is cor-
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rect, we compute the advisor's prediction error. For this we take the squared
diﬀerence of the advisor's belief and the computed average choice from above.
This diﬀerence serves as the dependent variable for the analyses below.
Figure 5.4: Quantiles: Prediction errors
Results In ﬁgure 5.4 we show a quantile plot of the prediction errors for the
pooled prediction errors for the RANK and PAY treatment. The 45◦-line rep-
resents the benchmark case of a uniform distribution of the prediction errors
over the quantiles. About 20% of advisors exhibit a squared prediction error
of 16 and larger, which indicates the advisors' predictions to be fairly accurate.
Approximately 60% of the observations exhibit a squared prediction error below
four. In other words: As the scale on the y-axis is squared, in 60% of the cases
the belief deviates from the actual average choice by e20,000 or less.
86
To analyze the prediction errors in more detail, in table 5.6 we present two re-
gression models to investigate if more and which information helps to decrease
the advisor's prediction error. The dependent variable is the squared diﬀerence
between the advisor's belief and the conditional average for the respective ad-
visee is employed. In model (5) and model (6) we include two diﬀerent types
of explanatory variables. In model (5) the variable 'sum seen' measures the
number of sociodemographic characteristics that is visible to the advisor when
making the prediction. In model (6) the sum of visible characteristics is split
up into the diﬀerent categories. For each category a dummy variable is included
which indicates a one if the category is uncovered. As a second set of variables
in both models we include controls for the treatment and the advisor's type
where the omitted category is 'non-professional'. Furthermore, both models
correct for advisee ﬁxed eﬀects and employ robust standard errors clustered on
advisors.
In model (5) we ﬁnd the variable 'sum seen' to be signiﬁcant at the 1%-level.
The negative sign indicates that if more categories are available, the precision
of the prediction increases. The marginal eﬀect of -0.652 is economically rele-
vant as the mean of the squared prediction error amounts to approximately 8.7.
Hence, we ﬁnd that indeed the amount of information plays a signiﬁcant role
for giving precise advice.
When considering model (6) we ﬁnd a negative coeﬃcient for the category
risk index, signiﬁcant at the 1%-level. This indicates that if the advisee's self-
assessed risk preference is visible to the advisor, the squared prediction error
decreases by approximately nine units. This conﬁrms that the risk index vari-
able possesses a signiﬁcant predictive power. This is also true for the family




























Junior prof. -4.599*** -4.011***
1.253 1.118








Adjusted R2 0.156 0.211
Advisee FE yes yes
Results of OLS regression, * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, ro-
bust standard errors clustered at advisors' level, dependent variable:
squared diﬀerence between advisors belief and actual choice of rep-
resentative advisee calculated from SOEP. 1{seen=1} indicates if a
characteristic is seen.
Table 5.6: Regression results: Prediction errors
A further considerable result of this analysis is obtained with respect to the types
of advisors. The prediction error of the junior professionals shows up to be sig-
niﬁcantly lower compared to the reference group of (omitted) non-professionals.
In model (5) this coeﬃcient has a relevant impact with a value of -4.6. When
comparing the two groups of professionals we ﬁnd the junior professionals to
have signiﬁcantly lower prediction errors compared to the senior professionals.
The coeﬃcient of the senior professionals is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the
reference category of non-professionals. Both groups of professional advisors
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perform signiﬁcantly better in model (6) compared to the non-professionals. In
addition to junior professionals, also senior professionals have a signiﬁcantly
lower prediction error at a signiﬁcance level of 10%.
A further observation in these models is that they explain 16% to 21% of the
variation in the prediction errors. Compared to other studies analyzing risk
preferences and their determinants, this is remarkably high.
In summary, these models demonstrate that if more information is available, the
prediction quality of advice increases. The variables risk index and parenthood
improve the prediction of risk preferences. A major result is that profession-
als outperform non-professionals in making precise predictions. Interestingly,
young professionals' beliefs are even more precise than the beliefs of the senior
professionals.
5 Robustness checks and further results
As outlined in section 3, the whole experiment is executed with the risk measure
of Holt and Laury (2002), which serves as robustness check (see chapter 2 for
details). In the following paragraphs we reproduce the previous analyses to
back the arguments made in the sections 4.1 and 4.2. For section 4.3 we cannot
provide a robustness check since the alternative risk measure is not available
for the SOEP dataset. All mentioned tables and ﬁgures can be found in the
appendix.
5.1 Self-assessment and beliefs
Figure 7.2 shows the distributions of the advisor's beliefs and the advisor's own
risk preferences as in section 4.1. In contrast to the e100,000 measure, the
HL-task allows to reveal risk-loving preferences. Approximately 12.6% of the
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advisors switch from lottery A to lottery B before row 5 and therefore exhibit
risk-loving behavior. These results are comparable in size with the results re-
ported by Holt and Laury (2002).
In general, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relationship between the beliefs in the HL-task
and the e100,000 question. The rank correlation coeﬃcient of the beliefs in the
two measures amounts to 0.52 and is statistically signiﬁcant at 0.1%. Hence,
the observed distribution of the beliefs in the HL-task (ﬁgure 7.2) is comparable
to the distribution of the beliefs in the e100,000 question (ﬁgure 5.3).
In ﬁgure 5.3 we ﬁnd that advisors judge the advisees to be less risk tolerant
compared to their own risk attitude in the RANK and PAY treatment. This
result is detected in the robustness check as well since the dashed lines lie above
the solid black line, as can be observed in ﬁgure 7.2. A sign-test approves this
result at a signiﬁcance level of 1%. 72% of advisors' beliefs are less risky or
equally risky compared to the advisors' own risk preferences. Furthermore a
Wilcoxon test does not detect any diﬀerence between SELF and PICT. There-
fore the statistical ﬁndings of the robustness check are in line with the results
of section 4.1.
5.2 How do advisors form beliefs?
In the following section we present the robustness checks for the question of
section 4.2. For this we replicate the analysis above with the HL-task and re-
estimate the empirical models (1) to (3) and refer to them as (1a) to (3a) in
table 7.3 and 7.4. If we ﬁnd coeﬃcients to exhibit an opposite sign compared
to section 4.2, our results are similar, as for the HL-task, a higher number
indicates that the advisee is supposed to switch later and thus reveals a higher
risk aversion. Aside from the sign, the dependent variables of both risk measures
range on a scale from 0 to 10.
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For model (1a), which analyzes the speciﬁcation of (1), we ﬁnd similar eﬀects.
Again the risk index, gender and income variables are signiﬁcant at the 1%-
level. All mentioned coeﬃcients are jointly signiﬁcant at the 1%-level as well.20
In model (2a) we incorporate advisors' own risk preferences ('all advisors self')
in addition to the advisee-ﬁxed eﬀects. In line with model (2a) the coeﬃcient
is signiﬁcant and of relevant magnitude.
Model (3a) includes indicator variables for the diﬀerent groups of advisors. In
model (3) we ﬁnd no false consensus eﬀect for the junior advisors. In contrast
to that, in model (3a) these advisors exhibit a false consensus. However it is
not statistically diﬀerent from the non-professionals. The same is true for the
senior professionals.
These robustness checks largely conﬁrm the results of chapter 4.2. We ﬁnd
diﬀerences in the magnitude of the false consensus for the junior professionals.
6 Conclusion
This study investigates how advisors form beliefs about the risk preferences
of advisees. Advice, especially in the ﬁnancial sector, is important as people
increasingly make their investment decisions after consulting a professional ad-
visor. Hence, an accurate prediction of an advisee's risk preferences is vital for
good advice. The results of this study contribute to the existing literature in
several ways.
We ﬁnd that the risk tolerance an advisor assigns to an advisee signiﬁcantly
depends on the advisee's self-assessment of risk preferences. Besides, the self-
assessment, gender and income have a signiﬁcant impact on the advisors' assess-
ment of the advisees' risk preferences. A salient ﬁnding is that advisors employ
20See table 7.4 in the appendix for details.
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their own risk preferences as a reference point when giving advice.
Interestingly, the beliefs show a higher risk aversion than the advisors' own risk
preferences. For the process of giving advice this indicates that - abstracting
from any incentive problems arising in the advice process - advisors in general
do not assess people to be more risky than they are themselves.
When analyzing the prediction errors we ﬁnd that more available information
reduces prediction errors. Especially the visibility of the risk index and family
status improves the prediction. By using the large-scale data of the SOEP to
construct choices of representative advisees, we provide further robustness for
this result. Sociodemographic information is helpful for advice to become more
precise. Good advice is thus not cheap, it needs sociodemographic information.
Information about family status and the advisees' self-assessment of risk pref-
erences, however, can be obtained easily in a counseling interview.
The fact that professional advisors are able to predict the risk preference with
higher precision is good news for costumers of ﬁnancial advisors. Furthermore,
theoretical studies that solely focus on agency problems and incentives that
arise in the counseling interview often take as given that the advisor is aware
of the risk preferences of the advisee. Given our study, this assumption should
be viewed with some caution.
A major asset of this study is the rich dataset. We investigate whether the
ﬁnancial professionals' behavior diﬀers from non-professionals. Interestingly,
junior professionals emerge as a group that stands out for two reasons. First,
their advice is less dependent on their own risk preferences, and second, the
prediction is more precise than in any other group. Hence, extensive counseling




Does Meeting Make a Diﬀerence? -
How Personal Interaction Aﬀects
the Assessment of Risk Preferences
1 Introduction
Advice is important for decision making, particularly in the ﬁnancial domain.
Two important features characterize recent developments in ﬁnancial markets
and are closely related to our study.
First, ﬁnancial products are becoming more and more complex. Financial lit-
eracy is required, but knowledge about even basic ﬁnancial principles is not
necessarily given among the population (Rooij et al. 2007, Lusardi and Mitchell
2005). Thus advice by professionals is increasingly important (Shiller 2008).
Furthermore, recent research suggests that subjects have a preference for advice
when making a decision. People ask for advice even if it is common knowledge
that the advisor does not have any information advantage in the ﬁeld of the
decision (Nyarko et al. 2006, Schotter and Sopher 2007). When making risky
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decisions subjects strongly react to advice (Allen 2001, Schotter 2003). How-
ever, for giving good advice, the consultant has to know the risk preferences of
the client to recommend products that match the client's preferences.
Second, the development of web-based technologies has induced that people are
able to buy ﬁnancial products online and do not necessarily visit a bank. On-
line trading accounts for a major share of the trading activity and inﬂuences the
performance of investors (Barber and Odean 2001, 2002). Also, communication
via the internet has become easy and cheap. However, when communicating via
the internet, the social distance1 between the ﬁnancial advisor and the advisee is
increasing. These two developments raise the question whether, for giving good
advice, personal interaction between consultant and client is necessary. For
example, for many online services a client transmits all relevant information
over the web. Based on this information, and without a face-to-face meeting,
the consultant recommends products. Recent research suggests that personal
involvement, empathy and the social distance between subjects aﬀect the deci-
sions made on behalf of others (e.g., Faro and Rottenstreich 2006, Güth et al.
2007).
The central question of this paper is whether personal interaction is necessary for
assessing the risk preferences of others. In our setup, subjects have to assess the
risk preferences of others in a within-subject-design. In our baseline treatment,
subjects base their decisions only on demographic information. In our two
main treatments we manipulate the social distance between the subjects: In
the INFORMATION treatment we provide the demographic information by
chat protocols between two persons. In the INTERACTION treatment subjects
predict the other's risk preferences after gathering the information by a face-to-
1In our understanding of social distance we follow Bohnet and Frey (1999): "When social




In our setup, advisors are rewarded for exactly meeting the preferences of the
advisee. We thus abstain from explicitly modeling payoﬀ responsibility; advisors
know that there are no payoﬀ consequences for the advisee. The main asset of
our study is that we manipulate the social distance between subjects when
predicting the risk preferences of others in a within-subject design. Our results
show that social distance has an ambiguous eﬀect on the prediction of risk
preferences. While we ﬁnd mild evidence that chat protocols help to avoid
misjudgments, interestingly, personal interaction does not have a positive eﬀect
on prediction errors.
In the subsequent analysis, we will proceed as follows. While section 2 gives an
overview of the literature, in section 3 the experimental design is described. In
section 4 we derive our hypothesis and present the results in section 5. Finally,
section 6 concludes. In the appendix, the experimental instructions can be
found.
2 Literature
Our investigation adds to the four following strands of the literature. First,
several studies investigate the assessment of another person's risk preferences
given their sociodemographic information. With this respect, Eckel and Gross-
man (2008) study gender stereotypes in a setup in which the subject to be
judged is fully visible. The authors ﬁnd that subjects believe that women are
less risk tolerant than men. Indeed, in their data females are less willing to take
risks. In a similar manner, Siegrist et al. (2002) ﬁnd that if groups of males or
females are assessed, the risk tolerance of the male group is overestimated, while
the female group is correctly assessed. In terms of cultural stereotypes, peo-
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ple perceive Chinese to be less risk tolerant than Americans (Hsee and Weber
1999). Interestingly, the actual experimental data show an opposite correlation.
Roth and Voskort (2012b) study the assessment of others' risk preferences based
on several sociodemographics and ﬁnd that indeed the amount of sociodemo-
graphic information increases the precision of advice. Our paper adds to this
literature as we let people interact face-to-face with the assessed person.
In a second strand of literature, subjects take risky decisions referring to others.
In this setup, no particular sociodemographic information is transmitted, but
the degree to which people have an (emotional) relationship diﬀers. According
to Loewenstein et al. (2001) decisions might change if people are emotionally
involved. The results by Hsee and Weber (1997) are twofold. First, they show
that subjects predict others to be more risk seeking than themselves in risky
choices. In addition, the authors ﬁnd that this self-other discrepancy vanishes
if the assessed person is vivid and shown to the subject. The concept of an em-
pathy gap (Loewenstein 1996) between advisee and advisor is also investigated
by Faro and Rottenstreich (2006). The authors study whether the self-reported
ability to empathize with someone else inﬂuences the ability to assess others'
risk preferences. The authors compare risky decisions made on behalf of a close
friend and an unknown person (on whom the decision maker has no further in-
formation). Faro and Rottenstreich (2006) ﬁnd that the greater the self-reported
ability to empathize with others' emotional reactions, the less regressive are the
predictions of others' risk preferences.
A third strand of literature introduces payoﬀ externalities for the judged subject.
The baseline result is provided by Chakravarty et al. (2011) and Eriksen and
Kvaloy (2009), who ﬁnd opposite eﬀects. First, Chakravarty et al. (2011) inspect
risk taking in delegated decisions by using lottery gambles. Judging and judged
subject are placed in diﬀerent rooms, no further information on the judged
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subject is provided and the identities are not revealed to each other. As a
result, the decision maker assigns more risk to others than to himself. However,
Eriksen and Kvaloy (2009) show that subjects take less risk with clients' money
than with their own. In a study by Pahlke et al. (2012) risky decisions are made
on behalf of others, but the decision maker has to justify his decision in front of
the judged subjects. The results deliver evidence that the decisions on behalf
of others bear less risk under responsibility, which is in line with Eriksen and
Kvaloy (2009).
Finally, Charness and Jackson (2009) investigate risk taking in a setting with a
dictator and a recipient. They compare dictators investing for themselves with a
setting where the investment is made on behalf of the recipient. As a restriction,
communication between the two players is not possible. The results show the
dictator's investments to be less risky when the investments are made for the
recipients than for themselves. Güth et al. (2007) investigate the eﬀect of social
distance on risk taking on behalf of others. They compare a situation in which
a speechless video clip of the judged subject is shown to a situation in which
the judged subject is unknown in order to investigate the relationship between
risk attitudes and social preferences. The authors do not detect signiﬁcant
diﬀerences between their treatments.
In our design, we manipulate the social distance diﬀerently as we introduce the
information treatment in which only text-based communication is observable as
well as face-to-face communication (interaction treatment). The next paragraph
explains the experimental setup in more detail.
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3 Experimental design
As outlined above, the experiment investigates the eﬀect of social distance on
the assessment of risk preferences of others. The experimental design we use is
a within-subject design. Subjects play one treatment after another. Therefore
we consider each subject to be an independent observation. The experiment
is computerized and programmed in zTree (Fischbacher 2007). In total we
conduct thirteen sessions. Each experimental session consists of eight subjects.
Overall, 104 subjects participate in the experiment. The subjects are recruited
via ORSEE (Greiner 2004) at the AWI-lab at Heidelberg University. Descriptive
statistics can be found in table 6.1.
For the remainder of the experiment we introduce two roles: a subject is denom-
inated to be an advisor if he or she forms beliefs about somebody else; a subject
is called advisee if an advisor forms beliefs about him or her. All subjects play
both roles subsequently.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Female 104 0.48 0.5 0 1
Year of birth 104 1989 2.65 1979 1994
Partner 104 0.35 0.48 0 1
Height (in cm) 104 175 8.85 157 198
Uni education 104 1 0 1 1
High income** 104 0 0 0 0
Proﬁt 104 13.46 2.65 8.6 19,2
e100,000*** 103* 4.58 3.08 0 10
sMPL**** 99* 6.02 1.89 1 10
* Outliers excluded
** refers to an income above e6,000
*** Decision in e100,000 question, amount not invested in e10,000.
**** row of switching to option B in sMPL
Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics of subjects in the experi-
ment
The experimental setup comprises the following treatments: In the ﬁrst treat-
ment, we elicit the advisor's own characteristics and risk preferences (SELF). In
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Figure 6.1: Course of actions
the second treatment (ANONYM) advisors have to predict the risk preferences
of 20 advisee proﬁles given their sociodemographic characteristics. In the third
treatment (INTERACTION), advisors take part in a one-to-one conversation
with four of the advisees presented in ANONYM and have to forecast their risk
preferences. In the fourth treatment (INFO) advisors judge the risk preferences
of four co-players already assessed in ANONYM. In contrast to INTERAC-
TION, the information is provided by a transcribed conversation. Hence, in
the INFO treatment the informational structure is as in INTERACTION, but
the advisees' appearance and voice cannot be observed. The following sections
explain the experiment in detail.2
Since the experiment includes treatments in which anonymity cannot be en-
sured, all participants have to sign a disclosure agreement at the beginning.
Measures of risk aversion Throughout the whole experiment two distinct
risk measures are employed. The ﬁrst measure is borrowed from Dohmen et al.
(2011) while the second mechanism is a multiple price list design taken from
Holt and Laury (2002). In chapter 2 we provide a detailed discussion of both
measures. In order to make sure that subjects understand these mechanisms
we include a test questions for both risk tasks.
2After INTERACTION we elicit second-order beliefs. We do not expect any interference
as no feedback is given.
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3.1 Treatments
The experiment is separated into four main treatments (SELF, ANONYM,
INTERACTION, INFO). When entering the lab, the subjects have to draw
a lot which randomly assigns them to a computer workspace.
SELF In the ﬁrst treatment SELF, we elicit the subject's demographics and
risk preferences. Therefore, subjects have to play the two risk tasks as described
above. The preference elicitation is incentivized. In the e100,000 question, the
value of e100,000 is paid oﬀ by e2.50. The subjects' payoﬀs range between
e1.25 and e5. For the sMPL the payoﬀs range from e0.10 to e3.85.
ANONYM After ﬁnishing the SELF treatment advisors enter the second
treatment (ANONYM) in which they assess the risk attitudes of others. It
serves as a baseline treatment. The advisors' task is to predict exactly the
advisee's decision in the two elicitation mechanisms. Therefore we ask the
advisors "How do you think the advisee, whose characteristics are displayed in
the box above, decided?" in the respective risk measure. In all treatments, when
the advisor's prediction meets the choice of the advisee we pay e0.50 per risk
elicitation mechanism. As we reward only for an exactly correct prediction, this
payoﬀ structure is incentive compatible.
Level of education university, technical college, apprenticeship, currently a student,
currently a student with an economics major, currently in an
apprenticeship, no vocational training or education
Age 0-25 years, 26-40 years, 40-65 years, over 65 years
Monthly net inc. Up to e1000, e1000-3000, e3001-6000, over e6000
Marital status single/single parent, divorced, in a relationship, living separately,
married, widowed
Gender male, female
Children children, no children
Body height in cm
Table 6.2: Information provided in the proﬁles
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In this treatment advisors have to predict the risk preferences of 20 proﬁles. For
each proﬁle we provide the advisor with seven sociodemographic characteristics
on the computer screen. The possible realizations of the characteristics are
presented in table 6.2. These characteristics are considered to be signiﬁcant
correlates with risk taking (Dohmen et al. 2011, Gaudecker et al. 2011, Roth
and Voskort 2012b). An example of a proﬁle presented is: gender: female,
family status: single, parental status: without children, age: 33 years, education:
university degree, monthly net income: e1001 - e3000, body height: 158 cm.
Hence, in this treatment, an advisor has only demographic information at hand
when making the judgment. The proﬁles presented are composed as follows: we
include the seven proﬁles of the co-players in INTERACTION and INFO. In
addition to the seven co-player proﬁles, we include further proﬁles from chapter
5. In total we elicit the beliefs over twenty proﬁles in order to achieve a higher
degree of heterogeneity in the proﬁles' demographics. The proﬁles are presented
to the subjects one after another in a random order.
INTERACTION In this treatment subjects come together for four personal
one-to-one conversations in groups of two. Compared to the previous treatment,
subjects experience a lower social distance through the personal interaction.
At the beginning of the experiment, subjects are randomly matched to four co-
players. In the INTERACTION treatment, the subjects meet these co-players
successively in person for a conversation. Each conversation takes place at a
separated table. At ﬁrst, one subject interviews the other and vice versa. By
this we gain observations for every pair. After the last of the four conversations,
subjects return to their computer workplaces and their task is to predict each
partner's risk preferences in both risk measures. To make sure the advisors
remember their advisee correctly, they ﬁll out a questionnaire which they keep
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after the interview. Thus both partners of the one-to-one conversation take the
role of advisor and advisee: in the same conversation, they have to assess their
interview partner and are assessed themselves.
To make sure they actually do not collude and simply tell their partner their
decisions in the risk measures, several control instruments are employed. The
sessions consist of eight subjects and therefore only four groups are chatting
simultaneously. In all sessions, two or three experimenters are present in the
lab and the conversations are audio recorded. Finally, subjects are told in the
instructions that they would be excluded from the experiment when mentioning
the risk measures. Throughout the whole experiment, we have not detected a
single attempt of non-compliance.
The four personal meetings diﬀer in the questions that subjects are allowed
to ask: two meetings are of TYPE A and two meetings are of TYPE B. In
TYPE A subjects are equipped with a questionnaire containing demographic
questions they are expected to ask their partners during the conversation (see
table 6.2). These questions are designed to ask exactly for the demographic
information according to the proﬁles. The subjects are told that they strictly
have to follow the questionnaire. By asking questions about the sociodemo-
graphics we ensure that the advisor has at least as much information available
as in ANONYM. However, it could easily happen that advisors gain more so-
ciodemographic information "between the lines" in this treatment compared to
the ANONYM treatment. Moreover, in TYPE B conversations, in addition
to the demographic questions, subjects can ask whatever they want except for
the risk measures. In contrast to the ANONYM treatment, the social distance
is substantially decreased in this treatment as in the face-to-face conversation
subjects will recognize appearance, voice, etc.
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INFO In this treatment, we equip subjects with transcripts of a chat of the
INTERACTION treatment. We use audio recordings of previous sessions to
transcribe an exact chat protocol of a conversation. By this, the advisor has
exactly the same amount of information available as in INTERACTION, but
does not meet with the advisee. Hence, the content of the communication is
kept constant but the social distance is larger compared to INTERACTION.
The transcripts are taken from conversations of earlier sessions. The drawback
of this treatment is that we cannot establish a within-advisor eﬀect as the
transcribed conversations are transferred to later sessions. For further details
see ﬁgure 6.2.
Figure 6.2: Allocation of transcripts
Over all thirteen sessions advisors judge 35 transcripts.3 As in INTERACTION
the transcripts are of two types: one of TYPE A and one of TYPE B. One
advisee presented in transcript TYPE A is also present in the transcript of
TYPE B. Thus every subject judges the proﬁles of three diﬀerent advisees. For
each transcript we gain eight observations.
3One transcript coming from session 1 is used twice.
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4 Hypotheses and data
4.1 Hypotheses
The key aspect of this study is to relate social distance to the prediction of risk
preferences. We use three treatments that implement diﬀerent levels of social
distance between advisor and advisee to evaluate this eﬀect. The underlying
assumption is that information on another person aﬀects the social distance. In
the INFO treatment the advisor gathers additional information on the advisee
by a transcribed conversation. By this feature of our design, the advisor re-
ceives the same demographic information as in the ANONYM treatment but is
possibly able to extract more information "between the lines". Hence, in INFO
the social distance should be lower compared to the ANONYM treatment in
which the information is presented in a list.
In the INTERACTION treatment, the advisor acquires information in an au-
thentic face-to-face conversation. Again, when making the decision the same
amount of demographic information as in ANONYM is available. In the con-
versation the advisor will receive information "between the lines" in a similar
fashion as in INFO and additionally experience the personal interaction. As a
consequence, we expect the lowest social distance in this treatment.
The variable of interest in this experiment is the prediction error of the advisor.
This is measured by the squared diﬀerence δ between the advisor's prediction
and the advisee's choice of the risk measure.4 As outlined above, both risk
measures are scaled from 0 (choice with the highest risk tolerance) to 10 (the
most risk averse choice). Therefore the squared diﬀerence ranges from 0 to 100.
4 δ=(advisor's belief-advisee's choice)2
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Hypothesis 1. (Information)
In treatment INFO, the advisor possesses more information on the advisee com-
pared to ANONYM. Hence, we expect that the availability of the additional
information decreases the prediction errors: δANONYM > δINFO
Hypothesis 2. (Interaction)
The personal interaction in treatment INTERACTION allows the advisor to
gather additional information such as gesture, appearance, behavior or reactions
compared to INFO. This should help the advisor to evaluate the advisee's risk
preference and lower the prediction errors: δINTERACTION < δINFO
Hypothesis 3. (Total eﬀect: Interaction and information)
As a consequence of H1 and H2, when analyzing the total eﬀect, we expect
lower prediction errors in INTERACTION than in ANONYM : δANONYM >
δINTERACTION
Before turning to the statistical analysis of our hypothesis in chapter 5, we
discuss the structure of the dataset in the following.
4.2 Data structure and outliers
In total, we have eight advisor observations in each of the 13 sessions. In
total this amounts to 104 observations for treatment ANONYM and INTER-
ACTION. For treatment INFO, only twelve sessions with eight advisors can be
analyzed, since in session 1 the transcripts for session 2 are generated. In table
6.3 we present the structure of the observations from the experiment.
In order to make sure that subjects have understood the sMPL measure we
control whether subjects have understood the risk measures and in case of non-
understanding, exclude them as outliers. We exclude subjects case-by-case if
the control questions are not answered correctly either for the e100,000 question
or the sMPL mechanism. Additionally, in the sMPL in row ten the payoﬀ of
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Hypothesis H1 H2 H3
Treatments ANONYM INFO INFO INTER? ANONYM INTER
Sessions 12 12 12 12 13 13
Advisors/session 8 8 8 4 8 8
Advisees/treatment 4 4 4 3 4 4
Total observations 384 384 384 140 416 416
Eﬀect: advisors within between within
Eﬀect: advisees within within within
?Note: (12 sessions · 3 advisees -1 [one proﬁle is used twice]) · 4 advisors = 140 obs
Table 6.3: Observations in treatments
option A is strictly lower than the payoﬀ of option B. Subjects that do not
choose the option with the higher payoﬀ are classiﬁed as an outlier for the
sMPL mechanism. For the sMPL we classify ﬁve subjects and for the e100,000
question a single subject as an outlier.5 For all results presented, there is no
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the results if the outliers are included. Table 6.1 shows
the risk preferences of the subjects without outliers. Table 6.3 summarizes
our dataset and the number of observations available for the analysis of the
treatment eﬀects.
As outlined above, we consider each subject to be an independent observation
because there is no strategic interaction between the subjects. To control for
the multiple observations for each subject econometrically we prefer random
eﬀect models over non-parametric statistics.
5 Results
After describing the dataset in the section above, in the following we present
the econometric analysis. In section 5.1 we test the hypotheses raised in section
4.1. We show robustness checks in 5.2 and 5.3 where we argue that subjects do
not answer the risk tasks randomly and that the treatments do not induce any
5Also, Holt and Laury (2002) report that 8 to 10 % of the subjects exhibit non-monotonic
or non-rational preferences in the sMPL, which might be due to diﬃculties in understanding.
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Model (1) (1a) (2) (2a) (3) (3a)
Hypothesis Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3
INFORMATION INTERACTION TOTAL EFFECT
Measure 100,000 sMPL 100,000 sMPL 100,000 sMPL
ANONYM 3.937** -0.0467 0.0583 -1.293
1.91 0.717 1.987 1.048
INFO -3.585** -1.465*
1.726 0.81
Type A -0.316 -0.797 -3.416* -1.994** 0.485 -0.419
1.91 0.717 1.779 0.834 1.987 1.048
Order 1.874 0.313 -0.905 -1.252 -1.534 -2.268**
1.91 0.717 1.769 0.837 1.987 1.048
Constant 18.14*** 5.445*** 5.604 5.423** 17.02*** 6.927***
1.385 0.514 5.252 2.386 1.191 0.599
RE: Advisors 95 91 102 98 103 99
Advisees dummy no no 35 35 no no
Observations 760 728 520 497 824 792
Random eﬀects models, Signiﬁcance * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; Outliers excluded
Table 6.4: Regressions: Treatment eﬀects
structural biases.
5.1 Treatment eﬀects
In order to tackle our hypotheses we set up three regression models as pre-
sented in table 6.4. We choose a regression analysis over non-parametric tests
to control for the dependencies within the multiple observations for each sub-
ject. Thus, we use random eﬀects models which include an individual eﬀect for
each advisor. For each of the three speciﬁcations we present the results of the
e100,000 question in the ﬁrst model and the results for the sMPL in a model
denominated with "a".
For all models the dependent variable is the prediction error as deﬁned above.
The set of independent variables contains a dummy variable indicating the
respective treatment. Furthermore we include binary variables capturing the
diﬀerent types of conversation (Type A) and potential order eﬀects (Order),
which result from the order in which advisees are presented to advisors.
As described in hypothesis 1, model (1) and (1a) capture the eﬀect of infor-
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mation as the treatments ANONYM and INFO are compared. In ANONYM
advisors have only demographic information available (cf. table 6.2) while in
INFO, advisors make their prediction given a protocol of a chat. A diﬀerence be-
tween these treatments indicates that information provided by the transcribed
conversation has an impact on the precision of the prediction error. As the
results in table 6.4 show, only for the e100,000 task a treatment eﬀect can
be observed. The variable "ANONYM" carrying the treatment eﬀect is only
statistically signiﬁcant in model (1) at 5%. The availability of the transcript
decreases the prediction error by 3.937 on average. This eﬀect is of economically
relevant magnitude. If we take the square root we ﬁnd that the availability of
the transcript increases the prediction accuracy by e19,842 on average. Hence,
we ﬁnd mild evidence in favor of hypothesis H1 saying that information lowers
the prediction error of risk preferences.
In a second step, we consider the hypothesis H2 to evaluate the eﬀect of a per-
sonal interaction. For this we compare the prediction errors δ in the INFO and
the INTERACTION treatment in model (2) and (2a). In both treatments we
have additional information compared to ANONYM, but only in the INTER-
ACTION treatment a face-to-face communication takes place. Consequently, a
diﬀerence in the prediction errors is caused by the personal interaction. The
results of the regressions show a signiﬁcant treatment eﬀect for the personal
interaction in both risk elicitation tasks. For the e100,000 question we ﬁnd
the eﬀect to be signiﬁcant at the 5%-level. The sign of the coeﬃcient INFO
indicates that the availability of the transcript compared to a personal meet-
ing decreases the prediction error by 3.585. By taking the square root this
translates into a higher accuracy of e18,934 on average in the INFO treatment
compared to the INTERACTION treatment. Hence, the size of the coeﬃcient
is economically relevant in its magnitude. When considering the sMPL we ﬁnd
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a coeﬃcient which is signiﬁcant only at the 10%-level. The sign is also coher-
ent to the e100,000 question. Interestingly, for hypothesis H2 we expected the
eﬀect to be in the opposite direction. Hence, the advisors are not able to ex-
tract useful information (with respect to the accuracy of the prediction) from a
personal meeting. In contrast, meeting the advisee in person apparently biases
the advisor. Therefore, H2 cannot be conﬁrmed.
In all models, the eﬀects in the sMPL are less pronounced, compared to the
e100,000 question. This could be due to the higher sophistication of the sMPL
as described above.
Model (3) and (3a) investigate the total eﬀect of personal interaction and in-
formation as we compare the treatment eﬀect between ANONYM and INTER-
ACTION (Hypothesis H3). In INTERACTION demographic information is
transmitted and personal interaction take place whereas in ANONYM only de-
mographic information is available. Within our treatments, these two conditions
exhibit the largest possible social distance and therefore diﬀerence between these
two treatments measures a total eﬀect of information and interaction. However,
as the results in table 6.4 show, there is no statistically signiﬁcant treatment ef-
fect. The variable "ANONYM" carrying the treatment eﬀect is not statistically
signiﬁcant at conventional levels. Hence, for the accuracy of the prediction of
risk preferences we do not detect an eﬀect. Hence, we reject hypothesis 3.
No signiﬁcant eﬀect can be observed for the type of questionnaire (Type A
or B) in the regression models comparing ANONYM with INTERACTION
and INFO, as the coeﬃcient on `Type A' indicates. Only a mild eﬀect can
be observed if comparing INFO and INTERACTION. We can thus conclude
that the additional information asked by subjects themselves apart from the
provided questions on sociodemographics has no strong eﬀect on the prediction
accuracy.
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Finally, considering all models, we do not observe any systematic order eﬀect
as we detect only in model (3a) a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient.
Summarizing the results, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀect of personal interaction on
the prediction of risk preferences. This is due to the fact that two opposite forces
work in countervailing directions. On the one hand, we ﬁnd mild evidence that
information improves the prediction of risk preferences. On the other hand, a
personal interaction decreases the quality of the forecast. From that we conclude
that the driving force for a good prediction is the information in a counseling
interview but not the information extracted from the appearance of a person.
Moreover, the appearance of a person even seems to bias an advisor's prediction
negatively.
5.2 Prediction errors are not random
In order to demonstrate that subjects give non-random answers, in ﬁgure 6.3 we
present quantile plots of the prediction error for the three treatments ANONYM,
INFO and INTERACTION. On the y-axis the quantiles of the prediction errors
are displayed whereas the x-axis denotes the fraction of observations that ex-
hibits the respective error. About 20% of the observations are able to meet the
advisee's actual choice in the e100,000 question. Approximately 25% deviate
only one notch from the advisee's decision, e.g., the advisor predicts e60,000
while the advisee actually chooses e40,000. In the sMPL around 15% are able
to predict the advisee's choice correctly. Even approximately 70% of the predic-
tions deviate two or less rows from the advisee's actual choice. If the advisors
predicted the risk preferences of their advisees randomly, one would expect an
even distribution of the prediction errors over the quantiles. Hence, the predic-
tion errors would coincide with the 45◦-degree line. According to ﬁgure 6.3 this
is not evident in our data. We can conﬁrm this result by non-parametric tests.
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e100,000 question sMPL
Figure 6.3: Quantiles of prediction error (δ)
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Dependent variable: advisor's belief
Model (4) (4a) (5) (5a) (6) (6a)
Hypothesis ANONYM-INFO INFO-INTER ANONYM-INTER
Measure 100,000 sMPL 100,000 sMPL 100,000 sMPL
ANONYM -0.147 -0.217 -0.126 -0.0909
0.229 0.16 0.22 0.154
INFO 0.293 0.131
0.241 0.195
Type A 0.116 -0.192 0.206 0.0366 0.194 0.141
0.229 0.16 0.226 0.187 0.22 0.154
Order 0.116 0.324** 0.344 0.509*** 0.33 0.222
0.229 0.16 0.224 0.187 0.22 0.154
Constant 5.100*** 6.082*** 5.540*** 6.888*** 5.019*** 6.162***
0.194 0.137 0.678 0.573 0.205 0.153
RE: Advisors 95 91 102 98 103 99
Advisees dummy no no 35 35 no no
Observations 760 728 520 497 824 792
Random eﬀects models, Signiﬁcance * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01; Outliers excluded
Table 6.5: Regressions: Treatment eﬀect beliefs
χ2-goodness-of-ﬁt tests reject that prediction errors are uniformly distributed
for all three treatments and for both risk tasks (p < 0.001 for all tests). In
general, we ﬁnd that advisors are fairly precise in their predictions.
5.3 Beliefs
Beside the analysis of the accuracy of the prediction of risk preference it is of
interest to analyze the advisors' beliefs about the advisees. In other words, we
have a look at the advisors' predictions instead of the prediction errors. This
analysis provides an insight whether the beliefs are biased in a systematic way
when personal interaction takes place. Given the results of Loewenstein (1996)
there could be eﬀects that advisors exhibit a biased prediction of risk preference
when they are in an empathetic relationship such as in the INTERACTION
treatment. If there are structural biases over the treatments at work it would
contaminate our above treatment eﬀects.
The models in table 6.5 are set up similar to the models in table 6.4. Again,
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the data is pooled over all treatments and the outliers are omitted. The only
diﬀerence is that we include the advisor's belief about the risk preferences of the
advisee as a dependent variable instead of the prediction error. Again, the set
of independent variables contains a dummy variable that identiﬁes the eﬀect
coming from the ANONYM respectively INFO treatment. Additionally, we
include dummy variables capturing order eﬀects as well as the diﬀerent types of
the transcripts. Econometrically, we control for the multiple observations per
subject by assigning a random eﬀect to every subject which is the independent
unit of observation.
The main ﬁnding from these regression models is that we do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
treatment eﬀect in the beliefs. In none of the models (4) to (6a) we do ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant impact of the treatment dummy. Mild order eﬀects can be observed
in model (4a) and (5a), however, without exhibiting a general pattern.
For the results found in section 5 this is good news as table 6.5 proves that
there is no systematic bias on the beliefs caused by the treatments.
Hence, the treatment eﬀects of the prediction errors are solely induced by in-
dividual predictions but not by systematically biased beliefs of the treatment
itself.
6 Conclusion
The idea of this paper is to explore the eﬀect of a personal meeting on the pre-
diction of risk preferences of others instead of having demographic information
only. We compare the advisors' prediction error of advisees' risk preferences in
two treatments. In our baseline treatment, only sociodemographic information
is available, while in the subsequent treatments we decrease the social distance
by increasing the available information. By construction of the treatments, we
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make sure that the advisors receive at least as much sociodemographic infor-
mation in the main treatments as in the baseline.
The experiment reveals two countervailing eﬀects. First, in our information
treatment advisors have a protocol of a chat of the advisee at hand to predict
the risk preferences. We ﬁnd that in this treatment the predictions of the ad-
visee's risk preferences are more accurate than in the baseline. Therefore we
conclude that the information gathered "between the lines" in a conversation
helps to forecast risk preferences.
Second, in the interaction treatment, the advisor meets the advisee in a face-
to-face conversation. Interestingly, when having the personal interaction the
advisors show higher prediction errors than in the information treatment. This
result is statistically signiﬁcant for both risk measures. Apparently, the personal
interaction does not help to "read" another person's risk attitudes. Combining
both eﬀects answers the question raised in the title of the paper: Does meeting
make a diﬀerence? If we compare the interaction treatment with the baseline
treatment we do not detect a statistically relevant treatment eﬀect. This means
that a subject's prediction of a person's risk preference is not improved by a
personal conversation.
Despite the mild experimental evidence, there is also a policy perspective com-
ing from our analysis as we ﬁnd that a good prediction of a person's risk attitude
is necessarily coming from a face-to-face meeting.
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1 Appendix for chapter 3
1.1 Tables
P-values for Wald tests for joint signiﬁcance for models in table 3.1
H0: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
samecndtn=PF-F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0001 0.000
samecndtn=P-PF 0.002 0.0017 0.045 0.034 0.17 0.12
PF-F=P-PF 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
P-P'=PF-F 0.003 0.007 0.0017 0.0047
P-P'=P-PF 0.57 0.63 0.72 0.87
P-P'=samecndtn 0.62 0.59 0.54 0.4
recall P-F=recall P-PF 0.69 0.73
recall P-F=recall PF-F 0.15 0.087
recall P-F=recall samesit 0.57 0.56
recall P-F=recall P-PF 0.16 0.12
recall PF-F=recall samecndtn 0.88 0.099
recall P-PF=recall samecndtn 0.000 0.8
P_PF=recall P-PF 0.86 0.73
PF_F=recall PF-F 0.000 0.000
samecndtn=recall samecndtn 0.6 0.64
Table 7.1: Consistency: Wald tests on joint signiﬁcance
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1.2 Pictures for credibility
Urn content with time identiﬁer Presentation of urns
Figure 7.1: Pictures of urns
1.3 Instructions
Please note: The experiment is a paper-and-pencil type experiment. The page




Instructions –November Session 
 
 






Welcome to our experiment. Your participation in this experiment supports our 
scientific work. At the same time, your actions allow you to earn money. 
The scientific coordinators for this experiment are Peter Dürsch, Daniel Römer, and 
Benjamin Roth (Alfred-Weber-Institute for Economics, Heidelberg University). 
 
 
Course of the Experiment 
 
Firstly, please turn off your mobile phone, and keep it off during the entire experiment. 
Do not talk to other participants. If you have any questions, please stay calm and raise 
your hand. Someone of our experimental staff will answer your question. 
 
Your payoff depends on the choices you make during the experiment.  
 
The experiment consists of two experimental sessions. The first session is taking 
place today. The second session is going to take place in January 2013. For the 
experiment it is essential that you participate in both sessions.  
 
Today’s session consists of five parts. These five parts are labeled in the instructions 
as “A”, “B”, “C”, “D”, and “E”. The instructions at hand explain today’s entire 
experimental session, and they are identical for all participants. The experiment starts 
with part A, then part B, and part C, followed by part D. E is the last part. You can keep 







In part A, you have to make choices for two different boxes („Box 1“ and „Box 2“). Both 
boxes are situated in this room, and each of them contains 30 marbles. Each box 
contains 10 yellow marbles. The remaining 20 marbles are either blue, or green, in 
an arbitrary combination.  
 
We will hand out decision sheets A. On decision sheet A you have to make two 
choices for each of the boxes. Each choice determines your payoff depending on the 
color of the marble that will be drawn from the corresponding box. 
 
You make your choices for both boxes. You are paid-off for the choices you made for 
one box. At the end of this experimental session, a coin flip decides which of the two 
boxes will be selected for today’s session’s payoff. Afterwards, two independent draws 
(the marble is put back into the box after each draw) determine your individual payoff 
according to the choices you have made on decision sheet A. To do so, one marble 
will be drawn from the box. The color will be recorded. Then the marble will be put 
back into the box. The procedure will be repeated for the second draw. The other box 






Again, you have to make your choices for two boxes (“Box 3” and “Box 4”). Box 3 is 
the identical box from part A which was not selected for the payoffs. Box 4 is a 
new box. Both boxes are situated in this room, and each of them contains 30 marbles. 
Each box contains 10 yellow marbles. The remaining 20 marbles are either blue, or 
green, in an arbitrary combination.  
 
We will hand out decision sheet B. On decision sheet B you have to make two choices 
for each of the boxes. Each choice determines your payoff depending on the color of 
the marble that will be drawn from the corresponding box. 
 
You make your choices for both boxes. You are paid-off for the choices you have 
made for one box. At the end of this experimental session, a coin flip decides which of 
the two boxes will be selected for today’s session’s payoff. Please be aware of that, 
contrary to part A, the draws from this box, as well as the corresponding payoff 
will take place in the second experimental session in January 2013. In the second 
experimental session in January 2013, two independent draws (the marble is put back 
into the box after each draw) determine your individual payoff according to the choices 
you have made on decision sheet B. To do so, in January, one marble will be drawn 
from the box. The color will be recorded. Then the marble will be put back into the box. 




Note: The box from which will be drawn in January will remain unchanged. Therefore, 
we will take a picture of the box’s content, together with an identifier for this session, in 
this room, directly before the draw. This picture will be sent to you via e-mail after the 
second session in January. In the January session we will take a picture of the content 






We will hand out decision sheet C. On decision sheet C you will find the following 
table. In this table, we ask you for ten choices. In each row you have two options: 
Option A and Option B. You have to choose one option in each row (Option A or 
Option B). 
 
Example: In the first row you can decide between two options.  
 If you choose Option A, you will receive with a probability of 10% a payoff of 
2.00€ and with a probability of 90% a payoff of 1.60€. 
 If you choose Option B, you will receive with a probability of 10% a payoff of 
3.85€ and with a probability of 90% a payoff of 0.10€. 
 
 (This is just an example table. You do not need to tick anything!) 
Option A  Option B 
Row Payoff Probability Payoff A or B Payoff Probability Payoff 
1 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
2 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
3 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
4 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
5 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
6 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
7 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
8 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
9 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
10 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
 
Your actual payoff in part C will be determined at the end of this experiment. One out 
of the ten rows (by rolling a ten-sided dice) is chosen by chance for payoff. For this 
row, the option you have marked (Option A or Option B) is paid off. Another cast of the 
dice determines whether the amount highlighted in gray, or the amount highlighted in 
white, is paid off. 
 
Example: If the dice indicates a 1 after the first cast, row 1 is selected. Consider the 
first row in the table. If the dice indicates again a 1 after the second cast, the amount 
highlighted in gray (not the white area) is paid out. Hence, you will receive 2€ if you 
have marked Option A, and 3.85€ if you have marked Option B. If the dice had 
indicated a number between 2 and 10 after the second cast, you would have received 






We will hand out decision sheet D. On decision sheet D you will find the following 
table. In this table, we ask you for ten choices. In each row you have two options: 
Option A and Option B. You have to decide for one option in each row (Option A or 
Option B). 
 
Example: In the second row you can decide between the following two options.  
 
 If you choose Option A, you will receive a payoff of 2.00€ in today’s session. 
 If you choose Option B, you will receive a payoff of 2.05€ in the next session in 
January.  
 
(This is an example table. You do not need to cross anything!) 
 Option A  Option B 
Row Payoff today A or B 
Payoff 
in January 
1 2,00 € o  o 2,00 € 
2 2,00 € o  o 2,05 € 
3 2,00 € o  o 2,10 € 
4 2,00 € o  o 2,15 € 
5 2,00 € o  o 2,20 € 
6 2,00 € o  o 2,30 € 
7 2,00 € o  o 2,40 € 
8 2,00 € o  o 2,60 € 
9 2,00 € o  o 2,80 € 
10 2,00 € o  o 3,00 € 
 
Your actual payoff in part D will be determined at the end of the experiment. Which 
one of the ten rows determines the payoff will be determined by chance (rolling a ten-
sided dice). For this row, only the option you have chosen by crossing will be of 
relevance (Option A or Option B). 
Example: If the dice indicates a 2, row 2 is selected. Consider the second row in the 
table. You will receive 2€ today if you have marked option A, or 2.05€ in January if you 














At the end of today’s session, you will receive the sum of your payoffs from part A, C, 
and potentially from part D. You will receive your payoff in cash and in private. Please 
remain patient. The distribution of the payoffs can take some time. 
 
Please wait until we call your number and then step forward. Please remain calm and 
do not talk to other participants. 
 
The drawings and payoff of part B will take place in the second experimental session 
in January 2013. 







Choice 1.1: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross)  
 
   You will receive 4€ if the drawn marble is yellow.    or 




How confident (from not confident at all to very confident) are you about this decision? 
 
not confident at all       very confident 
 
 
You will be paid-off according to your decision above. But, hypothetically asked, how 
much would we need to pay you such that you would change your decision above? 
 (Please mark with an „X“ the amount in the following scale) 
  
  │−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│ 





Choice 1.2: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross)  
 
   You will receive 4€ if the drawn marble is yellow or green.    or 
   You will receive 4€ if the drawn marble is blue or green. 
 
How confident (from not confident at all to very confident) are you about this decision? 
 
not confident at all       very confident 
 
 
You will be paid-off according to your decision above. But, hypothetically asked, how 
much would we need to pay you such that you would change your decision above? 
 (Please mark with an „X“ the amount in the following scale) 
  
│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│ 







Choice 2.1: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross)  
 
   You will receive 4€ if the drawn marble is yellow.    or 
   You will receive 4€ if the drawn marble is blue. 
 
 
How confident (from not confident at all to very confident) are you about this decision? 
 
not confident at all       very confident 
 
 
You will be paid-off according to your decision above. But, hypothetically asked, how 
much would we need to pay you such that you would change your decision above? 
 (Please mark with an „X“ the amount in the following scale) 
  
│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│ 






Choice 2.2: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross) 
 
   You will receive 4€ if the drawn marble is yellow or green.    or 
   You will receive 4€ if the drawn marble is blue or green. 
 
 
How confident (from not confident at all to very confident) are you about this decision? 
 
not confident at all       very confident 
 
 
You will be paid-off according to your decision above. But, hypothetically asked, how 
much would we need to pay you such that you would change your decision above? 
 (Please mark with an „X“ the amount in the following scale) 
 
│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│ 
0€  1€  2€  3€  4€  






Choice 3.1: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross) 
 
   You will receive 4€ if the drawn marble is yellow.    or 
   You will receive 4€ if the drawn marble is blue. 
 
 
How confident (from not confident at all to very confident) are you about this decision? 
 
not confident at all       very confident 
 
 
You will be paid-off according to your decision above. But, hypothetically asked, how 
much would we need to pay you such that you would change your decision above? 
 (Please mark with an „X“ the amount in the following scale) 
 
│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│ 






Choice 3.2: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross) 
 
   You will receive 4€ if the drawn marble is yellow or green.    or 
   You will receive 4€ if the drawn marble is blue or green. 
 
 
How confident (from not confident at all to very confident) are you about this decision? 
 
not confident at all       very confident 
 
 
You will be paid-off according to your decision above. But, hypothetically asked, how 
much would we need to pay you such that you would change your decision above? 
 (Please mark with an „X“ the amount in the following scale) 
 
│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│ 








Choice 4.1: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross) 
 
   You will receive 4€ if the drawn marble is yellow.    or 
   You will receive 4€ if the drawn marble is blue. 
 
 
How confident (from not confident at all to very confident) are you about this decision? 
 
not confident at all       very confident 
 
 
You will be paid-off according to your decision above. But, hypothetically asked, how 
much would we need to pay you such that you would change your decision above? 
 (Please mark with an „X“ the amount in the following scale) 
 
│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│ 





Choice 4.2: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross) 
 
   You will receive 4€ if the drawn marble is yellow or green.    or 
   You will receive 4€ if the drawn marble is blue or green. 
 
 
How confident (from not confident at all to very confident) are you about this decision? 
 
not confident at all       very confident 
 
 
You will be paid-off according to your decision above. But, hypothetically asked, how 
much would we need to pay you such that you would change your decision above? 
 (Please mark with an „X“ the amount in the following scale) 
 
│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│ 
0€  1€  2€  3€  4€  
 
 




Below, you will find a table. We ask you for ten choices in this table. In each row of 
this table you have to decide between two options: Option A and Option B. You have 
to decide for one option in each row (Option A or Option B). 
 
 
TABLE (Please choose now for each row either A or B!) 
Option A  Option B 
Row Payoff Probability Payoff A or B Payoff Probability Payoff 
1 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
2 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
3 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
4 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
5 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
6 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
7 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
8 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
9 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
10 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
 




Below, you will find a table. We ask you for ten choices in this table. In each row of 
this table you have to decide between two options: Option A and Option B. You have 
to decide for one alternative in each row (Option A or Option B). 
 
TABLE (Please choose now for each row either A or B!) 
 Option A  Option B 
Row Payoff today A or B 
Payoff 
in January 
1 2,00 € o  o 2,00 € 
2 2,00 € o  o 2,05 € 
3 2,00 € o  o 2,10 € 
4 2,00 € o  o 2,15 € 
5 2,00 € o  o 2,20 € 
6 2,00 € o  o 2,30 € 
7 2,00 € o  o 2,40 € 
8 2,00 € o  o 2,60 € 
9 2,00 € o  o 2,80 € 
10 2,00 € o  o 3,00 € 




Year of birth:  ________ 
Gender:   ○ female  ○ male 
 
Studies  
 currently not studying 
 currently studying  
Field of study:  ________ 
Semester:   ________ 
 
Specific subjects 
I took part in lectures in the following subjects: 





Height in cm:   ________ 
 
 1 
Instructions –January Session 
 
 






Welcome to our experiment. Your participation in this experiment supports our 
scientific work. At the same time, your actions allow you to earn money. 
The scientific coordinators of this experiment are Peter Dürsch, Daniel Römer, and 
Benjamin Roth (Alfred-Weber-Institute for Economics, Heidelberg University). 
 
 
Course of the experiment 
 
Please turn off your mobile phone, and keep it off during the entire experiment. Do not 
talk to other participants. If you have any questions, please stay calm and raise your 
hand. Someone of our experimental staff will answer your question. 
 
Your payoff depends on the choices you make during the experiment.  
 
The experiment consists of two experimental sessions. The first session took place in 
November 2012. Today the second session takes place. 
 
Today’s session consists of five parts. These five parts are labeled in the instructions 
as “A”, “B”, “C”, “D”, and “E”. The instructions at hand explain today’s entire 
experimental session, and they are identical for all participants. The experiment starts 
with part A, then part B, and part C, followed by part D. E is the last part. You can keep 







In part A, you have to make choices for two different boxes („Box 5“ and „Box 6“). Both 
boxes are situated in this room, and each of them contains 30 marbles. Each box 
contains 10 yellow marbles. The remaining 20 marbles are either blue, or green, in 
an arbitrary combination.  
 
Please note: Box 5 is the box for which you have already made a decision in the first 
session but was not chosen for payment. Box 6 is new. 
 
We will hand out decision sheet A. On decision sheet A you have to make two choices 
for each of the boxes. Each choice determines your payoff depending on the color of 
the marble that will be drawn from the corresponding box. 
 
You make your choices for both boxes. You are paid-off for the choices you have 
made for one box. At the end of this experimental session, a coin flip decides which of 
the two boxes will be selected for today’s session’s payoff. Afterwards, two 
independent draws (the marble is put back into the box after each draw) determine 
your individual payoff according to your choices you have made on the decision sheet. 
To do so, one marble will be drawn from the box. The color will be recorded. Then the 
marble will be put back into the box. The procedure will be repeated for the second 
draw.  
Note: The content of box 5 from the last session remained unchanged. Again, we will 
take a picture of the box’s content, together with an identifier for this session, in this 
room, right before the draw. This picture will be sent to you via e-mail after the last 
session (presumably on 25.02.2013) such that you will be able to check that the 




























We will hand out decision sheet C. On decision sheet C you will find the following 
table. In this table, we ask you for ten choices. In each row you have two options: 
Option A and Option B. You have to choose one option in each row (Option A or 
Option B). 
 
Example: In the first row you can decide between two options.  
 If you choose Option A, you will receive with a probability of 10% a payoff of 
2.00€ and with a probability of 90% a payoff of 1.60€. 
 
 If you choose Option B, you will receive with a probability of 10% a payoff of 
3.85€ and with a probability of 90% a payoff of 0.10€. 
 
 (This is just an example table. You do not need to tick anything!) 
Option A  Option B 
Row Payoff Probability Payoff A or B Payoff Probability Payoff 
1 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
2 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
3 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
4 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
5 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
6 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
7 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
8 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
9 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
10 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
 
Your actual payoff in part C will be determined at the end of this experiment. Which 
one of the ten rows determines the payoff will be determined by chance (rolling a ten-
sided dice). For this row, only the option you have chosen by crossing will be of 
relevance (Option A or Option B). The ten-sided dice will be rolled one further time in 
order to determine whether the amount highlighted in gray will be paid out, or the 
amount in the white area.  
 
Example: If the dice indicates a 1 after the first rolling, this means that row 1 is 
determined. Consider therefore the first row in the table. If the dice indicates again a 
1 after the second rolling, this means that the amount highlighted in gray (not the white 
area) will be paid out. Hence, you will receive 2€ if you have marked Option A, and 
3.85€ if you have marked Option B. If the dice had indicated a number between 2 and 
10 after the second rolling, you would have received 1.60€ for Option A and 0.10€ for 






At the end of today’s session, you will receive the sum of your payoffs from part A, B 
C, D, E and, if applicable, from the first part of the experiment. We also pay you a 
show-up fee of € 4 for today’s session. The payment will be cash and in private. 
Please remain patient since payment can take some time. 
 
Please wait until we call your number and then step forward. Please remain calm and 
do not talk to other participants. 







Choice 5.1: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross)  
 
   You will receive 4€ if the drawn marble is yellow.    or 




How confident (from not confident at all to very confident) are you about this decision? 
 
not confident at all       very confident 
 
 
You will be paid-off according to your decision above. But, hypothetically asked, how 
much would we need to pay you such that you would change your decision above? 
 (Please mark with an „X“ the amount in the following scale) 
  
  │−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│ 





Choice 5.2: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross)  
 
   You will receive 4€ if the drawn marble is yellow or green.    or 
   You will receive 4€ if the drawn marble is blue or green. 
 
How confident (from not confident at all to very confident) are you about this decision? 
 
not confident at all       very confident 
 
 
You will be paid-off according to your decision above. But, hypothetically asked, how 
much would we need to pay you such that you would change your decision above? 
 (Please mark with an „X“ the amount in the following scale) 
  
│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│ 







Choice 6.1: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross)  
 
   You will receive 4€ if the drawn marble is yellow.    or 
   You will receive 4€ if the drawn marble is blue. 
 
 
How confident (from not confident at all to very confident) are you about this decision? 
 
not confident at all       very confident 
 
 
You will be paid-off according to your decision above. But, hypothetically asked, how 
much would we need to pay you such that you would change your decision above? 
 (Please mark with an „X“ the amount in the following scale) 
  
│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│ 






Choice 6.2: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross) 
 
   You will receive 4€ if the drawn marble is yellow or green.    or 
   You will receive 4€ if the drawn marble is blue or green. 
 
 
How confident (from not confident at all to very confident) are you about this decision? 
 
not confident at all       very confident 
 
 
You will be paid-off according to your decision above. But, hypothetically asked, how 
much would we need to pay you such that you would change your decision above? 
 (Please mark with an „X“ the amount in the following scale) 
 
│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│ 
0€  1€  2€  3€  4€  
Questionnaire B     Seat number: ________ 
 
 
In this part you will receive 0.25€ for each correct answer. 
 




Assume that in the corresponding box there are exactly 10 yellow marbles, 5 blue 
marbles, and 15 green marbles. 
 
Please state how many marbles have to be in the box such that the participant’s 
payoff is 4€. 
 
For the draw for choice 1: 
 
There are ______ marbles in the box such that the payoff is 4€. 
There are ______ marbles in the box such that the payoff is not 4€. 
 
 
For the draw for choice 2: 
 
There are ______ marbles in the box such that the payoff is 4€.  
There are ______ marbles in the box such that the payoff is not 4€. 
Choice 1: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross) 
 
 X  You will receive 4€ if the drawn marble is yellow.    or 
   You will receive 4€ if the drawn marble is blue. 
 
Choice 2: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross) 
 
 X  You will receive 4€ if the drawn marble is yellow or green.    or 
   You will receive 4€ if the drawn marble is blue or green. 
 
Questionnaire C     Seat number: ________ 
 
The following questions refer to the first experimental session in November. During 
the first session you have made decisions on two boxes, one of which is paid out 
today. The other was not chosen for payment. For this box you have made a decision 
today (box 5). 
 
The following questionnaire will evaluate whether you are able to recall your 
decisions on these two boxes. 
 
Every correct answer pays €0.25. 
 
A. The box that was chosen for payment today in the first session. 
 
Choice A.1: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross)  
 
   You will receive 4€ if the drawn marble is yellow.    or 
   You will receive 4€ if the drawn marble is blue. 
 
Choice A.2: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross) 
 
   You will receive 4€ if the drawn marble is yellow or green.    or 
   You will receive 4€ if the drawn marble is blue or green. 
 
 
Hoe confident are you with your recall in the above decisions? 
 
How confident (from not confident at all to very confident) are you about this decision? 
 




B. The box that was not chosen for payment. (Box 5 of today’s session) 
 
 
Choice B.1: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross)  
 
   You will receive 4€ if the drawn marble is yellow.    or 
   You will receive 4€ if the drawn marble is blue. 
 
Choice B.2: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross) 
 
   You will receive 4€ if the drawn marble is yellow or green.    or 
   You will receive 4€ if the drawn marble is blue or green. 
 
 
Hoe confident are you with your recall in the above decisions? 
 
How confident (from not confident at all to very confident) are you about this decision? 
 
not confident at all       very confident 
Questionnaire D     Seat number: ________ 
 
 
Additional questions on the boxes 
 
 
Remember: All boxes contain 30 marbles. 10 are yellow; the remaining 20 are either 
blue or green, in an arbitrary mix. 
 
1. Have you made the same decisions on box 5 and 6? 
 
 Yes    No 
 
 













3. Do you think box 5 and 6 are filled the same? 
 




4. What do you think is the share of blue and green marbles in box 5? 
 
 There are more blue than green marbles in box 5. 
 There are more green than blue marbles in box 5. 
 There are equally many blue and green marbles in box 5. 
 
 
5. What do you think is the share of blue and green marbles in box 6? 
 
 There are more blue than green marbles in box 6. 
 There are more green than blue marbles in box 6. 











6. You neither know the content of box 5 nor of box 6. Have you treated the boxes 
differently? 
 














7. Remember: In the first session you had to make decisions for boxes that were paid 
out in the future but also for boxes which were paid out immediately. For none of the 
boxes did you know the exact content. Did you treat the boxes differently? 
 














8. Remember: Today and in the first session you decided on boxes that were paid 
out in the same session. For none of the boxes did you know the exact content. Did 
you treat the boxes differently? 
 















Below, you will find a table. We ask you for ten choices in this table. In each row of 
this table you have to decide between two options: Option A and Option B. You have 
to decide for one option in each row (Option A or Option B). 
 
 
TABLE (Please choose now for each row either A or B!) 
Option A  Option B 
Row Payoff Probability Payoff A or B Payoff Probability Payoff 
1 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
2 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
3 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
4 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
5 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
6 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
7 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
8 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
9 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
10 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
 
 
  1 








Welcome to our experiment. Your participation in this experiment supports our 
scientific work. At the same time, your actions allow you to earn money. 
The scientific coordinators of this experiment are Peter Dürsch, Daniel Römer, and 




Course of the Experiment 
 
Please turn off your mobile phone, and keep it off during the entire experiment. Do not 
talk to other participants. If you have any questions, please stay calm and raise your 
hand. Someone of our experimental staff will answer your question. 
 
Your payoff depends on the choices you make during the experiment.  
 
Today’s session consists of five parts. These five parts are labeled in the instructions 
as “A”, “B”, “C”, “D”, and “E”. The instructions at hand explain today’s entire 
experimental session and they are identical for all participants. The experiment starts 
with part A, then part B, and part C, followed by part D. E is the last part. You can keep 
the instructions and read them during the experiment at any time.  
 
 
In the following, we will start with part A. 




In part A, you have to make choices for two different linen bags (“Bag 1” and “Bag 2”). 
Both bags are situated here in this room, and each of them contains 30 marbles. Each 
bag contains 10 yellow marbles. The remaining 20 marbles are either blue or 
green, in an arbitrary combination.  
 
We will hand out decision sheets A. On decision sheet A you have to make two 
choices for each of the bags. Each choice determines your payoff depending on the 
color of the marble that will be drawn from the corresponding bag. 
 
You make your choices for both bags. You are paid-off for the choices you made for 
one bag. At the end of this experimental session, a coin flip decides which of the two 
bags will be selected for today’s session’s payoff. Afterwards, two independent draws 
(the marble is put back into the bag after each draw) determine your individual payoff 
according to the choices you have made on decision sheet A. To do so, one marble 
will be drawn from the bag. The color will be recorded. Then the marble will be put 
back into the bag. The procedure will be repeated for the second draw. The other bag 






Again, you have to make your choices for two linen bags (“Bag 3” and “Bag 4”). Bag 3 
is that bag from part A that was not selected for payoff. Bag 4 is a new bag. Both 
bags are situated in this room, and each of them contains 30 marbles. Each bag 
contains 10 yellow marbles. The remaining 20 marbles are either blue or green, in 
an arbitrary combination.  
 
We will hand out decision sheet B. On decision sheet B you have to make two choices 
for each of the bags. Each choice determines your payoff and depends on the color of 
the marble that will be drawn from the corresponding bag. 
 
After collecting the decision sheets, a coin flip decides which of the two bags is 
selected for the payoff. At the end of the experiment, two independent draws from this 
bag (the marble is put back into the bag after each draw) determine your individual 
payoff according to the choices you have made on decision sheet B. The other bag will 
not be used. 




We will hand out decision sheet C. On decision sheet C you will find the following table 
twice. In each of the tables, you have two options: Option A and Option B. You have to 
choose one option in each row (Option A or Option B). 
 
Example: In the first row you can decide between two options.  
 If you choose Option A, you will receive with a probability of 10% a payoff of 
2.00€ and with a probability of 90% a payoff of 1.60€. 
 If you choose Option B, you will receive with a probability of 10% a payoff of 
3.85€ and with a probability of 90% a payoff of 0.10€. 
 
(This is an example table. You do not need to tick anything!) 
Option A  Option B 
Row Payoff Probability Payoff A or B Payoff Probability Payoff 
1 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
2 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
3 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
4 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
5 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
6 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
7 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
8 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
9 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
10 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
 
Your actual payoff in part C is determined at the end of this experiment. The payoff is 
either for Table 1 or Table 2. At the end of this experiment, a coin flip decides which 
table is selected for the payoff. For the selected table, one out of the ten rows (by 
rolling a ten-sided dice) is chosen by chance for payoff. For this row, the option you 
have marked (Option A or Option B) is paid off. Another cast of the dice determines 
whether the amount highlighted in gray or the amount highlighted in white is paid off.  
Example: If the dice indicates a 1 after the first cast, row 1 is selected. Consider the 
first row in the table. If the dice indicates again a 1 after the second cast, the amount 
highlighted in gray (not the white area) is paid out. Hence, you will receive 2€ if you 
have marked Option A and 3.85€ if you have marked Option B. If the dice had 
indicated a number between 2 and 10 after the second cast, you would have received 
1.60€ for Option A and 0.10€ for Option B.  




We will hand out a questionnaire. Please answer the questions on this questionnaire. 















At the end of the experiment, you will receive the sum of your payoffs from parts A, B, 
C, and D. You will receive your payoff in cash and in private. Please remain patient 
since distributing the payoffs can take some time. 
 
Please wait until we call your number and then step forward. Please remain calm and 
do not talk to other participants.  
 
After the experiment, each participant has the opportunity to examine the bags. 
 







Choice 1.1: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross)  
 
   You will receive 4€ if the drawn marble is yellow.    or 




How confident (from not confident at all to very confident) are you about this decision? 
 
not confident at all       very confident 
 
 
You will be paid-off according to your decision above. But, hypothetically asked, how 
much would we need to pay you such that you would change your decision above? 
 (Please mark with an „X“ the amount in the following scale) 
  
  │−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│ 





Choice 1.2: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross)  
 
   You will receive 4€ if the drawn marble is yellow or green.    or 
   You will receive 4€ if the drawn marble is blue or green. 
 
How confident (from not confident at all to very confident) are you about this decision? 
 
not confident at all       very confident 
 
 
You will be paid-off according to your decision above. But, hypothetically asked, how 
much would we need to pay you such that you would change your decision above? 
 (Please mark with an „X“ the amount in the following scale) 
  
│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│ 







Choice 2.1: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross)  
 
   You will receive 4€ if the drawn marble is yellow.    or 
   You will receive 4€ if the drawn marble is blue. 
 
 
How confident (from not confident at all to very confident) are you about this decision? 
 
not confident at all       very confident 
 
 
You will be paid-off according to your decision above. But, hypothetically asked, how 
much would we need to pay you such that you would change your decision above? 
 (Please mark with an „X“ the amount in the following scale) 
  
│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│ 






Choice 2.2: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross) 
 
   You will receive 4€ if the drawn marble is yellow or green.    or 
   You will receive 4€ if the drawn marble is blue or green. 
 
 
How confident (from not confident at all to very confident) are you about this decision? 
 
not confident at all       very confident 
 
 
You will be paid-off according to your decision above. But, hypothetically asked, how 
much would we need to pay you such that you would change your decision above? 
 (Please mark with an „X“ the amount in the following scale) 
 
│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│ 
0€  1€  2€  3€  4€  






Choice 3.1: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross) 
 
   You will receive 4€ if the drawn marble is yellow.    or 
   You will receive 4€ if the drawn marble is blue. 
 
 
How confident (from not confident at all to very confident) are you about this decision? 
 
not confident at all       very confident 
 
 
You will be paid-off according to your decision above. But, hypothetically asked, how 
much would we need to pay you such that you would change your decision above? 
 (Please mark with an „X“ the amount in the following scale) 
 
│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│ 






Choice 3.2: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross) 
 
   You will receive 4€ if the drawn marble is yellow or green.    or 
   You will receive 4€ if the drawn marble is blue or green. 
 
 
How confident (from not confident at all to very confident) are you about this decision? 
 
not confident at all       very confident 
 
 
You will be paid-off according to your decision above. But, hypothetically asked, how 
much would we need to pay you such that you would change your decision above? 
 (Please mark with an „X“ the amount in the following scale) 
 
│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│ 








Choice 4.1: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross) 
 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is yellow.    or 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is blue. 
 
 
How confident (from not confident at all to very confident) are you about this decision? 
 
not confident at all       very confident 
 
 
You will be paid-off according to your decision above. But, hypothetically asked, how 
much would we need to pay you such that you would change your decision above? 
 (Please mark with an „X“ the amount in the following scale) 
 
│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│ 





Choice 4.2: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross) 
 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is yellow or green.    or 
   You will receive 4€, if the drawn marble is blue or green. 
 
 
How confident (from not confident at all to very confident) are you about this decision? 
 
not confident at all       very confident 
 
 
You will be paid-off according to your decision above. But, hypothetically asked, how 
much would we need to pay you such that you would change your decision above? 
 (Please mark with an „X“ the amount in the following scale) 
 
│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│−−−−+−−−−│ 
0€  1€  2€  3€  4€  
 
 
Decision sheet C     Seat number: ________ 
 
 
Below, you will find Table 1 and Table 2. We ask you for ten choices in each table. In 
each row of this table you have to decide between two options: Option A and Option 
B. You have to decide for one option in each row (Option A or Option B). 
 
TABLE 1(Please choose now for each row either A or B!) 
Option A  Option B 
Row Payoff Probability Payoff A or B Payoff Probability Payoff 
1 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
2 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
3 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
4 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
5 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
6 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
7 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
8 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
9 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
10 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
 
TABLE 2(Please choose now for each row either A or B!) 
Option A  Option B 
Row Payoff Probability Payoff A or B Payoff Probability Payoff 
1 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
2 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
3 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
4 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
5 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
6 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
7 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
8 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
9 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
10 2 €  1,60 € o 
 o 3,85 €  0,10 € 
Questionnaire D     Seat number: ________ 
 
 
Additional assessment of the bag 
 
In this part you will receive 0.25€ for each correct answer. 
 




Assume that in the corresponding bag there are exactly 10 yellow marbles, 5 blue 
marbles, and 15 green marbles. 
 
Please state how many marbles have to be in the bag such that the participant’s 
payoff is 4€. 
 
For the draw for choice 1: 
 
There are ______ marbles in the bag such that the payoff is 4€. 
There are ______ marbles in the bag such that the payoff is not 4€. 
 
 
For the draw for choice 2: 
 
There are ______ marbles in the bag such that the payoff is 4€.  
There are ______ marbles in the bag such that the payoff is not 4€. 
Choice 1: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross)  
 
 X  You will receive 4€ if the drawn marble is yellow.    or 
   You will receive 4€ if the drawn marble is blue. 
 
Choice 2: What do you prefer? (Please mark with a cross) 
 
 X  You will receive 4€ if the drawn marble is yellow or green.    or 
   You will receive 4€ if the drawn marble is blue or green. 
 




Year of birth:  ________ 
Gender:   ○ female  ○ male 
 
Studies  
 currently not studying 
 currently studying  
Field of study:  ________ 
Semester:   ________ 
 
Specific subjects 
I took part in lectures in the following subjects: 





Height in cm:   ________ 
2 Appendix for chapter 4 and chapter 5
2.1 Robustness check for section 4.2
In order to test for diﬀerences between the subject groups in the self-assessment rel-
ative to the population mean we run four regression models including demographic
covariates. In all models the dependent variable is a binary variable which is one if
the prediction is correct. For the independent variables, we include the same set of
variables as for the regressions in section 4.3. While models 1 and 3 are logit models
to account for the binary structure for the dependent variable, models 2 and 4 are
OLS estimations which serve as a robustness check.
As the results show, a signiﬁcant eﬀect between the subject groups can be detected
for the e100,000 question in model 4. Here, we ﬁnd the senior professionals to be less
successful in locating themselves in the distribution of risk attitudes than the omitted
non-professionals. This seems to be in line with the ﬁndings in ﬁgure 4.3. There we
ﬁnd the largest diﬀerences in the unconditional means between these subject groups
too. When testing the senior against the junior professionals a Wald test does not
reveal any signiﬁcant eﬀect for the HL-task. For the e100.000 question we ﬁnd that ju-
nior professionals show up to be signiﬁcantly more accurate (model 3: p-value=0.029,
model 4: p-value=0.089). Overall, we ﬁnd only mild signiﬁcant structural eﬀects be-
tween the subject groups. Only for the e100.000 question we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect
between the subject groups.
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Model 1 2 3 4
Method Logit OLS Logit OLS
Dep. Var. HL correct 100,000 correct
senior 0.4 0.095 -1.85 -0.30*
0.75 0.17 1.11 0.13
junior -0.25 -0.057 -0.0082 0.0027
0.39 0.089 0.44 0.083
female 0.67 0.15 0.1 0.019
0.36 0.081 0.39 0.075
lowinc 1.23 0.29 -0.79 -0.076
0.68 0.15 1.1 0.12
yob -0.013 -0.0029 -0.021 -0.0039
0.028 0.0058 0.032 0.0052
single 0.069 0.014 -0.11 -0.026
0.43 0.096 0.43 0.088
children 1.12 0.26 0.69 0.14
0.72 0.16 0.77 0.15
Constant 25.5 6 44.3 8.64
55.8 11.5 62.9 10.3
Observations 167 167 167 167
R-squared 0.057 0.036
Robust standard errors, *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Table 7.2: STEREOTYPE: Self-assessment
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2.2 Robustness check and further results of chapter 5
2.2.1 Self-assessment and beliefs
Figure 7.2: Advisors' choices in treatments (HL-task)
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2.2.2 Belief formation
Model (1a) (2a) (3a)








Year of birth0 13.95 15.22 15.22
13.79 13.35 13.09
No uni degree -0.12 -0.272* -0.267*
0.187 0.164 0.161
Single -0.16 -0.179 -0.197
0.192 0.164 0.165
Low income 0.0865 0.047 0.0399
0.149 0.143 0.142
Male -0.246 -0.232 -0.203
0.164 0.142 0.142
No children -0.177 -0.155 -0.12
0.161 0.144 0.145
















Year of birth -0.00725 -0.00785 -0.00785
-0.00697 -0.00676 -0.00662
Uni degree 0.123 0.27 0.262
-0.196 -0.182 -0.178
Partner 0.24 0.253 0.275
-0.199 -0.18 -0.176
Female 0.706*** 0.643*** 0.644***
-0.131 -0.12 -0.12
High income -0.636*** -0.613*** -0.636***
-0.215 -0.212 -0.206
Parenthood 0.291 0.297 0.286
-0.204 -0.195 -0.197















Junior prof. 0.0235 0.198 0.384
0.203 0.181 0.920
Senior prof. -0.661** -0.467* -1.647*
0.324 0.267 0.947
Rank 0.02 0.0395 0.0326
0.0863 0.0838 0.083
Constant 6.916*** 4.082*** 4.404***
0.264 0.454 0.529
N 1,336 1,336 1,336
R2 0.23 0.353 0.36
Adjusted R2 0.216 0.341 0.347
Advisee FE yes yes yes
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, robust standard er-
rors clustered at advisors' level. Dependent variable:
advisor's belief in HL-task. 1{seen = 1} indicates a
characteristic is visible. {soc dem} indicates the re-
alization of the characteristic. The left-out category
is 1{seen = 0}.
Table 7.3: Regression results: Belief formation in HL-task
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Model (1) (2) (3)
H0 : {socdem = 0}+ {socdem 6= 0}=0
Year of Birth 0.256 0.256 0.247
Education 0.988 0.988 0.971
Family status 0.647 0.647 0.625
Income 0.014 0.014 0.009
Gender 0.003 0.003 0.002
Parenthood 0.460 0.460 0.378
Risk index 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table 7.4: Wald test on joint signiﬁcance (p-values) for models in table 7.3
2.3 Instructions of the web survey for chapter 4 and 5
Regarding this survey:1 Please try to answer all questions. If you do not know an
answer or if you prefer not to answer a question please skip it.
General Questions
• Please state: Year of birth, Federal state of birth, Gender, Mother tongue,
Nationality, Religion
• Please state: Do you speak other languages? If so, which?
• Family status: (Please choose: single, divorced, partnership, live separated,
married, widowed)
• Number of children: (Please choose: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or more, none)
Education
• Highest school degree: (Please choose: Abitur, Realschule, Hauptschule, Son-
derschule, no school graduation)
• Please state: How many years have been in school till your highest degree?
• Education: (Please choose: University, Advanced training, Training, in training,
no training)
• State the name/title of your last training:
• Job: (Please choose: Worker, Employee, Employee in public sector, Civil Ser-
vant, in education/training, self-employed, working at my own household, un-
employed, disabled, other)
• Working time: (Please choose: full-time, half-time, part-time but less than
half-time, not working)
1The experiment was executed in German language and by using an experimental software
based on a PHP framework. Here, we present a transcribed and translated version of the
German instructions.
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• Last executed job (Please state):
• Monthly net income: (Please choose: up to e1,000, e1,001-e3,000, e3,001-
e6,000, over e6,001)




You will have to make ten decisions in the table below. In every row of the table you
can choose either Option A or Option B. Option A and Option B are two lotteries.
Your job is to decide on one lottery (either Option A or Option B). Consider the ﬁrst
row for example: In Option A you receive a payment of e2 with a probability of 10%
and a payment of e1.60 with a probability of 90%. If you imagine a ten-sided-dice this
would mean that you receive e2 if you rolled a 10 and e1.60 for rolling any number
between 1 and 9. If you choose Option B you will receive e3.85 with a probability
of 10% and e0.10 with a probability of 90%. If you again imagine the ten-sided-dice,
this would indicate that you receive e3.85 if you roll a 10 and e0.10 if you roll a
number between 1 and 9.
Please decide whether you would choose Option A or Option B in each of the 10 rows:
Lottery 2
Please now consider that it is not possible for you to answer the lottery. You ask
a close conﬁdant to make the following decision for you. On your behalf, the close
conﬁdant is asked to name the preferred option in every row. Please remind yourself
of the person's image and name. You are not able to communicate with your close
conﬁdent, you are not able to inform him/her about your decision. What do you
think, how would this close conﬁdent take the decisions in the following lottery?
Again you ﬁnd the same table as before in which we ask you for 10 decisions. As
before, you can either choose Option A or Option B. You make your decision by
crossing the option in the column "Your choice".
Which relationship do you have with the person (e.g., partner, friend, relative etc.)?
Other Questions
People can behave diﬀerently in diﬀerent situations.
How would you describe yourself? Are you a risk-loving person or do you try to avoid
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risks? People behave diﬀerently in diﬀerent areas. How would you assess your own
risk tolerance in the following areas? Please choose a number on a scale between 0
and 10. A 0 denotes "no willingness to take risks" and 10 indicates "very high risk-
tolerance". You can gradate you assessment with the values in between. Your risk
tolerance?
• When driving? (Please choose: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
• In leisure and sports? (Please choose: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
• In your career? (Please choose: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
• Concerning your health? (Please choose: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
• In your trust in unfamiliar people? (Please choose: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
• In ﬁnancial investments? (Please choose: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
Another question regarding your risk preferences:
Please consider what you would do in the following situation:
Imagine that you had won e100,000 in the lottery. Almost immediately after you
collect the winnings, you receive the following ﬁnancial oﬀer, the conditions of which
are as follows: There is the chance to double the money. It is equally possible that
you could lose half of the amount invested. You have the opportunity to invest the full
amount, part of the amount or reject the oﬀer. What share of your lottery winnings
would you be prepared to invest in this ﬁnancially risky, yet lucrative investment?
What fraction of your winnings do you want to invest in the risky but also proﬁt-
promising lottery?
(Please choose: e100,000; e80,000; e60,000; e40,000; e20,000; nothing, I would de-
cline the oﬀer)
What is your opinion on the following three statements?
• On the whole one can trust people (Please choose: Totally agree, agree slightly,
slightly disagree, disagree totally)
• Nowadays one can't rely on anyone (Please choose: Totally agree, agree slightly,
slightly disagree, disagree totally)
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• If one is dealing with strangers, it is better to be careful before one can trust
them (Please choose: Totally agree, agree slightly, slightly disagree, disagree
totally)
Would you say that for most of the time, people (Please choose one of the
two possibilities)
• attempt to be helpful?
• or only act in their own interests?
Do you believe that most people (Please choose on of the two possibilities)
• would exploit you if they had the opportunity
• or would attempt to be fair towards you?
What would you say: How many close friends do you have?
How often does it occur that,
• you lend your friends your personal belongings (e.g., CDs, books, car, bicycle)?
(Please choose: Very Often, Often, Sometime, Seldom, Never)
• you lend your friends money? (Please choose: Very Often, Often, Sometime,
Seldom, Never)
• you leave the door to your apartment unlocked? (Please choose: Very Often,
Often, Sometime, Seldom, Never)
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2.4 Instructions of the lab experiment for chapter 4 and
5
Please note:
• Comments to the instructions are printed in italic and were not presented to
the subjects.
• A horizontal line indicates whenever a new window was presented to advisors.
• To ease orientation, treatments as mentioned in the paper are identiﬁed by
TREATMENT X.
Instructions of the Lab Experiment:
Goal and Process of the Experiment
The experiment consists of a total of two phases, in each of which you will have to
make decisions. In the ﬁrst phase we will ask you a number of questions and you will
make two decisions. In the second phase of the experiment you will make the same
set of decisions for other people and your payment will depend on the accuracy of
your decisions.
The e2.65 that you receive for you participation can be used during the experiment
- more on that later. You can make money with every decision you make. We will
inform you about your compensation in every round as well as your total compensation
for the entire experiment only after the completion of the experiment.
TREATMENT SELF
Basic Information
Please answer the following general questions. The success of the experiment depends
on you answering the questions carefully.
General Information
• Year of Birth:
• Height in cm:
• Gender: (please choose: male/ female)
• Marital Status: (please choose: Single, Divorced, In a relationship, Living sep-
arately, Married, Widowed)
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• How many children do you have?: (please choose: no children, one child, two
children, three children, four children, ﬁve or more children)
• Enter your highest level of education: (please choose: University, Technical
College, Apprenticeship, Currently a student, Completed Economics Major,
Currently an Economics Major, No vocational education)
• What is your current occupation?: (please choose: white-collar employee, white-
collar civil servant, blue-collar employee, blue-collar civil servant, civil servant
with tenure, student, self-employed, working at home, unable to work, unem-
ployed, other)
• What are your current working hours?: (please choose: full-time, half-time,
part-time (less than halftime), not employed)
• What is your monthly net income in Euro?: (please choose: Up to e1,000,
e1,001 - e3,000, e3,001 - e6,000, over e6,000)
How would you describe yourself?
Are you a risk-loving person or do you try to avoid risks?
People behave diﬀerently in diﬀerent areas. How would you assess your own risk
tolerance in the following areas?
Please choose a number on a scale between 0 and 10. A 0 denotes "risk averse" and
10 indicates "fully prepared to take risks". You can gradate you assessment with the
values in between.
Your risk tolerance?
• In general? (Please choose: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
• When driving? (Please choose: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
• In leisure and sports? (Please choose: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
• In your career? (Please choose: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
• Concerning your health? (Please choose: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
• In your trust in unfamiliar people? (Please choose: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
• In ﬁnancial investments? (Please choose: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
Game Decision I
We will now begin with the ﬁrst game decision. Please read the instructions carefully;
it is very important that you understand the question.
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Game Decision I
Please consider what you would do in the following situation:
Imagine that you had won e100,000 in the lottery. Almost immediately after you
collect the winnings, you receive the following ﬁnancial oﬀer, the conditions of which
are as follows: There is the chance to double the money. It is equally possible that
you could lose half of the amount invested. You have the opportunity to invest the full
amount, part of the amount or reject the oﬀer. What share of your lottery winnings
would you be prepared to invest in this ﬁnancially risky, yet lucrative investment?
Your Compensation
In terms of your actual compensation, the e100,000 are equivalent to e2.50 (e80,000
correspond to e2 , etc.). Your chosen amount will be entered into the lottery; the
computer draws lots to see if you double or half your invested amount.
Your Decision
What fraction of your winnings do you want to invest in the risky but also proﬁt-
promising lottery?
(Please choose: e100,000; e80,000; e60,000; e40,000; e20,000; nothing, I would de-
cline the oﬀer)
By clicking on NEXT your choices are saved. You cannot change your choices after-
wards. Your compensation will be revealed at the end of the experiment.
Game Decision II
The second game decision is up next. Please read the instructions carefully. Take your
time. It is very important that you thoroughly understand the question, since this
question will be repeated in diﬀerent variations throughout the rest of the experiment.
Game decision II
You will have to make ten decisions in the table below. In every row of the table you
can choose either Option A or Option B. Option A and Option B are two lotteries.
Your job is to decide on one lottery (either Option A or Option B). Consider the ﬁrst
row for example: In Option A you will receive a payment of e2 with a probability of
10% and a payment of e1.60 with a probability of 90%. If you imagine a ten-sided-dice
this would mean that you receive e2 if you roll a 10 and e1.60 for rolling any number
between 1 and 9. If you choose Option B you will receive e3.85 with a probability
of 10% and e0.10 with a probability of 90%. If you again imagine the ten-sided-dice,
this would indicate that you will receive e3.85 if you roll a 10 and e0.10 if you roll a
number between 1 and 9.
There are two rational strategies in this game:
• you choose Option A at the beginning before switching to Option B for the rest
of the rows,
• you choose Option B for all of the rows.
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We are interested in ﬁnding out in which row you ﬁrst choose Option B. Please specify
the row in which you will ﬁrst choose Option B below the table. If you only choose
Option B, please enter a 1.
Your Compensation
A random row will be chosen for your actual Euro-payment. Your chosen option will
be applied to this row. The realization of either the higher or the lower payment for a
certain option will be chosen randomly. If the seventh row is chosen for example and
you have decided on option A, you will receive e2 with a 70% probability and e1.60
with a 30% probability.
Your Decision
I choose option B the ﬁrst time in row: (Please choose: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
By clicking on NEXT your choices are saved. You cannot change your choices af-




How do other people decide?
In the rest of the experiment you will have to estimate how other people made the
game decisions that you just made.
Game Decision 1
Ca. 22,000 participants answered the Game Decision I in a preliminary survey.
Remember, the wording of Game Decision 1 was:
To shorten the experimental instructions, we will subsequently refer to this description
of Game Decision 1 as DESCRIPTION GAME DECISION 1.
Please consider what you would do in the following situation: Imagine that you had
won e100,000 in the lottery. Almost immediately after you collect the winnings, you
receive the following ﬁnancial oﬀer, the conditions of which are as follows: There is
the chance to double the money. It is equally possible that you could lose half of
the amount invested. You have the opportunity to invest the full amount, part of
the amount or reject the oﬀer. What share of your lottery winnings would you be






• Nothing, I would decline the oﬀer
Your Compensation
You will receive e0.25 for every correct assessment.
Do you think the average participant of the preliminary survey invested
more, less, or the same amount of money as you did in the ﬁrst game de-
cision?
Your Decision
I think that the average participant of the preliminary survey invested
(Please Choose: More, less, the same amount of)
money as I did in the ﬁrst game decision.
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How do you think certain groups within the preliminary survey decided?
Your Decision
Who invested more money in the lottery?
• Gender: (please choose: men, women, both groups invested the same amount)
• Age: (please choose: older (40 and up), younger (below 40), both groups in-
vested the same amount)
• Marital Status: (please choose: single, married or in a relationship, both groups
invested the same amount)
• Level of Education: (please choose: participants with a university degree, par-
ticipants without a university degree, both groups invested the same amount)
• Number of Children: (please choose: participants with children, participants
without children, both groups invested the same amount)
• Income Category: (please choose: participants with a net monthly income up
to e1,000, participants with a net monthly income above e1,000, both groups
invested the same amount)
By clicking on NEXT your choices are saved. You cannot change your choices after-
wards. Your compensation will be revealed at the end of the experiment.
How do other people decide?
Game Decision II
In another survey 190 people responded to Game Decision II. The characteristics of
the participants were also documented.
Remember, the wording of Game Decision 2 was:
To shorten the experimental instructions, we will subsequently refer to this description
of Game Decision 1 as DESCRIPTION GAME DECISION 2.
You will have to make ten decisions in the table below. In every row of the table you
can choose either Option A or Option B. Option A and Option B are two lotteries.
Your job is to decide on one lottery (either Option A or Option B). Consider the ﬁrst
row for example: In Option A you receive a payment of e2 with a probability of 10%
and a payment of e1.60 with a probability of 90%. If you imagine a ten-sided-dice this
would mean that you receive e2 if you rolled a 10 and e1.60 for rolling any number
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between 1 and 9. If you choose Option B you will receive e3.85 with a probability
of 10% and e0.10 with a probability of 90%. If you again imagine the ten-sided-dice,
this would indicate that you receive e3.85 if you roll a 10 and e0.10 if you roll a
number between 1 and 9. We are interested in ﬁnding out in which row you ﬁrst
choose Option B. Please specify the row in which you will ﬁrst choose Option B below
the table. If you only choose Option B, please enter a 1.
Your Compensation
You will receive e0.25 for every correct assessment.
Do you think the participants in the preliminary survey switched to Option
B earlier (so in a row with a smaller row number), later, or at the same
time as you did?
Your decision
I think that on average, the participants in the preliminary survey switched to option
B Please Choose (earlier, later, at the same place) as I did.
How do you think certain groups within the preliminary survey decided?
Your decision
Which group switched to option B earlier (so in a row with a smaller row number)?
• Gender: (please choose: men, women, both in the same row)
• Age: (please choose: older (40 and up), younger (below 40), both in the same
row)
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• Marital Status: (please choose: single, married or in a relationship, both in the
same row)
• Level of Education: (please choose: participants with a university degree, par-
ticipants without a university degree, both in the same row)
• Number of Children: (please choose: participants with children, participants
without children, both in the same row)
• Income Category: (please choose: participants with a net monthly income up




In this section you are supposed to estimate how other people decided in the Game
Decisions that you have just made. The better your estimation, the higher your com-
pensation will be. You will receive some information about the persons whose decision
behavior you are trying to predict.
It is important to understand what information is subsumed in certain characteris-
tics. Please carefully read the characteristics and the possible manifestations of these
characteristics.
The following characteristics are available:
1. Age




• Still in Apprenticeship
• Currently an Economics Major
• No vocational education
3. Income (current monthly net income)

















• Has no children
7. Risk disposition concerning ﬁnancial investments
• Answer to the question: Are you risk-loving when it comes to ﬁnancial
investments or do you try to avoid ﬁnancial risks? Please choose a number
on a scale between 0 and 10. A 0 denotes "risk averse" and a 10 indicates
"fully prepared to take risks".
You will only have to assess how a single person decided in the two Game Decisions,
so you will have to evaluate a speciﬁc person. You are paid according to the accuracy
of your assessment. If you correctly assess how the presented person acted in both
decisions, you will receive e0.50 for every correct prediction. In order to make your
assessment, you will make the decisions you previously made for yourself for the spe-
ciﬁc person instead.
The information available for assessing the person will consist of a selection of the
seven characteristics presented above. You will not receive all seven of the person's
characteristics. Instead, we will generate a random number between 1 and 7 that
corresponds with the number of revealed characteristics. If the randomly generated
number is a 3, for example, you will receive the ﬁrst three characteristics of the person
that you are assessing.
You can now decide which characteristic you want to assign to the ﬁrst position, the
second position, all the way to the seventh position. Make you decisions carefully;
characteristics with a higher position are revealed with a higher probability.
Your Decision
Sort the characteristics by clicking and dragging the characteristics to the positions
you want them in.
The characteristic at the top of the list has the highest prioritization; the second char-
acteristic has the second-highest characterization etc.
Note: The characteristics are presented in alphabetic order
• Level of Education
• Income category
• Marital Status
• Year of Birth
• Gender
• Has Children
• Risk disposition concerning ﬁnancial investments
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This window appeared 4 times with diﬀering number of characteristics shown
How do you assess other people?
The person has the following characteristics: Since x was drawn as the random number





What decision do you think the person above made in the game's ﬁrst round?
Remember, the wording of Game Decision I was:
DESCRIPTION GAME DECISION 1
Your Compensation
If you make exactly the same decision as the described person, you will receive e0.50.
If your decision does not correspond with the described person's decision, you will not
receive any money.
Your Decision
What fraction of your winnings do you want to invest in the risky but also proﬁt-
promising lottery?
(Please choose: e100,000; e80,000; e60,000; e40,000; e20,000; nothing, I would de-
cline the oﬀer)
Game Decision II
What decision do you think the person described above made in the game's second
round? Remember, the wording of Game Decision 2 was:
DESCRIPTION GAME DECISION 2
Your Compensation
If you make exactly the same decision as the described person, you will receive e0.50.
If your decision does not correspond with the described person's decision, you will not
receive any money.
Your Decision
Please try to make the same decision as the person described above made. We are
interested in ﬁnding out in which row you ﬁrst choose Option B. Please specify the
row in which you will ﬁrst choose Option B.
The person chooses Option B for the ﬁrst time in row: (Please choose: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
By clicking on NEXT your choices are saved. You cannot change your choices after-
wards. Your compensation will be revealed at the end of the experiment.
181
TREATMENT PAY
This and the following window appeared 4 times.
How do you assess other people?
In this round you will have to assess four other people again. As in the previous
round, you will be given a selection of the seven characteristics shown above to help
facilitate your decision-making process. This time, however, you can choose which of
the characteristics of the person you are assessing you want to have revealed. You
have to pay for every revealed characteristic.
As you can garner from the table below, the costs of the characteristics vary. The
ﬁrst characteristic costs e0.01, the second e0.02 etc. The seventh characteristic costs
e0.50. The right-hand column of the table displays the total costs. If you want to
see all seven characteristics of the person you are assessing, for example, you will be
charged e0.99.
Cost of Characteristic Total cost
1. Characteristic e0.01 e0.01
2. Characteristic e0.02 e0.03
3. Characteristic e0.03 e0.06
4. Characteristic e0.06 e0.12
5. Characteristic e0.12 e0.24
6. Characteristic e0.25 e0.49
7. Characteristic e0.50 e0.99
Your compensation is as follows:
Compensation for Game Decision I + Compensation for Game Decision II
- Payment for Characteristics
As in the previous round you will receive e0.50 for Game Decision 1 and e0.50 for
Game Decision 2 if your assessment proves to be correct.
The costs of buying certain characteristics will be subtracted from your compensation.
If, for example, your assessment for Game Decision I is correct and your evaluation
for Game Decision II is not and you have bought three characteristics, you will receive
(e0.50 + e0 -e0.06 =e0.44).
Please note: Since you have winnings from previous rounds and the e2.65 that we
put at your disposal at the beginning of the game, your total compensation cannot
be negative.
Please decide on the characteristics that you want to buy now:
• Age






• Risk disposition concerning ﬁnancial investments
By clicking on NEXT your choices are saved. You cannot change your choices after-
wards. Your compensation will be revealed at the end of the experiment.
How do you assess other people?
The person has the following characteristics:





What decision do you think the person above made in the game's ﬁrst round?
Remember, the wording of Game Decision I was:
DESCRIPTION GAME DECISION 1
Your compensation
If you make exactly the same decision as the described person, you will receive e0.50.
If your decision does not correspond with the described person's decision, you will not
receive any money.
Your Decision
What fraction of your winnings do you want to invest in the risky but also proﬁt-
promising lottery?
(Please choose: e100,000; e80,000; e60,000; e40,000; e20,000; nothing, I would de-
cline the oﬀer)
Game Decision II
What decision do you think the person described above made in the game's second
round?
Remember, the wording of Game Decision 2 was:
DESCRIPTION GAME DECISION 2
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Your Compensation
If you make exactly the same decision as the described person, you will receive e0.50.
If your decision does not correspond with the described person's decision, you will not
receive any money.
Your Decision
Please try to make the same decision as the person described above made. We are
interested in ﬁnding out in which row you ﬁrst choose Option B. Please specify the
row in which you will ﬁrst choose Option B.
The person chooses Option B for the ﬁrst time in row:
(Please choose: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
By clicking on NEXT your choices are saved. You cannot change your choices after-
wards. Your compensation will be revealed at the end of the experiment.
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3 Appendix for chapter 6
3.1 Instructions
Please note: A horizontal line indicates whenever a new window was presented to the
subjects
Welcome to the experiment!
Dear participants,
Welcome to our experiment. You support our academic work through your participa-
tion in our experiment. At the same time, you have the opportunity to earn money by
participating. The game administrators are Andrea Leuermann and Benjamin Roth
(Department of Economics at Heidelberg University).
Please remain quiet and do not communicate with the other participants. Please turn
oﬀ your cell phones. Raise your hand if you have any questions.
Goal and Design of the Experiment
The experiment consists of a total of three phases. Your task in each phase will be to
assess the risk preferences of other people. You can earn money with every decision
you make during the experiment. Your compensation depends on how successful your
choices are. Therefore, you should consider every choice carefully.
Both your payment for every round and your total compensation will be revealed only
after all rounds have been completed. You can earn up to 20 Euros.
Please note: All the information you supply us with within the experiment will be
treated in a conﬁdential and anonymous manner and will only be used for research
purposes.
Nondisclosure Agreement
You will receive personal information about the other participants during the experi-
ment.
You hereby commit to treat all information you receive conﬁdentially. In particular,
the information can under no circumstances be given to a third party in any form
whatsoever and is only to be used within the experiment. A declaration containing
the statement above can be found on the desk in front of you. Please sign the decla-
ration.
By clicking on the OK-button, you conﬁrm that you have signed the nondisclosure
agreement.
Basic Information
We need some basic information about you before we can proceed with the exper-
iment. The successful completion of the experiment depends on you answering the
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following questions carefully.
What is your gender? m/f
What is your year of birth?
Marital Status: Single or single parent/ divorced /In a relationship/ Living sepa-
rately/ Married/ Widowed
Do you have children? No children/ have children
If you have children, how many do you have?
What is your highest level of schooling? Abitur/ no Abitur
What is your highest level of education? University/ Technical College/ Apprentice-
ship/ Currently a student/ Currently a student with an Economics Major/ Currently
in an apprenticeship/ No vocational training or education
What is your monthly net income? Up to 1000 Euro/ 1001 Euro- 3000 Euro/3001
Euro- 6000 Euro/ over 6000 Euro
Click OK to conﬁrm that you have answered all the questions.
We need some further information:
Do you have a side job? Yes/No
How many hours a week do you spend at your side job (if you have one)? Up to 10/
11 to 20/ 21 to 30/ more than 31
What is your monthly net income from your side job (if you have one)? Up to 200/
201 to 400/ 401 to 800/ more than 801
What is the main reason why you have a side job (if you have one)? to earn a living/to
gain professional experience/the side job is a fun pastime/ other reasons
How would you describe yourself? Are you a risk-loving person or do you try to avoid
risks? Please tick a box on the 10-notch scale. A value of 0 corresponds to "not at
all willing to take risks" and value of 10 corresponds to "very willing to take risks."




When participating in leisure activities of sports?
When it comes to your career?




We are now coming to the ﬁrst game decision. It is very important that you understand
exactly what you are doing, so please read the instructions carefully.
Game Decision I
Imagine that you have just won 100,00 Euros in a lottery. Immediately after receiving
the 100,000 Euro you obtain the following proposal for a new lottery: On the one
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hand you have the chance of doubling your money. On the other hand, you could lose
half of the money you have invested with the same probability. What fraction of your
winnings do you want to invest in the risky but also proﬁt-promising lottery? The
total amount of e100,000; the amount of e80,000; the amount of e60000; the amount
of e40000; the amount of e20000; nothing, I would not take part in the lottery Please
answer the following question before you decide what to do: Consider two individuals.
Individual A invests e80,000 and individual B invests e40,000.
Which individual made the less risky decision?
Individual A/ Individual B
Game Decision I
Let's return to your choice in Game Decision I. Please answer the following question:
Consider what you would do in the following situation: Imagine that you have just
won 100,000 Euros in a lottery. Immediately after receiving the 100,000 Euros you
obtain the following proposal for a new lottery: On the one hand you have the chance
of doubling your money. On the other hand, you could lose half of the money you
have invested with the same probability.
Your Compensation
In terms of your actual compensation, the 100,000 Euro are equivalent to 2.50 Euro
(80,000 Euro correspond to 2 Euro, etc.).
Your chosen amount will be entered into the lottery; the computer draws lots to see
if you double or half your invested amount.
What fraction of your winnings do you want to invest in the risky but also proﬁt-
promising lottery? The total amount of e100,000; the amount of e80,000; the amount
of e60,000; the amount of e40,000; the amount of e20,000; nothing, I would not take
part in the lottery
Game Decision II
We are now coming to the second game decision. Please read the instructions very
carefully. Take your time. It is very important that you understand the question,
since it will be repeated in diﬀerent variations throughout the rest of the experiment.
Game decision II
You will have to make ten decisions in the Table below. In every row of the Table you
can choose either Option A or Option B. Option A and Option B are two lotteries.
Your job is to decide on one lottery (either Option A or Option B).
Consider the ﬁrst row for example: In Option A you receive a payment of 2 Euro with
a probability of 10.
There are two rational strategies in this game:
• you choose Option A at the beginning before switching to Option B for the rest
of the rows.
• you choose Option B for all of the rows.
187
We are interested in ﬁnding out in which row you ﬁrst choose Option B. Please specify
the row in which you will ﬁrst choose Option B below the Table. If you only choose
Option B, please enter a 1. If you choose only Option A, please enter 11. Please
answer the following question before you decide what to do: Consider two individuals.
Individual A ﬁrst chooses Option B in row 4. Individual B ﬁrst chooses Option B in
row 8.
Which individual made the less risky decision?
Individual A/ Individual B
Game decision II
You can now make your decision of the second game decision. The lottery was ex-
plained on the prior slide. Please note how your compensation is calculated. We
are interested in ﬁnding out in which row you ﬁrst choose Option B. Please specify
the row in which you will ﬁrst choose Option B below the Table. If you only choose
Option B, please enter a 1. If you choose only Option A, please enter 11.
Your Compensation
A random row will be chosen for your actual Euro-payment. Your chosen option will
be applied to this row. The realization of either the higher or the lower payment for a
certain option will be chosen randomly. If the seventh row is chosen for example and
you have decided on option A, you will receive 2 Euro with a 70% probability and
1.60 Euro with a 30% probability. Please make your decision now! What row would
you choose in the lottery? You choose Option B for the ﬁrst time in row:
Enter a number between 1 and 11.
We need some additional information.
Please indicate the likelihood of engaging in each activity for each of the following
statements. Provide a rating from 1 to 7 (1= extremely unlikely, 2=unlikely, 3=some-
what unlikely, 4= not sure, 5= somewhat likely, 6= likely, 7= extremely likely).
Here the 30 item questionnaire of Weber et al. (2002) are asked.
In this section you have to assess how other people decided in the game decisions
that you have already faced. You will evaluate the proﬁles of multiple individuals.
A better evaluation will lead to a higher payoﬀ. A number of characteristics of the
individuals that you are assessing may help facilitate your decision.
It is therefore important to know what information can be contained within a certain
characteristic category. Please read the categories and the possible characteristics
carefully. The following characteristics are available (in alphabetical order):
1. Level of Education: University, Technical College, Apprenticeship, Currently
a student, Currently a student with an Economics Major, Currently in an ap-
prenticeship, No vocational training or education
2. Age of the person you are assessing: 0-25 years, 26-40 years, 40-65 years, over
65 years of age
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3. Income (monthly net income): Up to 1000 Euro, 1001 Euro- 3000 Euro, 3001
Euro- 6000 Euro, over 6000 Euro
4. Marital Status: Single/single parent, divorced, In a relationship, Living sepa-
rately, Married, Widowed
5. Gender: male, female
6. Children: children, no children
7. Height: in cm
The following 3 screens are repeated 19 times with diﬀerent proﬁles.
Proﬁle 1: Characteristics of the assessed individual
• Level or Education: University
• Age category: under 25
• Income: under 1000
• Marital Status: single/ single parent
• Gender: male
• Children: has no children
• Height: 180 cm
As a reminder, the wording of game decision I was:
Imagine that you have just won 100,000 Euro in a lottery. Immediately after receiving
the 100,000 Euro you obtain the following proposal for a new lottery: On the one hand
you have the chance of doubling your money. On the other hand, you could lose half
of the money you have invested with the same probability. If you assess the described
individual's choice correctly, you will receive 0.50 Euro. Proﬁle 1: Characteristics of
the assessed individual
• Level or Education: University
• Age category: under 25
• Income: under 1000
• Marital Status: single/ single parent
• Gender: male
• Children: has no children
• Height: 180 cm
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How do you think the individual, whose characteristics are displayed in the box above,
decided? What fraction of his or her winnings did the described individual invest in
the risky but also proﬁt-promising lottery? The total amount of 100,000 Euro; the
amount of 80,000 Euro; the amount of 60,000 Euro; the amount of 40,000 Euro; the
amount of 20,000 Euro; nothing, I would not take part in the lottery
As a reminder, the wording of game decision II was:
In every row of the Table below you can choose either Option A or Option B. We
are interested in ﬁnding out in which row you ﬁrst choose Option B. Please specify
the row in which you will ﬁrst choose Option B below the Table. If you only choose
Option B, please enter a 1. If you choose only Option A, please enter 11. Please
consider how the individual whose characteristics are displayed in the box to the right
decided. If you assess the described individual's choice correctly, you will receive
0.50 Euro. Characteristics of evaluated individual: Proﬁle 1: Characteristics of the
assessed individual
• Level or Education: University
• Age category: under 25
• Income: under 1000
• Marital Status: single/ single parent
• Gender: male
• Children: has no children
• Height: 180 cm
Please make your decision now! How do you think the individual, whose characteristics
are displayed in the box above, decided?
The individual described above ﬁrst chooses Option B in row: Enter a number between
1 and 11.
Please await further instructions from the game administrators
Phase 2: Conversation
In the following section of the experiment you will work together with other partic-
ipants. The participant that you will work with has been determined randomly. In
order to identify participants, you will receive a player number for the remainder of
the experiment. Your player number is XXX.
The sequence of events for the following section is as follows: You will successively
meet with four other experiment participants. You will receive the player number
of the partner you are to meet with before the meeting. A game administrator will
direct you to your partner.
You will then ask your partner questions and your partner will ask you questions.
You will receive a questionnaire before the meeting. Please return to your seat as
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soon as you have answered all the questions from the questionnaire. Wait until the
game administrators distribute the next questionnaire and take you to meet your next
partner. Your task is to ﬁnd out information about your partner during the inter-
view. You will have to assess the risk preferences of your playing partners later in the
experiment.
Phase 2: Conversation
There will be two diﬀerent types of questionnaires. For the ﬁrst two interview partners
you will use questionnaire A. For the ﬁnal two interview partners you will employ
questionnaire B. Questionnaire A: Begin by writing down your own player number
and your partner's player number on the questionnaire. Then ask the questions from
the questionnaire and make sure to write down the answers on the questionnaire. The
participant with the lower player number begins asking the questions. Do not deviate
from the questions. Only ask questions from the questionnaire. Questionnaire B: You
will have the opportunity to think of further questions before the start of the interview.
Write these additional questions on the back of the questionnaire. Begin by writing
down your own player number and your partner's player number on the questionnaire.
Ask both the questions from the questionnaire and the questions that you have thought
of yourself. Write down the answers to all the questions on the questionnaire. The
participant with the lower player number begins asking the questions. You can answer
all questions that you deem to be important as long as you do not directly ask your
partner how he or she answered game decisions I and II. Asking for the answers to
game decisions I and II will lead to your exclusion from the experiment.
Please note that the conversations are recorded.
Please click OK to see the player number of your ﬁrst partner.
Your player number is X1, your ﬁrst partner's player number is X2.
Please wait until you receive a questionnaire and a game administrator directs you to
your partner.
Please wait for further instructions.
(These instructions are repeated for all four partners (X2, X3, X4, X5)
Your player number is X1, your third partner's player number is X4.
Please wait until you receive a questionnaire and a game administrator directs you to
your partner.
Please consider if and which questions you want to ask your partner. You have 5
minutes to write down your questions on the questionnaire.
The following 3 screens are repeated 4 times.
Please read the questionnaire from the conversation with player B. Recall player X2.
Conﬁrm by clicking OK.
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As a reminder, the wording of game decision I was:
Imagine that you have just won 100,000 Euro in a lottery. Immediately after receiving
the 100,000 Euro you obtain the following proposal for a new lottery: On the one hand
you have the chance of doubling your money. On the other hand, you could lose half
of the money you have invested with the same probability. If you assess the choice of
the individual you have met correctly, you will receive 0.50 Euro.
Evaluated individual: Assess your ﬁrst partner with the player number X2. How do
you think the individual who you met earlier decided? What fraction of his or her
winnings did the described individual invest in the risky but also proﬁt-promising
lottery? The total amount of 100,000Euro; the amount of 80000 Euro; the amount of
60000 Euro; the amount of 40000 Euro; the amount of 20000 Euro; nothing, I would
not take part in the lottery
As a reminder, the wording of game decision II was:
In every row of the Table below you can choose either Option A or Option B. We
are interested in ﬁnding out in which row you ﬁrst choose Option B. Please specify
the row in which you will ﬁrst choose Option B below the Table. If you only choose
Option B, please enter a 1. If you choose only Option A, please enter 11.
Please consider how the individual whose characteristics are displayed in the box to
the right decided. If you assess the described individual's choice correctly, you will
receive 0.50 Euro.
Evaluated individual: Assess your ﬁrst partner with the player number X2. Please
make your decision now! How do you think the individual, whose characteristics are
displayed in the box above, decided? The individual described above ﬁrst chooses
Option B in row: Enter a number between 1 and 11.
You will now receive the transcript of a conversation from a previous experiment.
Please read the conversation. Conﬁrm that you have ﬁnished reading the conversation
transcript by pressing OK.
The following two screens are repeated four times
Please begin by evaluating the individual XX from the recorded conversation.
As a reminder, the wording of game decision I was: Imagine that you have just won
100,000 Euro in a lottery. Immediately after receiving the 100,000 Euro you obtain
the following proposal for a new lottery: On the one hand you have the chance of
doubling your money. On the other hand, you could lose half of the money you have
invested with the same probability. If you assess the choice of the individual XX
correctly, you will receive 0.50 Euro.
Evaluated individual: Assess individual XX from the recorded conversation. How do
you think the individual XX from the recorded conversation decided? What fraction
of his or her winnings did the described individual invest in the risky but also proﬁt-
promising lottery?
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The total amount of e100,000; the amount of e80,000; the amount of e60,000; the
amount of e40,000; the amount of e20,000; nothing, I would not take part in the
lottery
As a reminder, the wording of game decision II was:
In every row of the Table below you can choose either Option A or Option B. We
are interested in ﬁnding out in which row you ﬁrst choose Option B. Please specify
the row in which you will ﬁrst choose Option B below the Table. If you only choose
Option B, please enter a 1. If you choose only Option A, please enter 11. Please
consider how the individual whose characteristics are displayed in the box to the right
decided.
If you assess the described individual's choice correctly, you will receive 0.50 Euro.
Evaluated individual: Assess individual XX Please make your decision now! How do
you think the individual XX decided? Individual XX ﬁrst chooses Option B in row:
Enter a number between 1 and 11.
Your Compensation
Your total compensation: x Euro
Your player number: XXX
Payment Procedure
We will prepare the payment for player number 1. Please answer the questionnaire
that will appear presently while you wait. Please bring the nondisclosure agreement
with you when you are called.
Thank you for your participation
Andrea Leuermann and Benjamin Roth
Please wait. You will be redirected to the ﬁnal questionnaire in a moment.
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